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This thesis explores the ways in which gender and contemporary anthropology interact, 
with the special emphasis on the areas frequently referred to as “poststmcturalist” or 
“postmodern.” More specifically, I look at one aspect which postmodern approaches and feminist 
theories have in common: questioning of the dominant narratives. This questioning then leads 
through a series of constmcted realities (or hyperrealities) to the realization of the importance of the 
concept of difference(s) in all its aspects.
The ethnographic examples aie from the Republics of Slovenia (primarily concerning 
feminist groups and scholars) and Macedonia (the region of Prespa, in the southwestern part of the 
country). In both countries the fall of communism has created a sort of a power hiatus, filled with 
questions about identity, the future and ways to organize the newly emerging societies (since both 
countries became independent in 1991). In that regard, both countries are hyperreal. After the 
Introduction, I outline the debates surrounding “postmodern” approaches in anthropology, 
different theoretical assumptions, as well as the area(s) where these approaches can inform 
anthropological research. I start with the overview of the working definitions of “postmodernism” 
and the attitudes towards it that characterize current anthiopological theory, continuing with what I 
regard to be the most illustrative examples of it being misunderstood and misrepresented, and 
concluding with the meeting point of postmodern anthropology and the study of gender. In the 
following chapters I present the results of my field research in Macedonia and in Slovenia, 
concluding with the theoretical implications of contemporary anthiopological approaches to the 
study of gender, as well as the reasons for presenting it as basically a social construct. In 
Conclusion, I point out at the fact that gender studies seem to be the only area where 
postmodernism and anthropology interact in the most positive way, primarily tlnough the full 
exploration of the concept of difference(s).
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When someone is honestly 55% right, that is very 
good and there is no use wrangling. And if 
someone is 60% right, it is wonderful, it is great 
luck, and let him thank God. But what is to be said 
about 75% right? Wise people say this is 
suspicious. Well, and what about 100% right? 
Whoever says he is 100% right is a fanatic, a thug, 
and a most dangerous man.
(an old Jew from Galicia, from Milosz 1953, slightly modified)
Introduction: 
For an anthropology of difference
I’m all these words, all these strangers, this dust of words, with 
no ground for their settling, no sky for their dispersing, coming 
together to say, fleeing one another to say, that I am they, all of 
them, all of those that merge, those that past, those that never 
meet, and nothing else, yes, something else, that I’m something 
quite different, a quite different thing.
(Beckett 1958: 386)
EXERGUE: ON VOICES
The voices in the following text are meant to represent some of the opinions 
related to the study of gender in contemporary anthropology. Of course, their very 
selection is to a large extent a matter of personal choice,^ just as it is the case with the 
topics covered. Although I have tried to let the authors speak with their own voice (in 
their own words) as much as possible, again, this is basically my interpretation (one of 
the many possible ones) of their voices. My personal construction of their meanings.^
My own position in the whole postmodernist/anthropological debate is 
somewhat determined by my background: growing up with a healthy dose of 
scepticism^ so typical of South European/Mediterranean cultures, as well with the 
almost complete disregard for any kind of authority I grew up bilingual and
 ^ This personal choice is, however, determined by the fact that gender and postmodernism are 
important issues in antliropology, and that postmodern approaches can help one situate gender 
within contemporaiy anthropology —  the fact that I intend to prove in the course of this thesis.
2 The fact that this is a personal construction does not automatically invalidate other personal 
constructions on the same subject. The main point that makes this construction special for me is 
the sense of authorship, the fact that it has been constructed by me.
3 Living in a few Western cultures (USA, UK) in recent years, I have realized that the great 
majority of people do not regard scepticism as something very positive. Sceptical attitudes tend 
to be equated with the muddling up of otherwise cleai- situations —  not dissimilar to my 
experience of the communist authorities in former Yugoslavia and their reactions to critical 
intellectual discussions. (The big difference being that this negative attitude in former 
communist countries was imposed from above —  by tlie holders of power —  while in the 
Western societies that I am aware of it seems to come from below  —  from “the people” 
themselves, without actually being imposed on them.) This is not the understanding of 
scepticism that I have (and share with many people from where I come) —  that is where the 
quotation from the beginning of M ilosz’s Captive Mind comes in. I would be quite happy to be 
55% right in my thesis. 60% would almost constitute a perfection.
Although I do not intend to discuss the notion of authority here, I have to note that the popular 
(Western) understanding of the respect for authority in Souüi European/Mediterranean cultures 
unjustifiably equates respect within the family (which is also to a great extent earned) with
bicultural, so the notion of plurality (of more than one culture, language, possible 
interpretation, voice, etc.) in all its aspects was part of my everyday experience 
throughout my life. The part of the world where I come from (Republic of Macedonia, 
former SFR Yugoslavia, Balkans) is highly unstable (politically, historically, etc.) — 
in this century alone these territories have been occupied three times, and Belgrade (the 
city where I have spent most of my adult life) has been razed to the ground 32 times in 
the more than 2000 years of its history (twice in this century alone).
Therefore, I simply do not have a notion of stability and order, so common in 
most of the Western European cultures, with their institutions and traditions of political 
life going back for decades and perhaps centuries. The notion of flux, instability, 
constant change (involving total destmction) and uncertainty is something that comes 
“naturally” to me — but I am well aware how frightening these notions might be for 
someone raised to think in specifically well-determined and well-defined categories. (I 
am not implying here that all change is the same — but I do feel at ease with the notion 
of constant change.) What is today the Republic of Macedonia, was occupied 
throughout most of its history, its language was suppressed or banned for several 
decades in this century (1912-1944), and it still practically banned among the Slav 
Macedonian population in Northern Greece. People need to constantly readjust in 
order to survive.
In that sense, someone could probably define me as a person reasonably close 
to postmodernism^ — a kind of postmodernism that questions its own premises as 
well as any other grand narrative (in Lyotard’s sense of the word).^ Certainly, 
postmodernism was (and still is) the medium of expressing hope in the former 
Yugoslavia (cf. Longinovic 1994). From the early 1980s, to use Longinovic’s 
example, a group of young people around the journal Vidici in Belgrade started 
questioning the technologies of power. Although no specific mention was made of the 
communist mlers of Yugoslavia at the time, the threat to their established authority was 
recognized and this group was quickly shut out of the journaL^ Throughout the 1980s 
and in the 1990s, many brave people were trying to expose the fallacies and dangers of 
the rising tide of nationalist hysteria. Many of them were simply labelled 
“postmodernist” and shut out of political and public life (intellectuals never had any 
serious impact in Balkan societies anyway), but when the savage war in what used to 
be Yugoslavia erupted, the same people (including others, with different theoretical 
perspectives) organized themselves as the only significant intellectual opposition to the 
ideology of local warlords (who happen to be well established politicians), and
respect for institutions (Church, local government, state, etc.). These are not the same.
Someone can respect authority within the family unit without necessarily respecting religious or 
political authorities. Although in theory these concepts of authority may appear to be the same, 
in “real life” they are completely set apait.
 ^ Watching from the sidelines, or just reading this —  we can never see ourselves as clearly as 
other people can. I do not see m yself as “post,” “pre,” or in any sense “modern” — just as 
someone trying to make some sense out of the world in which he happens to be living.
 ^ For the definition of grand narrative, I refer to J. M. Bernstein; “Grand narratives, or meta­
narratives as they are sometimes called, are second order narratives which seek to narratively 
ai'ticulate and legitimate some concrete first-order practices or narratives” (in Wood 1991: 102).
 ^ “Also, many of the strategies developed by the Vidici group are presently an inspiration for a 
new generation of dissidents under the current Serbian regime, which most prominently includes 
persons associated with Radio B-92, the weekly magazine Vreme, the Center for Anti-War 
Actions, and the Belgrade Circle” (Longinovic 1994: 121).
organizations such as the Belgrade Circle arose as a result of such an effort.^ These 
people put their careers and their lives at risk by standing up and reacting to madness 
and violence. Reading Baudrillard and opposing the nationalist/bloodthirsty madness 
goes together quite well in the former Yugoslavia. From this perspective, I do find 
some criticisms of postmodernism as “reactionary” (or politically quietist) almost 
incomprehensible.^ For how can something that questions all authority and all the 
basis for authority (including, in a nice hyperreal twist, its own authority to table these 
questions!), something that questions all the metanarratives (including itself as one of 
them!) be labelled as “reactionary”?
The voices presented are to an extent all mine, I try to express myself with the 
voices of others as well as with my own voice. In the end, they blend together in the 
curious mixture of “what the author meant to say.” This is exactly what I mean, 
neither more nor less — as Humpty Dumpty would put it. It is easy to constmct 
meanings where they do not exist, and it is just as easy to misinterpret and place voices 
out of context. I try to avoid this by making clear when I agree and when I disagree 
with a voice, when I take it to be representative of other, different voices on the same 
subject, and when I do not. Therefore, it is my intention to present a text that is a 
combination and a cross-section (and an intersection as well) of my own voice with 
others’ voices. The sum of all this is the inclusion of my own narrative, my own 
presentation of the discourses that relate to the construction of gender in contemporary 
anthropology. The number of verbatim quotations may at times (in some chapters 
more than in others) appeal' excessive, but I believe that it is much more honest to 
quote what people (anthropologists, feminists, philosophers, postmodernists, authors.
 ^ Their voices are exemplified in a series o f publications by the Belgrade Circle (for example in 
Colovic and Mimica 1992), as well as in magazines like Feral Tribune and Arkzin in Croatia and 
Mladina in Slovenia.
 ^ As exemplified by Christopher Norris 1993.
etc.) actually say (in their own words), than just to paraphrase the same passages.
This (quoting instead of paraphrasing) is primarily a matter of personal choice.
It is my intent to “borrow” the voices of others in order to express myself more 
fully — as well as to “lend” them my own voice occasionally. In a way, I hope to 
create a sense of dialogue between these multiple voices and multiple perspectives. 
First of all, of course, people should try to spealc the same (or at least a mutually 
comprehensible) language. I do not see that this would be more difficult in a world 
with plural narratives. Once we agree that we are all different, we can establish that 
difference as a basis for dialogue,
I feel a great deal of ambiguity about voices that describe themselves as 
“humanistic.” I share this feeling of uneasiness with the authors like Foucault — 
although for perhaps slightly different r e a s o n s . Some of my fonner mentors (and 
friends) in former Yugoslavia, members of the Praxis philosophical group, world-
111 Some of the quotes (like the one from M ilosz’s book) have been slightly modified to take 
into account other translations available to me (in Croatian or Serbian, etc.), and to present as 
much as possible the meaning of the expressions that might be lost in a literal translation. Of 
course, there is a possibility that (as in the case o f M ilosz’s book) I simply read other 
translations first, became familiar with them, and later tried to combine them in order to 
“preserve” the feeling and the understanding of the specific texts that I had before. It does not 
mean that tlie other tianslations are in any way “better” —  they just might be more 
comprehensible to me personally.
11 When relating the question o f difference to the issues related to gender, I basically follow the 
approach taken by Irigaray. [This is elaborated in the chapter “Writing gender.”] In general, I 
found the attitudes of European (especially French) feminists very close to my own thinking and 
very much applicable to the issues that aie being addressed here.
1^  I think that one can follow Foucault in saying that one cannot be “for” or “against” 
humanism —  it all has to do with specific attitudes and specific situations. Foucault points out 
(1984: 44) that the concepts and the ideas of “humanism” varied a great deal over time and they 
were frequently in sharp opposition with each other: starting from the critique of Christianity and 
religion in general, through the Christian critique of ascetic and mystic movements, 19-th century 
humanism hostile to science, 19-th century humanism which placed all its hopes in science, 
Marxism, existentialism. National Socialism, Stalinism.
3^ So, obviously, there is also a sense of personal betrayal.
known and highly respected humanists (with all the classical and the Enlightenment 
connotations of that word), took the wrong turn in the horrors in former Yugoslavia. 
Professor Mihailo Markovic has become the chief ideologist of the Serbian 
ultranationalists (or National Socialists, as I prefer to call them^^), and Professor 
Svetozar Stojanovic was for some time (1992/93) chief adviser of the then president of 
Serbia and Montenegro, Dobrica Cosic — a man whose writings and public discourses 
in the past few decades helped fuel the rising tide of Serbian nationalism. Throughout 
the world (and through well-established and internationally recognized philosophical 
journals such as Praxis International), these people came to be equated with the notion 
of humanism, with the ideals of human dignity and freedom in a rapidly changing 
world. But their notion of humanism turned out to be a mere illusion, it simply served 
to justify the acceptance of violence as a means of solving problems.
I cannot prove that this shift was a necessary or logical consequence of their 
“humanism,” but the fact remains that people that regarded themselves (and were 
regarded as such by a wide international audience!) as “humanists” took a radically 
different stance to the ones that regarded themselves as “postmodernists.” These and 
some other first-hand experiences make it very difficult for me to connect to the word 
“humanist,” although I realize that it may be quite unfair to people who genuinely 
believe in the sanctity of human life and the basic freedoms that each and every one of 
us should have (and that this does not invalidate the philosophical connotations of the 
idea of “humanism”). To them, my apologies. From them, I hope for some 
understanding. For this is essentially just another voice. And voices depend to a large 
extent on someone’s presence and ability to heai' (and perhaps understand) them.’^
For example, in Boskovic 1993.
I  realize that my own position might as well be described by “humanistic.” Therefore, I hope 
that hearing my voice can make it easier to understand what my relationship with tliis concept is 
and where it comes from.
WORDS: MAPPING THE MEANINGS
The main purpose of this thesis is to outline the ways in which postmodernism 
can help us navigate the world we (me and you — readers, critics, disinterested 
observers, etc.) live in. By “we” I mean myself (as an author and temporary user of 
voices presented here) as well as my audience (readers and critical evaluators of this 
text), and anyone else interested in the issues discussed, mentioned or outlined here.
In the simplest terms, “we” should be taken literally: it means “you and me.”
While I do not pretend that I know for certain how to do this navigating, I think 
that postmodern approaches offer some interesting insights. Furthermore, and this 
idea is developed in the chapter “Postmodernism, anthropology and common sense,” it 
seems to me that gender studies and more specifically anthropological studies of 
gender are an area where postmodernism and anthropology interact in a most 
interesting and potentially most productive way.
I begin with the longest chapter of the thesis, “Postmodernism, anthropology 
and common sense,” in which I outline current debates about postmodern approaches 
and what I see to be the source of its misunderstanding. This chapter ends with the 
“meeting point” of postmodernism and gender — since both are fundamentally 
concerned with the notion of difference, I try to show how they can be used together. 
This notion of difference is further illustrated in the chapter “The other side of the 
window: Gender, equality and difference in Prespa, Republic of Macedonia.” There I 
show how are discourses on gender in Macedonia constructed in such a way as to 
“justify” a certain “type” of “reality” — while at the same time both men and women 
are well aware that this “reality” is a mere illusion. The problems of construction and 
consumption of “reality” are further explored in chapter “What’s in a name?; 
Contemporary feminist discourses in the Republic of Slovenia,” especially in the 
example of an advertising poster campaign as well as with reference to some
comparative data (regarding projections of a certain type of imagery for children as 
well as legacy of pre-World War II feminism in the former Yugoslavia). I also use 
statistical data to illustrate my arguments, especially in the next chapter, “Gender, 
identity and rights: Mothers, fathers and the rest in Slovenia.” The construction of 
stereotypes regarding gender differences is also illustrated using the example of the 
mediaeval commune of Piran. In these three chapters I provide specific examples of 
how the dominant narratives about gender are being questioned and in a (postmodern) 
sense almost deconstructed.
The concepts of difference and hyperreality are further tied together with a 
series of snapshots of contemporary (popular) culture when the imagery related to the 
body is concerned in the chapter “Writing gender: Gendered discourses and 
contemporary anthropology.” Here I also introduce another type of community (after 
the ones in Macedonia and Slovenia), contemporary anthropology, with its own 
specific constructions (illustrated with some examples from physical anthropology). 
Finally, in the concluding chapter, “In the hall of mirrors: Gender, feminism, 
postmodernism,” I tie together different receptions of feminism and postmodernism 
with contemporary anthropology and show how the concepts of difference and 
hyperreality intersect and overlap with each other, enabling researchers to constmct a 
very useful models for understanding (or navigating) the world we live in.
In the remainder of this Introduction, I will now outline the course of the thesis 
in a somewhat greater detail, starting with the chapter “Postmodernism, anthropology 
and common sense.”
One of the main problems connected with the reception of postmodernism in 
Anglo-American academic circles is a of lack of understanding or communication 
between critics and practicing “postmodernists.” Although being “eveiybody’s bête 
noire,” postmodernism has at the same time played a cmcial role in “shifting the 
paradigms in cultural studies and sociology, doing that kind of intellectual work which 
inevitably provokes controversy and protest, all the more so when what seem to be at
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stake are precisely those terms like history, society and politics (...)” (McRobbie 1994: 
1-2). The whole attitude is outlined in the dialogue between Alice and Humpty Dumpty 
(critics of postmodernism being represented by the latter) at the beginning of this 
chapter. The importance of these debates and their relevance for certain questions 
dealing with gender studies necessitated a relatively detailed discussion.
I make no claim that anything written here will revolutionize anthropology (I am 
very sceptical of most things revolutionary anyway) — I do not even think that most of 
what I have to say is something extraordinary or spectacular. The main points that I 
take from postmodernism in the context of present work are:
1/ the questioning of dominant narratives; and 
2/ the notion of hyperreality.
The first is elaborated both through some examples of misunderstanding of 
what postmodernism represents (in the first section of the chapter “Postmodernism, 
anthropology and common sense”), and through specific discourses in Slovenia and 
Macedonia. By discourse, and following Umberto Eco, a semiotician and an author 
deeply rooted in the (South European/Mediterranean) set of cultures that I come from,
I mean something that is in fundamental opposition to a story (in the sense of the 
French histoire, corresponding to what I call narrative). Unlike story in this sense, 
which contains a given subject matter, discourse is a way in which any given text (oral 
or written) exhibits to its readers or viewers the very process of its being communicated 
to them (cf. Eco in Blonsky 1985: 31-32). This opposition is only theoretical — it can 
never be achieved in practice, since there can be no story (histoire, or narrative) without 
discourse and there can be no discourse without story. In this sense, I understand their 
relationship to be similar to two sides of a coin. '^  ^ The story and the discourse at the 
same time represent two aspects of essentially the same thing (by affecting one side one 
automatically affects the other side as well). In other words, discourse can perhaps be
This is the line of argumentation used by Saussure in explaining the difference between the 
signifier and the signified. I elaborate on this elsewhere (Boskovik N. d.)
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best understood as a style o f presentation o f a narrative (hence, it can be expressed in 
text, sounds, images, etc.).
When referring to both ethnographic areas of my work, Macedonia and 
Slovenia, I use the word discourse in this sense. In both countries there is a plurality 
of discourses — and I have tried to cover as many as possible insofar as they relate to 
gender and the issues of dominant narratives and hyperreality. The recent communist 
past (both countries were federal units in the communist Yugoslavia from 1945 until 
1991) encouraged multiple discourses as ways of expressing oneself, while at the same 
time encouraging some segments of population (especially university students, authors 
and some intellectuals) to distmst dominant (communist) narratives. At the same time, 
some of these narratives (like the one on the dangers of feminism) have remained 
extremely powerful and influential.
My use of statistical data (especially in the chapters dealing with Slovenia) is 
also meant to represent a certain discourse. Of course, I do not think that the statistical 
data can prove what I am trying to say —  but they definitively illustrate my points. In 
all the cases, I became aware of the relevant statistics only after doing my field 
research. Again, in all the cases the statistical data provided me with the “hard” 
(numerical) illustrations of what I was trying to say. They always illustrate what I 
heard in conversations and interviews, and it was easier for me to present them than the 
specific conversations.*”^ Despite my own deep distrust towards any universalizing 
statements,*^ this is one of the universalizing statements that I am willing to make.
Most of my meetings in Slovenia were with intellectuals and scholars (although 
I was living in Drenov Gric, a small village just outside Ljubljana), so the data from
*^  In counti'ies that have such a small population (both Slovenia and Macedonia have around two 
million inhabitants), being put “on the spot” by being quoted in a foreign thesis or publication is not 
something that people look forward to. Quoting specific individuals in pseudonyms would not help 
because of the small size o f both countiies —  if anyone wants, any source can be quickly identified.
*^  After all, here I have to use language in order to communicate my thoughts and ideas, and language 
itself is universalizingl
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general opinion polls also provided me with (averaged) opinions of much larger 
segments of population. Another important point is that Slovenians are extraordinarily 
well and very frequently studied using statistics (opinion polls, surveys, etc.) — this is 
a well established practice that goes back at least 20 years or so*  ^and is very much 
present in the work of major Slovenian sociologists studying gender — like Professor 
Maca Jogan, for example. In this sense, the use of statistical data presents also another 
native voice — the voice of the scholars constructing it and using it.
I should stress, of course, that this thesis is primarily a library thesis. Despite the 
actual interviews and observations, I based most of my analysis on the published (written on 
contemporary anthropology/social theory/postmodernism/feminism — as well as Slovenian) 
materials. This emphasis on the written (published) material is not something that I set out to 
do from the beginning, but the wealth of data (as well as the availability of works of all the 
Slovenian feminist scholars, for example) directed me in that way. However, this is much 
less the case with Prespa, Macedonia — so, while in Slovenia I compared the data derived 
from the writings of (as well as my interviews with) the leading feminists and intellectuals, 
in Macedonia I proceeded from the reality that I observed to cross-cultural comparisons 
described in the literature on the rural France, Greece, and Croatia.
The construction and use of different voices is also connected with the concept of 
hyperreality. My own use is derived from the works of Baudrillard (1987, 1992, 1993) and 
Eco (1986). I elaborate more on this in the chapter on postmodernism, as well as in the 
following sections of this Introduction. Hyperreality is a reality constructed and artificial — 
but with the full awareness of the participants in this reality. It is a reality that exists while at 
the same time negating (or even denying) other realities, but the fact that the participants (and 
creators) are self-conscious of its aitificiality opens numerous possibilities for paradoxes. 
Hyperreality is a place (or area, domain, field, etc.) where all the paradoxes meet and co­
exist, side by side. The paradoxes are made obvious (apparent) through the media — and
*9 I suspect that this was a way to be “subversive” while Slovenia was still ruled by the communists, 
since presenting numbers was much safer than presenting specific people’s specific opinions. 
Individuals could be harassed by the police, numbers could not.
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this is something that clearly distinguishes the hyperreal from the end of the 20th century 
from the surreal or any similar concept. The media input enables people to see (and become 
aware of) themselves as others. The nature of contemporary technology (Netscape, film,
TV, video) makes this imagery extremely widespread (especially in the “West”). It also 
makes all the paradoxes of the contemporary world more appaient. By opening the way for 
paradoxes, it can also lead to a greater appreciation of relativism.
The concept of relativism is essential for a variety of different methodological 
approaches in both philosophy and the social sciences. First of all, the realization of the 
arbitrariness of the basic elements of any communication system (derived from the 
Saussurean concept of language as a system of absolute differences), means that there can be 
no unique, single, and all-encompassing Truth (or Reality), or a way to approach it. We can 
speak only of different (essentially, arbitrary) traths or realities (in the plural, it is important 
to stress), and about the different ways of pursuing objective scientific inquiry. These ways 
are potentially limited, but they do require that we recognize the essentially arbitrary nature of 
all claims that pretend to aspire to universal Tmth (so popular in logical positivism and 
related approaches), and to recognize the need for a greater deal of relativity (in Paul 
Feyerabend’s famous term: “anything goes” °^) in dealing with all such concepts. 
Furthermore, anthropologists as far back as Evans-Pritchard (the well-known example with 
the Azande witchcraft^*) were frequently very well aware of relativity as an integral part of 
their research methods.
“To those who look at the rich material provided by history, and who are not intent on 
impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the 
form of claiity, precision, 'objectivity', 'truth', it will become clear that there is only one principle 
that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the 
principle: anything goes (Feyerabend 1993: 18-19).
The pun is intentional, the variety of meanings also, so Feyerabend writes: “ 'anything goes' 
is not a 'principle' I hold —  I do not think that 'principles' can be used and fruitfully discussed outside 
the concrete research situation they are supposed to affect —  but the terrified exclamation of a 
rationalist who takes a closer look at history” (1993: vii).
*^ Which he found as useful in dealing with his daily activities as any other method.
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I think that I make clear enough (in the chapter on postmodernism) the importance of 
relativism in my own research. However, to be a relativist does not necessarily mean to be 
without any opinions or choices in life. I do like some things more than others, I have my 
favorite colors, music, teams, etc. The lived experience, as well as our place in it, is at stake 
here. It is important to stress here that I  find moral relativism totally unjustifiable. It all 
comes to the question of personal involvement and the views that one can defend. My own 
background influences my belief that we are what we do — so it is important that we make 
the “right” choices in life. These choices are not something that can be played around with, 
nor can they be put in a morally relativistic setting. For example, I cannot see racism or any 
form of xenophobia as a “choice.” I cannot see any forni of discrimination (based on 
gender, class, age, ethnic origin, etc.) as a “choice.” Being for cognitive relativism and at 
the same time being opposed to moral relativism might seem contradictory, but I see it as 
connected with choices in life — and it is now a well-recognized fact that people can (and 
do) hold contradictory (and mutually even excluding) views. I do not see any contradiction 
in being a relativist (where methodology and research are concerned) and at the same time 
arguing (in what can even be termed “value judgements”) against oppression of any kind, or, 
more specifically, against domestic violence. While I have certain uneasiness about concepts 
like “progress,” at the same time I would regard regulating domestic violence as a criminal 
offense (in both Macedonia and Slovenia) as a significant “step forward” and something very 
positive. Furthermore, I also believe that representing others (for example, African women 
and girls in the French colonial postcards studied by Corbey 1988) as dehumanized and 
animalistically sexualized objects is wrong (just as I believe that colonialism and ideologies 
such as Nazism are wrong) and I find it disgusting and disturbing. Of course, I admit that 
people have the right to like this type of imagery (or to glorify colonialism and fascism) — 
but they have no right to impose their values on other members of society or community. 
These are value judgements that I am happy to make and always willing to defend.
“Anything goes” is definitively not a principle that I can accept when the “real life” (or lived 
experience) is concerned (see footnote 20).
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THE “WEST”
Words and concepts like the “West” are more difficult to define — although they 
have been used consistently in scholarly research (especially dealing with post-colonialist 
theory, but by Third-World feminists like Minh-ha [1987] as well) in the last two decades. I 
see the “West” as something quite different from myself and the set of cultures that I come 
from, while at the same time recognizing that there are differences within this concept. It is 
not a unified category in itself, but I find it easier to refer to certain traits as “Western.” In a 
geographical and political sense, the term usually^^ refers to most highly industrialized 
countries of the world, members of the EU + Norway, Iceland and Switzerland in Europe, 
USA, Canada, and A u s t r a l i a . ^ ^
Both in Macedonia and in Slovenia, the word and the concept are almost 
self-explanatory: “Western” equals high-tech, capitalist, market-oriented, etc. On another 
level, “Western” also equals dangerously different, — greedy, selfish, money as the 
supreme commodity, disrespect for individual freedoms. Both countries want to become 
part of the “West“ in the first sense (democracy and market values), while avoiding the 
second one (greed and disrespect). To a large extent the choices have to do with material
In former Yugoslavia, but also some other “Third World” countries (the same understanding of the 
term exists in Guatemala, for example).
Citizens of Yugoslavia regarded themselves as exactly “in the middle” or in the center —  
between East (Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact countries) and West. A specific political background 
(Yugoslavia was one of the co-founders of the Non-aligned Countries Movement) contributed to this as 
well.
3^ Despite a very high level of industrialization, Japan is not seen as part of the “West.” Among the 
EU countries, a certain level of ambiguity exists when South European/Meditenanean countiies aie 
concerned: while France is definitively seen as “Western,” southern Italy, Greece and Portugal ai'e 
considered to be closer to the “non-Western” or “Third World” cultures.
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goods: the “West“ comes to be equated with material wealth, and smaller nations want to 
take a shaie of it. Within the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia, with its comparatively high 
productivity and higher standard of living, epitomized “the West.”^^  This was even more the 
case for the visitors from former East European countries (Alenka Svab, personal 
communication). However, this view was not shared universally; in the late 1980s a famous 
Belgrade lawyer, Srdja Popovic, used the analogy of time travel to refer to his travels to the 
“West.” In his account, starting from “19th century Serbia, ” he felt that by entering 
Slovenia he was in the 1920s, and only by crossing the Italian border was he crossing into 
the “present.”
My own position towards the West is ambivalent: I live in the West (at the moment at 
least), so I am part of it, but at the same time very wary of it.^  ^ For some of people in 
Slovenia, Macedonia and former Yugoslavia, I have become “Western,” while at the same 
time my ethnic background, my nationality^^ and my inadequate use of the English language 
clearly identify me as “non-Western” in the UK, for example. While, taking into account my 
nationality, discussing Macedonia could be seen as doing anthropology at or close to 
“home,” “home” for me, in the last three years, has been St. Andrews. Of course, there is a 
sense of closeness, a sense in which I almost instinctively “understand” (not necessarily 
approve!) some things and attitudes expressed in both Slovenia and Macedonia — but I do 
not know how to refer to or how to express this feeling of “closeness” here.
At the risk of “orientalizing” the concept, I take the “West” to be a product (and a 
stereotype!) of relatively recent history (since the 16th century CE), and in the second section
Most of the citizens of former Yugoslavia understood their country to border the West exactly 
where Slovenia borders Italy and Austiia —  not where Macedonia borders Greece (cf. note 22)!
^  I prefer to refer to m yself as a “Third World” person —  with all the political implications of this 
concept. But this is only a very vague determinant, since I am well aware that just like within the 
“West,” there are huge differences within tlie “Third World.”
Although I use the terms “ethnicity” and “nationality” interchangeably in my chapter on 
Macedonia, I have to note that while they are related, ethnicity does not necessarily correspond to 
nationality. I see “nationality” as primarily having a certain passport; I can have (in theory) a French 
passport —  but that would not make ethnically French.
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of the chapter “Postmodernism, anthropology and common s e n s e ’’^? i elaborate on this, 
following Stephen Toulmin (1990). I see the Western powers (political and economic) as 
well as Western discourses as something in positions of absolute power and domination, 
acquired with the great colonial expansion of the nations of the Northwestern edge of the 
European peninsula (cf. Bauman 1993: 135-136) in the last three centuries.
“DIFFERENCE” AND “HETEROGENEITY”
The dominant (post-Renaissance) Western intellectual tradition is, as I see it, 
intrinsically opposed to difference and heterogeneity — and these are the traits that 
characterize postmodern approaches. Furthermore, the whole idea of domination leads to the 
justification of “objectifying” approaches that relegate others (other ethnic groups, women, 
children, etc.) to lower levels of “humanity.” Therefore, feminist scholars were quick to 
point out that “[kjnowledge is not objectively arrived at but subjectively and practically 
gained” (Sandra Farganis quoted in Dagenais 1987: 23). Furthermore, according to Angela 
Miles, the claim to “objective knowledge” is “possible (enforceable) only for the powerful 
groups in the society which can to a certain extent shape the society by their very definitions. 
The claim is also a key component in maintaining their power” (1985: 9). This 
“demystification” of “objectivity” is certainly an area in which postmodernisms and 
feminisms find themselves — both sets of approaches insist on pluralism and heterogeneity, 
both elevate the notion of difference(s) high enough, as something to be reckoned with.
It is hardly surprising then to find that the criticism of postmodern approaches 
focuses to a great extent on these notions of difference and heterogeneity — this is explored 
in the section “Anthropology and common sense: The way we were.”
27 In the section “What do you think you know (and why?)?: Two great Western traditions.
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Questions of heterogeneity and otherness (as well as some gender-related issues) are 
further explored in the section “Postmodernism and anthropology: ‘It’s the end of the world 
as we know it’.” Some of the questions mentioned (like the ones related to otherness, 
money and power, etc.) are presented in a very condensed form. Women are already 
recognized as others in recent general anthropological texts (for example, Kilani 1994) — as 
well as in writings of the most important postmodern scholars like Lyotard (1989) and 
Baudrillard (1996). Obviously, there is a risk of oversimplifying the otherwise complex 
issues, but again I see issues related to identity, otherness, power and gender as essentially 
stemming from a certain type of narrative (established as a result of the “rationalistic turn” in 
the last three centuries) — it is these specific narratives that need to be questioned, and 
postmodernism provides adequate tools for this. (I have to add that questioning something 
does not necessaiily imply that something is wrong — but by questioning it we can go 
further and understand it better.)
“CULTURE”
Another term that I use a lot in this text is “culture.” It is also a universalizing and 
totalizing concept, but one which cannot be avoided. Entire volumes have been written 
about it by learned people of the past, and I neither can nor wish to compete with them.^s 
Following Umberto Eco, I propose to look at culture as something intrinsically 
heterogeneous. In one sense, culture is something completely opposed to practical everyday 
activities, as well as areas like politics, economics or science. Culture, understood in this 
way:
28 Of course, as noted by Moore (1988: 197): “There is no generally accepted definition in social 
anthropology of what a culture is.”
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privileges the formation of aesthetic taste, according to the dominant class of 
course (Beethoven is culture, while appreciating the singing of drunks is not, 
unless in the form of ethnological study, nostalgia, or the snob research of 
kitsch) (...) It is not possible for everyone, for reasons of class, income and 
innate ability. It is a sign of distinction.
(Eco 1994; 117-118)
This is what keeps sections on “culture” in newspapers and magazines separate from 
the ones devoted to the issues related to politics, society or production.
In another sense, “culture” can be defined as a superior attitude of mind set against 
the ignorance of the masses. In this sense, it does not necessarily privilege areas such as 
“humanities,” thus:
a bank manager and a customs officer are equally men of culture (...) In the 
final analysis, culture is the possession of knowledge in every sense (...) In 
its democratic aspects this gives rise to appeals for the diffusion of culture 
among the lower classes. But precisely because practical and manual 
knowledge are excluded from it. A car mechanic is not a cultured man (...) 
Therefore this idea of culture also entails a measure of idleness as a necessary 
condition for cultural growth.
(Eco 1994: 118)
Finally, in what Eco calls an “anthropological definition,” culture comprises 
“institutions, myths, rites, laws, beliefs, codified everyday behaviour, value systems and 
material techniques elaborated by a group of humans.” In this sense, culture does not have 
to be explicit, nor does it invite value judgements. On the other hand, “cultures whose 
experience of other, different cultures has not been traumatic do not identify themselves as a 
culture, but as the model of humanity pure and simple” (Eco 1994: 120). It is precisely this 
last sense in which a certain set of cultures have established themselves as dominant over 
other cultures, and it is precisely this aspect which is questioned by postmodern 
anthropologists.
Quotes and epigraphs are an integral part of my line of argumentation. Lewis 
Carroll’s A/ice (1992a, 19926) provided me with several important examples — like the one
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when Alice actually steps through the mirror (or looking glass^^). A mirror analogy 
provides me with a convenient way to explore the notions related to the concept of 
difference(s), and it is precisely this concept that is shared by both contemporary feminism 
and postmodern approaches (Svab 1995: 3-4). On the one side is the importance of the 
whole set of othernesses for anthropology. On the other, women as others are recognized as 
a set of legitimate categories to be studied (for example, Strathern 1987a: 288), as well as 
deconstmction of the “unified female subject” in contemporary gender-related research (for 
example, Butler 1990, 1993, 1995; Moore 19946). The last two sections of the chapter on 
postmodernism (“Postmodernism and common sense: Beyond the looking glass” and 
“Conclusions and points of departure: Defining gender”) serve to introduce this theme into 
the main body of the thesis. It would be very naïve to claim that by just stepping through the 
looking glass (as brave Alice does) one can overcome all the complexities and resolve all the 
questions by simply leaving them behind. Stepping through I understand as the first step 
towards exploring the concept of difference and its relevance for both contemporary 
anthropology and gender-related studies.
ETHNOGRAPHIC ENCOUNTERS
A questioning of dominant narratives and an exposition of hyperreality are my 
primary concerns in the chapters dealing with Macedonia and Slovenia. My research on 
Slovenia was mostly based on the publications of leading Slovenian scholars. In this sense, 
from a “Western” point of view, this can be seen as an instance of “elitist” discourses — but 
the Slovenian scholars certainly do not see it that way (Vesna Godina, personal 
communication). I had access to everything that was published on gender-related research in 
Slovenia. On the one hand, feminist discourses provided me with a relatively coherent area 
or community for research. On the other, they do have certain impact in a rapidly changing
29 Of course, this also provided an inspiration for the title o f Michael Herzfeld’s book (1987).
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world of a newly independent country. Finally, their impact is also muted and moderated, 
both by the inherited (communist) past, and by the prejudices that people still have and the 
issues regai'ding the distribution of power. Most importantly, the emphasis on Slovenian 
feminist discourses takes them (Slovenian feminists) as agents of (possible) change, so I 
was interested to see what their influence really is and how far can they push the limits of 
what the more conservative elements in the society see as “normal” or “natural.”
The amount of material that I gathered in Slovenia much outweighs that in Macedonia 
— I was able to meet almost all of the Slovenian feminist scholars and authors.^o This was 
impossible in Macedonia (in fact, I did not get any reply to my inquiries from any of the 
women’s groups there) — partly due to the fact that the word “feminism” has a certain 
inherited (negative) meaning from the recent communist past. “Feminist literature” is viewed 
with considerable suspicion in the Government’s official report for the 4th World 
Conference on Women in Beijing (Government of the Republic of Macedonia 1995: 27) — 
although it is difficult to find examples of it in Macedonian.
On the other hand, I obviously (having spent there perhaps one quarter of my life so 
far) know (in a very subjective and relativistic way!) much more about the way(s) in which 
society functions in Macedonia — hence the level of generalizations in the chapter “The other 
side of the window: Gender, equality and difference in Prespa, Republic of Macedonia.” I 
am aware that my statements may appeal' universalizing, but they come as a product of 
actual observation and interviews (I am not sure how can I precisely refer to “living” in the 
one’s area of study), and they must be taken in the context of a particular individual 
interacting with other particular individuals in order to produce something (a written work 
for the purpose of obtaining a degree in anthropology) that has no point of reference in the
I did not set out with the intention of meeting all o f the Slovenian feminist scholars and authors, 
but in the course of my research they somehow established themselves as a relatively homogenous 
group (homogenized for me under the “Slovenia/feminism” heading). As a group, they share a type of 
discourse that is not necessarily understood by the wider population. At the same time, some of them 
(Jogan, Rener) rely on the statistical data and observations of the segments o f population for their own 
research.
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local (Macedonian) culture. By this I mean that there is no such thing as anthropology in 
Macedonia — there is no course of studies at any of the country’s universities, people^i do 
not know what it is that “an anthropologist” may be. There is no such thing as “gender 
studies” either —  despite the fact that it was a Macedonian, Professor Dimitar Mircev, who 
taught several courses on gender at the Faculty of the Social Sciences in Ljubljana in the 
early 1980s, and with the important exception of the PhD dissertation by Mileva Gjurovska 
(1995).32 I found it extremely difficult to explain to “ordinary people” in Prespa what was I 
doing — and in the end I simply gave up. The only level on which my explanations made 
sense was the one of ethnography, hence the (descriptive and general) style of the chapter 
also reflects what people in Macedonia in general and in Prespa in particular would recognize 
as a description of their own “reality.”
Of course, this “reality” is a construction — as several examples concerned with 
gender clearly show. While women are supposed (in everyday discourses) to be oppressed 
and subordinated, they are not necessarily so. By “everyday discourses” I mean what 
“ordinary people” (“average” persons in “average” situation at any time or place^^) say in 
everyday conversations. Obviously, everyone has a set of beliefs about what things are and 
how they should be. I found quite interesting the fact that while both men and women 
participate in an (officially approved or sanctioned) discourse that acknowledges women’s 
subordination, both men and women are at the same time aware that this is not necessarily 
true!34 One can talk about complementarity much more than about subordination or 
domination — and historical studies (such as the one of the peasant families in France) 
provide further examples that illustrate this concept.
3^  Ordinary people in Prespa, o f course. Intellectuals like Professor Dimitar Mircev are obviously 
very aware of the concept.
32 The “official” area for which this PhD dissertation is produced is sociology of work.
33 At the same time, I do not claim that this specific person as such exists —  I construct my idealized 
categories following Max W eber’s (1989) concept of “ideal types.”
34 This is hyperreality at its best.
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It is impossible not to mention specific historical circumstances (the fall of 
communism and the actual emergence of both countries as sovereign and independent as one 
of its results) common to both Macedonia and Slovenia. In the case of Macedonia, the 
“ethnic mix” is quite diverse (65% Macedonians, 23% Albanians, among the rest Turks, 
Vlachs, Romas, Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians...). For some quite extraordinary 
political reasons (some of which look as if they have been taken from Ionesco’s “theater of 
the absurd”), Macedonia is, however, faced with very specific problems: their neighbors 
claim that it doesn’t exist (cf. Schwartz 1995, Danforth 1993). Albania claims that the 
western part of the country (where the majority of ethnic Albanians live) should be given 
huge autonomy and probably eventually should be annexed to Albania itself. Serbia and 
Macedonia have some unresolved territorial disputes, and the majority of Serbs believe that 
Macedonians are just “Southern Serbs” (a term used during the Serbian occupation, between 
1912 and 1941). Bulgaria claims that, while Macedonia as a country exists, Slav 
Macedonians do not, and that they are, basically, just Bulgarians who have not yet realized 
their “true” (that is to say, Bulgarian) identity. Finally, Greece believes that Macedonia’s 
close relations with Turkey^^ pose a threat to Greece. This attitude is connected with the 
Greek denial of the existence of a Slav Macedonian minority36 in its northern province and 
the refusal to grant to this minority such basic rights as the use of its own (Macedonian) 
language.37
The Macedonian language is recognized as a distinctive South Slavic language by all 
the countries in the world with the exception o f its neighbors Greece and Bulgaria. Because
33 Bulgaria and Turkey were the first two countries to recognize Macedonia under her constitutional 
name.
36 Helsinki Watch and other NGOs put the number of Slav Macedonians in this area between 15,000 
and 50,000.
37 These issues are very much present in contemporary anthropology. A great controversy arose 
recently when Cambridge University Press (at a very late stage and bypassing its own anthropology 
editorial board) refused to publish a book by Greek anthropologist Anastasia Karakasidou, dealing with 
the Slav Macedonian minority in northern Greece. Apparently, the publisher was afraid that this book 
might irate Greeks.
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of Greek pressure (the northern Greek province is also called Macedonia), Macedonia was, 
in April 1993, admitted to the UN (and afterwards to other world organizations) only under 
a temporary (it is still in use now, in August 1996!) name: Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. It is still being referred to by this temporary name in official communications 
from the EU, US, and other world organizations — but this term (and being referred to by 
it) almost all Macedonians find very offensive.
So, Macedonia is a new country that perhaps exists and it is inhabited by people 
claimed and at the same time denied by their neighbors. This whole situation creates a sense 
of disbelief. Even on the personal level, I cannot really explain how it feels to be infomied 
of one’s own non-existence (I met one Greek person in St. Andrews who really could not 
believe that I existed). Macedonia not only provides some interesting examples for the 
concept of hyperreality — it is hyperreal itself.
The same can be said of Slovenia, for it was throughout its history:
a country so thoroughly suspended between East and West, for so many 
centuries, that it actually disappeared. Or, to be more precise, it didn’t appear 
at all — until the spring of 1991, that is. Slovenia’s limbo within this East- 
West “twilight zone” — most recently, between the great Orwellian blocks of 
the century’s second half — did nothing to lessen the struggles fought on her 
soil. (Hemingway’s First World War novel A Farewell to Arms, which 
chronicles the carnage of the Socha Front, never once mentions Slovenia — 
despite being set almost entirely within the borders of the present-day 
republic.) Slovenia’s obscurity on the global stage, the concomitant 
inconsequentiality of her fate, have made the Slovenes unconsciously attuned 
to historical and ideological pressure changes.
(Mocnik 1994: 83)
In the chapter “The other side of the window: Gender, equality and difference in 
Prespa, Republic of Macedonia” I also mention the special role that families have in shaping 
the lives of individuals.^^ Marriage is essentially a contract between families — and it is the
38 Altitudes towards families (including some comparative data) are further explored in the Slovenian 
context in the chapter “Gender, identity and rights.”
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way for families to reassert their position within the local community. Some terms, like 
“neolocality,” should be understood in this specific context. Couples in Prespa (and in 
Macedonia in general, as well as in Slovenia) are not as mobile as their counteiparts in some 
industrialized Western countries (US, United Kingdom, etc.). Throughout the South 
European/Mediterranean cultures, the concept of “neolocal residence” implies several 
important things. First of all, it is easier to build a house closer to where one lives. If the 
land is expensive or difficult to get, the easy way out is to build it on land owned by the 
groom’s or bride’s parents. This new house might even be adjacent or the extension of the 
one owned by the parents, but this is still a new residence — a new locality (Baskar 1993: 
150).
A very important point that I wish to make is the role of women as “keepers of the 
family” — the ones that preserve the local cultural heritage by telling stories to and raising 
the children. The role of women as nurturers is therefore elevated to the level of the ones 
responsible for the survival of the whole nation. This way of representing women as in a 
sense “mothers” of the whole nation is fairly typical in Balkan cultures and it has a long 
history, from the Serbian medieval myth of the battle of Kosovo in 1389,39 to the more 
recent carnage in the former Yugoslavia (Ivekovic 1996). Nationalists stressed this as the 
primary and “natural” role for women, and took it as an excuse to try to limit their rights 
(regarding both work and reproductive rights).
Some of the questions relating to nationalism and identity are explored further in the 
chapter “Gender, identity and rights: Mothers, fathers and the rest in Slovenia.” The debates 
around the proposed changes of the Slovenian Maternity Leave Law^o highlighted some 
arguments that have been put forward by the nationalists and
right-wing parties; in essence, they claim that women have both a duty and an obligation to 
stay at home and care for children. These efforts, however, did not achieve the desired
39 An excellent reading of this myth with regard to the role of women is in Slapsak 1995.
40 See the Appendix. One has to note that the whole area of maternity leave is comparatively well 
regulated in Slovenia (Office for Women’s Policy 1996: 1).
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effects — they galvanized women across the spectrum of class, education and income, and 
the proposed changes were defeated.
The important points where Slovenia is concerned relate to both the heterogeneity and 
the marginality of gender-related discourses (this is discussed in some detail in the chapter 
“What’s in a name?: Contemporary feminist discourses in the Republic of Slovenia”).4i The 
very beginnings of anthropology in Slovenia are connected with gender-related issues; the 
study of prostitutes was one of the first major projects (in the 1930s) of the University of 
Ljubljana’s Department of Anthropology, led by Dr. Bozo Skerlj. This included measuring 
the diameter of their heads, weighing them, registering the color of their eyes, etc. (Zavirsek 
1994: 119). Of course, this specific project served only to corroborate the prevailing cultural 
and social opinions (that prostitutes are not very intelligent, that they age prematurely and die 
young, etc.) — even though none of these were supported by actual census data. However, 
these “scientifically supported” (or “objective”) claims both contributed to and influenced the 
normative discourses of what the “true” role of a woman should be. These claims were also 
based on the dichotomy public/private, but this dichotomy is not always present and does not 
have the same meanings like as the West (for examples from East Central Europe, see 
Einhorn 1993).
This is another example of the conflation of the “real” and the “ideal”: the former 
relating to how things are (or how they appear to us), the latter to how (someone says or we 
think) things should be. The concept of “lived reality” would fall within the first meaning; 
the normative discourses of how one should act or what one should do in a specific 
situation, within the second one. I do not claim that any of these concepts (like “real,” 
“ideal,” public,” “private,” etc.) is “objective” — all that relevantly exists in Slovenia (as 
well as in Macedonia) is that which is conceptualized by the people I talked with (my 
“informants”).
41 An abridged version of this chapter was presented at the one-day feminist conference in 
St. Andrews (Boskovik 1996).
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This conceptualizing aspect must be taken into account where my own presentation 
of the Macedonian and Slovenian situation is concerned. I am not trying to present a 
universalizing and totalizing account of what gender differences are and how are they 
constructed in these regions — I am just offering a narrative. The fact that I am the first non- 
Slovenian to conduct this kind of research in Slovenia, while Prespa in Macedonia has never 
been studied anthropologically increases the risks, but I hope to minimize them by giving 
credit to differing (whenever possible) voices and opinions and by relativizing my own 
interpretation (this is again where the quote from Milosz comes in very handy). In the 
course of my work, several people from Slovenia and Macedonia were able to read these 
chapters and I was very pleased by the fact that they found them reasonable as an account of 
their “realities” (with some critical remarks, of course).
FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO FEMINISM AND BACK; 
POINTS OF REFERENCE
The chapter “Writing gender: Gendered discourses and contemporary anthropology” 
presents both a radical break with the previous three chapters (in style as well as in content) 
and at the same time explores the same themes of gender difference(s) and construction. 
Here is where I (having briefly done so in the chapter “Postmodernism, anthropology and 
common sense”) turn again to anthropology, but anthropology in the widest possible sense, 
anthropology as “a study of culture” — culture in all the three senses outlined above. 
Contemporary anthropology has been influenced by feminist theorists from France (Luce 
Irigaray in particular) and (as far as it is concerned with gender studies) it is increasingly 
realizing the importance of the concept of the (sexed, eroticized) body. “Contemporary 
anthropology” is taken here to represent another type of community — not on the lines of 
geographical, ethnic or national criteria (as in the cases of Macedonia and Slovenia), but
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more as a professional endeavour and a type of community which people enter by choice 
(and thi'ough a system of the elaborate initiation ceremonies connected with education, 
research, writing and examinations).42
The chapter begins with an outline of the writings on difference of one of the major 
feminist authors of our time, Luce Irigaray. Equality and difference were major themes 
discussed in the previous three chapters, so Irigaray presents some kind of a logical 
continuation of this theme. At the same time, she is an important representative of a set of 
theories (Lacanian and post-Lacanian, psychoanalysis-influenced) which is extremely 
influential in Slovenia (Zizek 1990, 1992, 1994; Renata Salecl, Eva Bahovec and the whole 
circle around the journal Delta), and she herself has been studied by some of the leading 
Slovenian feminist scholars (Zupanc Ecimovic 1995).
The second section of this chapter (“I sing the body electric: Bodies, sexes, 
anthropologists, metaphors") presents an overview (too sketchy, perhaps) of various 
discourses concerned with the body — from popular culture to women’s studies and 
anthropology. This is again a theme that has been studied by leading feminist scholars in 
Slovenia (Bahovec 1995) — and its importance is further stressed when one refers to the 
advertising campaign (“VSAKA IMA SYOJ FAKTOR”) discussed in the chapter “What’s in 
a name? Contemporary feminist discourses in the Republic of Slovenia.” This whole 
campaign can be seen in light of the Western semiotics of advertising — and this cannot be 
separated from contemporary (Western) views and opinions related to sexed and eroticized 
bodies. I try to illustrate these views by offering several snapshots of contemporary 
discourses and representations — from Playboy to the National Geographic, French 
colonial postcards, and contemporary fashion critics. This section also represents a 
connection with some of my articles on the representation of eroticized body in comic books 
(Boskovic 1990a, 19906) — which was the first time that I thought about gendered 
representations. The body as a construct gains in relevance in contemporary feminist debates
42 Communities like Slovenia and Macedonia are never entered by a choice —  one has to be born into 
them. (Non-Slovenians and non-Macedonians can, of course, obtain Slovenian or Macedonian 
nationality, but they will never, under any circumstances, be recognized as one of “us.”)
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on gender and difference, as will become obvious in the concluding chapter (“In the hall of 
mirrors: Gender, anthropology, postmodernism”).
Finally, in the section “ ‘Females readily available’: Apes, monkeys and humans,” I 
mention some of the most important female anthropologists and the impact that they had on 
the understanding of new constructs related to gender. It is a fact that physical or biological 
anthropology has been one area where the impact of female researchers in the last 20 years 
has been truly remarkable. It seems that at one point, this area was regarded as marginal 
enough for women to be granted “equal access” (some of the prejudices as well as further 
references are given in Haraway 1991). However, scholars like Tanner, Zihlman and 
Haraway (as well as primatologists Goodall, Fossey, Galdikas and Strum before them) did 
more than that: they started questioning the dominant narratives of human evolution, 
behavioral patterns, and so on, and changed and at the same time increased our 
understanding of these narratives.
In the final chapter, “In the hall of mirrors: Gender, anthropology, postmodernism,”
I discuss some specific accounts of feminism and postmodernism as they relate to 
anthropology. Anthropologists like Strathern, Moore and Haraway, as well as scholars 
from other disciplines like Butler, and De Lauretis, represent the trend that moves 
contemporary research towards a greater inclusion and a greater importance of difference (the 
title of Henrietta Moore’s last book: A Passion for Difference). However, the implications 
of this concept are not acceptable to such feminists as Lovibond, Felski, Probyn, and 
Chapman, who take as their starting point the universal category of “woman.”
The construction of gender is also put into perspective with examples that Archetti 
(1994) provides of models of masculinity in the Argentinian tango. When discussing the 
place of men in feminism, I mention Jean Baudrillard and his theory of seduction as a way of 
overcoming tensions and conflicts between the genders. Baudrillard (1996) also thinks that 
the concept of Otherness which men and women project to each others is a legacy of 
Modernity. Therefore, he presents a good example of postmodern theorists trying to abolish 
the artificial dichotomies and Enlightenment-derived concepts. I also mention a critique of
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models derived from the study of education (who performs better, who performs worse, and 
under which circumstances). Some of the differences assumed in learning seem to be a 
direct result of methodological errors. Educational discourses also represent an important 
point of reference for some Slovenian scholars — as can be seen in the section 
“Understanding constructs...” of the chapter “What’s in a name?...”
The concept of difference(s), which had previously been regarded as between men 
and women in contemporary studies of gender, gains new relevance. At the same time it 
becomes a tool for studying differences between (and, as De Lauretis would argue, within) 
women (as well as men) themselves.
Contemporary feminist scholars look at these differing expressions of difference 
from both within and outside the feminist movement. Feminist theories and politics are 
increasingly being called into question. This particularly goes for categories such as 
women, gender, sexual difference, identity, and the body.
This is the area where postmodernism and feminism become closely connected. 
According to Seyla Benhabib (1995), neither feminism nor postmodernism are merely 
descriptive categories, but constitutive and evaluative concepts which help to define the 
practices which they both try to describe. According to Carol Bigwood (1991), it is the 
body that presents the ultimate challenge for both feminism and postmodernism. She 
maintains that what we need is a new model of the nature/culture dichotomy, which would 
include the dimension of gender without taking the body itself as a product of cultural 
meaning.
I also focus on Judith Butler’s book Gender Trouble, which represents a turning 
point in a recognition of the difficulties in contemporary feminism, as well as the usefulness 
of approaches that can be described as postmodern. Butler argues that, essentially, even 
biological sex is culturally constructed. Western industrialized societies are based on a 
specific “contract” between the genders, and this “contract” clearly assigns and differentiates. 
But gender “realities” are never as simple or straightforward as they may appear to be. As 
Butler says:
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It may well be a woman, male-identified, who desires another woman, or a 
man, female-identified, who desires another man, and it may also be a 
woman, male-identified, who desires a man, female-identified, or, similarly, 
a man, female-identified, who desires a woman, male-identified.
(quoted in Angerer 1994: 198)
One of Butler’s main points is the deconstmction of the idea of a “naturalized” 
heterosexual identity. The body is represented merely as an instrument or a medium and this 
is burdened with cultural meanings. Even notions such as the “womb” are a mere 
constmction. Sexual identity is a shifting, changeable phenomenon, not a static, fixed thing. 
Butler argues that the separation of sex from gender is irrelevant. “To become a gender” is 
how she describes a process of “naturalization.”
This whole area opens numerous possibilities for dialogue and collaboration between 
gender studies and anthropology. Of course, anthropologists like Marilyn Strathern (for 
example, 1991) have already noted that in some aspects (like the “deconstmction of the 
unified male subject” — not the exact term used by Strathern!) feminism actually precedes 
postmodernism. The work of an anthropologist like Henrietta Moore (1988, 19946) is an 
example of interaction between gender studies and postmodernism, and I also explore the 
consequences of this interaction.^^
This whole area also resembles a hall of mirrors: the images that we see are both 
others and ourselves (as well as ourselves and others and vice versa), sometimes distorted, 
sometimes funny, sometimes blurred. Mirrors are at the same time the only ways in which 
we can see ourselves — so we can never know whether the image that we saw was “real” or 
even “true.” I guess that we shall always need others to tell us that.
43 It is interesting to note that Moore 1988 provides an important point of reference for Slovenian 




“When I  use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a 
scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean —  neither more 
nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words 
mean so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be 
master — that’s all.”
(Carroll 19926: 159)
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INTRODUCTION: FROM ANTHROPOLOGY 
TO THE POSTMODERN WORLD AND BACK
“What is your argument worth, what is your proof worth?” (...)
“What is your ‘what is it worth’ worth?”
(Lyotard 1984: 54 passim)
We live in the postmodern world. Whether one regards this statement as 
obviously true or just as obviously false probably defines one’s attitudes towards 
the word and the concept. In this chapter, I intend to outline the debates 
surrounding “postmodern” approaches in anthropology, different theoretical 
assumptions, as well as the area(s) where these approaches can inform 
anthropological research. I will begin with an overview of the working 
definitions of “postmodernism” and the attitudes towards it that characterize 
current anthropological theory, continuing with what I regard to be the most 
illustrative examples of it being misunderstood and misrepresented, and 
concluding with the meeting point of postmodern anthropology and the study of 
gender. Finally, in the last section of this chapter, I intend to briefly outline 
some of the problems that arise in the definition of the word and concept 
“gender,” as well as its distinction from other related concepts — like “sex,” for 
example.
Postmodernism implies something that comes after {post) Modernism, so 
another implication is that we all (reading this, participating in debates, or just 
watching from the sidelines) share the same (or at least similar) knowledge of the 
same (or at least commensurable) concepts within our common (shared) 
intellectual and cultural framework. It also implies that we can agree on the
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meaning of concepts such as M o d e r n i s m ( O n e  attempt at outlining a 
definition which I find useful in the context of present work has been made by 
Lyotard in his book The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, 
originally published in 1979A^) But this is not the caseA^ this chapter, I will 
attempt to briefly point out some of the difficulties that arise from the simple fact 
that the language^'^ that we (anthropologists, philosophers, social scientists, 
critical intellectuals, etc.) use does not denote the same things (or concepts) for 
the same people.48
Still, the same concept of postmodernsim is usually associated with the 
names of Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Richard Rorty, Gianni
44 Cf. Williams 1989: 31-35; Toulmin 1990: 7-13; Docherty 1993a: 1-3; Huyssen 1990: 235 ff; 
Hassan 1993: 149; for a completely different perspective, see Eco 1986: 61-72.
45 To quote from Lyotard (1984: xxiii): “I will use the term modern to designate any science that 
legitimates itself with reference to a metadiscourse o f this kind [producing a discourse of 
legitimation with respect to its own status] making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, such 
as the dialectics o f Spirit, the hermeneutics o f meaning, the emancipation o f the rational or working 
subject, or the creation o f wealth.”
On the other hand, Foucault proposed looking at modernity “rather as an attitude than as a 
period o f history (...) a mode o f  relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain 
people (...) a way o f thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same 
time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task” (1984: 39, passim).
46 Cf. Mongardini 1992; Hassan 1986; Featherstone et al. 1988; Llobera 1988; Lovibond 1989;
Hall and Jarvie 1992; Smart 1992; Lyon 1994; De Lauretis 1987: 73-75.
47 And within language, different concepts or signs and symbols. I will use the term “sign” to refer 
to anything that denotes anything within the realm of communication. I will use the term “symbol” 
to refer to something that invokes the image or a concept o f something that is not immediately 
present. For the further elaboration and more precise references, see the appropriate chapters in 
Noth 1990.
48 I agree with Zygmunt Bauman (in Featherstone et. al. 1988) that the concept o f postmodernism is 
inherently connected with the intellectuals’ search for meaning in a rapidly changing world, as well 
as with his comments regarding the impossibility of defining Modernism retroactively, now that we 
do have postmodernism as a (more or less —  depends on who is talking) radical break or rupture 
with the concepts that were prevalent in a Western (European in the first place) cultural tradition 
since the early 17th century.
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Vattimo and Slavoj Zizek in philosophy, Michel Foucault and Hayden White in 
history, Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze, R. D. Laing, Norman O. Brown in 
psychoanalysis, Herbert Marcuse, Jean Baudrillard and Jürgen Habermas in 
political philosophy, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend in the philosophy of 
science, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Wolfgang Iser and the 
“Yale critics” in literary theoiy, Merce Cunningham, Alwin Nikolais, Meredith 
Monk in dance, John Cage, Karlheinz Stockhausen, Laurie Anderson in music, 
Robert Rauschenberg, Jean Tinguely in art, Robert Venturi, Charles Jencks, 
Charles Moore in architecture, as well as various authors like Samuel Beckett, 
Hélène Cixous, Eugène Ionesco, Jorge Luis Borges, Harold Pinter, Peter Handke, 
Thomas Bernhaidt, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Julio Cortazar, Italo Calvino, Danilo 
Ki^, William Burroughs, Thomas Pynchon, and Sam S h e p a r d  49 (Movies like 
The Blade Runner, Alien, and Blue Velvet also come to mind.) As Hassan 
(1993: 147) remarks, “these names are far too heterogeneous to form a 
movement, paradigm, or school. Still, they may evoke a number of related 
cultural tendencies, a constellation of values, a repertoire of procedures and 
attitudes. These we call postmodernism^
The very concept of postmodernism implies the sense of narrativity in 
which we all live; we are both producers, as well as users and consumers of 
different types of narratives.^o Nairatives tend to be imposed and superimposed.
49 This list o f names is based on Hassan 1993: 147, with some slight modifications. It is by no 
means exhaustive or final, and it does not imply that the authors listed would necessarily consider 
themselves as postmodern.
50 This sense of narrativity primarily means that we are constantly both involved and exposed to 
different narratives (whether through the media, some other kind o f state/political/ideological 
propaganda, or in our everyday lives). We are caught in the net of narratives which in some ways 
resembles a spider’s web —  except that there is no escape (not even theoretically) from the net of 
narratives. We are almost dependent on them. They are here to stay —  as dominant discourses in 
politics, sciences, cultures, even in supposedly “democratic” information environments like the 
Internet. Only by being aware o f this fact, we can successfully try to cope with this situation and 
question the basis and the content o f all narratives. For the different concepts of the study of
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and they tend to articulate the way in which we perceive the world, so it is very 
important to realize how and why they are produced, and to what end. These 
questions lead to increasing disbelief and a sense of doubt in regard to the 
nairatives that are tiying to impose themselves as metanarratives of the present 
world. These narratives are referred to by different types of knowledge and often 
various types of communication (which seem to be the most important aspects of 
Lyotard’s book, which opened up a way for the theories of the postmodern in 
Anglo-American academia). As a matter of fact, Lyotard (1984: xxiv) defines 
'"postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives.”  ^^
It is not my intention to cover here all the different currents that regaid 
themselves (or are regarded as such by their proponents or critics) as postmodern, 
but to concentrate on the areas in which most successful interaction between 
anthropology and postmodernism takes place. These areas are sometimes 
associated with the so-called “literary turn,” or the meeting point of anthropology, 
literature, literary criticism, hermeneutics, and anti-foundationalist philosophy, 
but also with the increasing importance of gender studies and the influence of 
feminist theory. This vast area has been plagued by a lack of proper 
communication, since sometimes it seems that everyone is trying to say the same 
thing at the same time, while also contradicting everyone else.^2 This lack of
narrative, I refer to Paul Ricœur (cf. Wood 1991). An excellent encyclopedic overview is given by 
Noth 1990: 367-373.
My own use o f the word narrative implies first and foremost a story presented using a certain 
type o f discourse. By the metanarrative (following Lyotard), I mean a story that establishes itself 
as the dominant story of the epoch and within a certain cultural frame (society, set o f cultures, 
dominant ideology, etc.).
51 “These metanarratives are stories which purport to justify loyalty to, or breaks with, certain 
contemporary communities, but which aie neither historical narratives about what these or other 
communities have done in the past nor scenarios about what they might do in the future” (Rorty 
1983: 585).
52 For example, criticism o f postmodernism in anthropology from the feminist perspective Mascia- 
Lees, Sharpe and Cohen 1989; also Benhabib 1995; but slightly different approach from the feminist
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proper communication becomes critical in the case of postmodernism. I will try 
to show that proper communication is the key to an understanding of the debates 
and issues stemming from what I regai'd to be an argument that has persisted in 
the Western (European) intellectual tradition since at least the Renaissance.
In contemporary anthropology, the word and the concept postmodernism 
is quite frequently used in a derogatory sense (King 1991; Pool 1991; Coombe 
1991; Gordon 1993; Knauft 1994, etc.), to refer to writings of anthropologists 
that are regarded as the representatives of the “Postmodern” or “literary” turn (the 
terms are used synonymously in Fabian 1991), mostly George Mai'cus, James 
Clifford, Michael Fischer, Michael Taussig, Vincent Crapanzano, Kevin Dwyer, 
Marilyn Strathern, Johannes Fabian, Bob Scholte, and Stephen Tyler.53 It is 
interesting to note that most of these authors do not regard themselves as 
“Postmodern,”54 some even specifically state so (cf. the examples cited in Pool 
1991; Scholte 1986 and 1987), but this is insufficient for the critics of anything 
“Postmodern.” For the critics, the word comes to mean almost anyone that does 
not know what she/he is talking about, which then necessitates recourse to 
strange styles and different modes of expression. By extension, it also means that 
the practicing “Postmodernists” are completely detached from the problems and 
concerns of the contemporary woiid.55 This kind of criticism has also been
perspective as well is by Fraser and Nicholson in Featherstone et al. 1988: 373-394; as well as by 
Butler 1995. The work o f Henrietta Moore (19946) establishes a frame in which postmodernism and 
anthropology can successfully coexist, as I will show in the last chapter.
53 Other names, like Clifford Geertz, or Paul Rabinow, are occasionally added to this list. I do not 
wish to imply that this list o f names is exhaustive in any sense; my primary concern is with the 
authors with whose work(s) I am familiar with.
54 To be more specific, only Stephen Tyler does, although his response to Scholte puts a bit o f 
uncertainty as to whether he regards Clifford and Marcus as part o f this group or not.
55 Cf. Scholte 1986 for the critique o f Geertz; and Scholte 1987; Fardon 1990 and Hobart 1990 for 
the general assessment of the volume Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986).
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directed at the “deconstructionist” movement in contemporary critical theory, 
primarily associated with the influence of Jacques Derrida (1974, 1978, 1982a, 
19826),56 postmodernism as presented to the English-speaking world by Jean-
The reply of one o f the participants in the Writing Culture volume (and the only one who does 
regard himself to be a postmodern!) to Scholte is worth quoting, because it summarizes some o f the 
frequent misunderstandings of what postmodernism does or could signify for anthropology:
Writing Culture is not post-modern; its authors neither invert the 
relationship between aesthetics and epistemology nor revolutionize the 
three-fold hierarchy o f epistemology, politics, and aesthetics (in 
descending order o f hierarchic precedence)... they are willing only to 
promote politics, to contextualize science to power, to relativize 
epistemology to politics, but this politicization o f discourse does not 
change or threaten the ancient Western idea of hierarchized discourses.
Instead, it preserves the myth o f a privileged discourse that founds or 
grounds all the others 
(Tyler 1987: 51).
56 For a valid and very useful assessment of the “deconstructionist” movement, see Norris 1991 —  
although Norris himself does criticize the postmodern movement —  and Baudrillard in particular —  
from a radical leftist perspective, for example, in Norris 1990. I think that most o f his criticism is 
actually based on a serious misunderstanding o f Baudrillard’s style —  especially the irony and 
sarcasm that he uses so frequently. To give one example, his often (mis)quoted article from the 
Libération  on the Gulf War (“Did the Gulf War really happen?”) was definitively not an apology for 
the Gulf War and its disastrous consequences for the civilian population — Baudrillard was simply 
calmly explaining the mechanisms o f media input and filtering, the ways in which this horrible event 
was presented as a “media spectacle” for the enjoyment o f the masses, a kind o f hyperreality that the 
holders o f power wanted to project. In that sense, the question of the “reality” o f the Gulf War is 
perfectly justified. It was real for the victims and direct participants. It was presented as unreal for 
the masses in the Western countries. Baudrillard’s critical position towards this kind of  
(mis)representation of events is more than obvious.
On the other hand, Norris’ observations about tbe connection between the dismal fate o f the 
May 1968 movement in France and its connection with the origins o f postmodern debates in France 
(especially Lyotard) are extremely important and accurate. It seems, however, that Norris excludes 
Derrida from the postmodern movement, and, as a result, presents his work in quite a positive light. 
For some serious misconceptions about Derrida (especially in the Anglo-American academia), an
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François Lyotard, as well as the post-postmodernist philosophy of Jean 
Baudrillard.5^ Of course, not many of these thinkers would actually refer to 
themselves as “Postmodern” — Baudriliard in particular has rejected the label
strenuously (if not very s u c c e s s f u l l y ) . ^ ^
Some of the criticism that the “postmodern” anthropologists get is from 
the perspective that things could somehow be different, that if only anthropology 
could be done in the same way that it was being done 30 or so years ago, some of 
the questions concerning its validity, methodological foundations, and claims to 
universal knowledge could just be ignored. (Needless to say, 30 or more years 
ago things were not that simple and clear-cut, as the critics would sometimes like 
it to appear — one could only look at Malinowski’s critique of colonialist 
strategies from the 1930s [cf. Stocking 1991; 55-61], or later writings of such a 
“classical” anthropologist as Evans-Pritchard, etc. The gap between “the good 
old days” and contemporary theory is actually very narrow, and to a large extent
excellent summary is by Jay 1988; for the criticism from the neo-Marxist perspective, cf. Jameson 
1991). The reasons for some o f these serious (and perhaps deliberate) misunderstandings are 
outlined below in this section by McRobbie and Di Leonardo.
Even though Lyotard himself credits the Anglo-American critics like Ihab Hassan for the actual 
“invention” of the term!
As far as the political criticism of “Postmodernists” as essentially reactionary and oriented 
towards the preservation o f the existing exploitative power structures (especially Jameson 1991) is 
concerned, one should only look at the critical engagement of Derrida to see the futility o f this line 
o f criticism. As for the “Postmodernists” from other areas o f the world, I should note that most 
people engaged in a futile (but brave and honest) attempt to provide reason in the carnage of former 
Yugoslavia, were exactly “Postmodernists” (Dr. Miladin Zivotic and Obrad Savic in Belgrade, Dr. 
Rastko Mocnik in Ljubljana, to name just a few).
On the other hand, and among the scholars well known in the West, Zygmunt Bauman, 
whose critical and intellectual engagement is beyond any doubt, embraced the “consequences o f  
postmodernism.” Bauman sees the fall o f communism as definitive proof that the societies based on 
the ideals o f modernity are impossible (1992: 156 ff, 1992: 221).
The latest label attached to him is the “Quentin Tarantino of the philosophy world.” Among 
previous ones: “supermarket philosopher, intellectual imposter, dangerous nihilist, postmodern guru, 
reactionary, fascist.” (Street 1995: 4)
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it can be attributed to the changes in the contemporary world — or at least the 
changes in our ways of perceiving and referring to it.)
One recent critic notes that the volume Writing Culture and similar 
products of contemporary anthropological theory are
clearly the product of an explosive mixture of poststructuralist 
thought with its emphasis on a textually based interdisciplinary 
approach to the production of social knowledge, and an emergent 
self-reflexivity on the part of anthropologists.
(Thomas 1992: 1-2)
This brings us to the question of social involvement. One of the main 
criticisms that the “postmodern” thinkers get is that they are actually too abstract, 
too much removed from “real life,” from the “basics” of their field. In the words 
of another critic:
Despite the postmodernists’ own desire to avoid universal claims 
and despite their stated opposition to such claims, some 
universalist assumptions creep back into their work. Thus, 
postmodernism, despite its stated efforts to avoid the problems of 
the European modernism of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, at best manages to criticize these theories without 
putting anything in their place. For those of us who want to 
understand the world systematically in order to change it, 
postmodernist theories at their best give little guidance.
(Haitsock 1987: 190)
The problem with this kind of critique is that it wants a specific theoretical 
approach (or, as I see it, a set of approaches) as some sort of political guidance.
To go back to Feyerabend (1993), theory can never guide actions — actions can 
only inform the theory and make it more appropriate. It is nice to have a certain 
“theoretical principle” that one adhers to, but this principle might be of absolutely 
no relevance to one’s (actual or perceived) place in the world. Any action should 
first be formulated in practical terms, theory can only follow up on this. In short 
, I think that the main problem that Nancy Hartsock has is that she believes that it
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is possible “to understand the world systematically.” This can never be done 
(except in some kind of an empathetic Einfiihlung) — the only thing that we can 
understand is how is our surrounding (“the world”) influenced by our actions 
(thoughts, experiments, etc.). Nothing more and nothing less.
But postmodern approaches also have their proponents. According to 
Angela McRobbie,
Postmodernism is a concept for understanding social change. It 
seems feeble to suggest it, but maybe the reason for the hostility to 
the concept in Britain lies at least partly in the abysmal fate of 
social science research and intellectual work in general in the UK 
during and after the Thatcher years, where the nature of these 
constraints inevitably produced defensive political and intellectual 
responses (...) Thus while there has been a debate about ‘new ways 
of living’ and about post-Fordism as well as one on fragmentation 
and identity, there has been little opportunity to examine in any 
depth the lived ‘condition of postmodernity’. As a result the really 
engaged debate on how best to understand this refiguring of 
society was never able to take place.
(McRobbie 1994: 62)
What happened instead, she argues, was an almost instinctive 
entrenchment of many intellectuals and their immediate rejection of the “Post” 
movement without actually examining its premises.
This is similar to the situation in American academic circles in the last 
few decades, as summed up by Micaela di Leonardo:
The American Rightward shift, coupled with demographic 
fluctuations and the Reagan administration’s cutoff of many social 
programs, had immediate effects on American colleges and 
universities. Social science (excluding economics) and liberal arts 
programs lost student enrollments to business majors and to 
professional schools as undergraduates and graduates responded to 
economic insecurity and rightwar d shift through attempts to gain 
“practical ” training (...) At the same time, rightward shift and 
funding crises led anthropology departments to focus on shifting
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“traditional” fields and topics, and thus to neglect feminist, 
Marxist, and American-focused research.
(Di Leonardo 1991&: 18)
In this context, Micaela di Leonardo sees postmodern and poststructuralist 
approaches (she uses the terms interchangeably — for example, 19916: 25) as 
quite dangerous, as some kind of a diversion keeping anthropology from going 
“back on the track” (or back to “feminist, Marxist, and American-focused 
research”<50). She adopts a line of criticism that is not dissimilar to the one (by 
Ernest Gellner) which will be examined more closely later in this chapter. For 
example:
Poststructuralist arguments, by their very nature, attempt to 
destabilize received conceptions of science, order, society, and the 
self. Poststructuralism is antiscience, antitheory; it levels our 
distinctions among truth and falsehood, science and myth. It 
denies the existence of social order or real human selves, declaring 
the death of the subject (....) it cannot affirm any truth or claim 
any political stance. It can only deconstruct.
(Di Leonardo 19916: 24)^1
But she is already part of the postmodern (and poststructuralist) culture 
itself. <52 The volume that she edited (Di Leonardo 1991a) is being advertised as 
a book dealing with postmodern anthropology. Postmodernism sells. And its 
critics are part of its marketing strategy. The flourishing of postmodern theory in
Which probably leaves anthropologists regarding themselves as postmodern and doing research 
exactly in these areas somewhat bewildered.
<51 O f course, I should note that “destabilizing perceived conceptions o f science, order, society, and 
the s e lf ’ is what postmodernist approaches are all about —  hardly any postmodern thinker would 
disagree with this phrase, except that it would be regaided as a compliment —  not as a critical 
remark!
Although I doubt that she would agree with this statement, this is the point that Donna Haraway 
makes, but I will return to it in the penultimate section o f this chapter.
I am not implying that Di Leonardo has in any way consciously influenced this marketing 
strategy!
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practically all areas of contemporaiy culture makes it difficult to avoid the 
paradoxicality of certain questions — not the least being the fact that even critics 
of postmodernism must enter the postmodern discourse (and use some of the 
specifically postmodernist discourse-strategies) if they want to make their point.
The fact is that there are no sacred things in postmodern discourses. 
Everything is open to discussion and debate, everything should be questioned.
No grand narrative should be accepted simply because someone in a position o f 
power says so! But this may sound too horrible for the proponents of abstract 
humanism. Their belief in the sanctity (and the very existence) of something 
vaguely described as “human nature,” combined with a vaguely leftist orientation 
leave them shocked by statements of postmodern thinkers (or thinkers of the 
postmodern) like the following:
They [the masses] are neither good conductors of the political, nor 
good conductors of the social, nor good conductors of meaning in 
general. Everything flows through them, everything magnetises 
them, but diffuses throughout them without leaving a trace. And, 
ultimately, the appeal of the masses has always gone unanswered. 
They do not radiate; on the contrary, they absorb all radiation from 
the outlying constellations of State, History, Culture, Meaning. 
They are inertia, the strength of the inertia, the strength of the 
neutral.
(Baudriliard 1983: 2 )^
I do not claim that this is a typical postmodern utterance, but it is statements like this that 
produce most horror for the socially engaged critics o f postmodernism. On the other hand, 
Baudriliard is often criticized for some things (exemplified by the critics like Norris, Jameson, 
Benhabib, among others) that are associated with postmodernism in general. Baudrillard’s apparent 
total disrespect for “the masses,” his attributing to them of only an endless inertia can be easily 
misunderstood and misinterpreted as the advocation o f some kind o f society or a system where only 
a privileged few would make all the relevant decisions. Although he is quite disillusioned with the 
Left, this is definitively not Baudrillard’s position. I cannot see how a careful reading of 
Baudriliard (the whole books/texts/interviews/etc.) can justify such a misinterpretation.
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Baudrillard’s “silent majorities” are part (an integral one!) of our world — 
and the examples connected with a poster advertisement in Slovenia (to which I 
will refer in one of the next chapters) are definitive proof for this. To call this 
politically “reactionary” is to totally misunderstand Baudriliard: in order to 
understand our interaction with the world, we have to analyze (sine ira et studio) 
some of the concepts of that very same world. If that means spelling out some 
painful truths, so be it. Anyone that lived in the former communist countries can 
understand veiy well a kind of inertia that Baudriliard is talking about. 65 xhe 
masses allow themselves to be led, they allow “truths” to be pre-packaged and 
delivered to them as “neutral.” Any questions regarding the “technologies of 
power” or the source(s) of the dominant discourses are strongly discouraged. By 
merely depicting the behavioral patterns of the masses, Baudriliard commits a 
horrible crime against the idealized images of “people’s power,” “people’s quest 
for liberty” (or Truth, Harmony, Reason, etc.), against the visions of societies 
where people wil know how to “rationally” determine “the nature of things.” 
Well, that mystical entity called “the people” (or masses) simply does not operate 
that way. This is something that I feel I have the right to say, having lived 
through some interesting political (as well as cultural) changes endorsed by the 
masses — and living through something does make it look different from the 
image created in the ivory towers of fa raw ay66 academics. The fall of 
communism in Eastern and Central Europe was followed by the enthusiastic 
endorsement (by the masses) of the variety of extremely nationalistic, 
chauvinistic and xenophobic policies, some of them culminating in the horrors of
65 I should stress that this kind of behavior is not limited to former communist countries —  it is 
widespread through the Western countries (especially the US). In a way, it forms the basis o f the 
Western “democracies” —  people that allow themselves to be “led,” people that do not want to be 
bothered with too many unpleasant questions —  these are the kinds of people that are and will be 
good subjects. They are every government’s dream.
66 In both a physical (geographical) and cultural sense.
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war in the former Yugoslavia. The masses in the West have no problem with 
their governments invading some countries (Panama), bombing others (Iraq), 
while shutting their eyes to the horrendous atrocities committed by their “allies” 
(hence the silence surrounding East Timor or Tibet). The “unification” of Europe 
was followed by the creation of numerous barriers that would discourage (or 
make it as difficult as possible) for any “non-European” (i. e., citizen of any 
country not belonging to the EU) to travel to the territories of the EU countries. 
These policies are brought into effect by the governments that represent the will 
o f the people. So why give this strange entity the respect that it had in left-wing 
political theory? Why not expose it for what it really is? Even if that is done in a 
somewhat playful (à la Baudriliard) way.
Postmodern thinkers are too often charged with “playfulness” and 
“disrespect,” with “not offering anything instead of the concepts that they 
deconstruct.” But what is wrong with playfulness? And why is it necessary to 
offer any universal concepts? Why not leave this to specific situations, to 
specific cultures, to specific social situations? Contemporary anthropology, I 
would like to think, does not need stone tablets. It needs understanding.
It is important to stress here (and I will come back to this point later in 
this chapter) the essential plurality of postmodernist approaches —  different 
theoretical approach(es) are valid — within certain social/cultural/academic 
parameters. Any theory and any theoretical approach is valid within its scope of 
research if it answers reasonably well the questions that a researcher puts 
forward. Some would call this attitude a relativistic one. I prefer to call it 
an a rch ic .67 In Paul Feyerabend’s famous (often misinteipreted) phrase:
67 Of course, naive anarchism believes that since there can be no definitive methodology o f any 
scientific discipline, all methodological approaches are equally valid. This is not my position. 
Obviously, there is a difference between the approaches that promote individual freedoms and rights 
and approaches that set out to annihilate these rights and to promote different kinds o f  
totalitarianism. I believe that it is both my duty and an obligation to actively promote the former
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“anything goes.” The only boundary set in the research should be the one 
concerning its results.
Once this boundary is set, it is easy to go forward (or backward, 
depending on preference). It is necessary to establish the boundaiy in order to 
grasp fully the consequences of our living in hyperreality. By hyperreality , I 
mean the notion of reality which is mediated (as well as presented, distorted, etc.) 
by different discourses and different m ed ia .68 It is a reality that is constructed— 
and the point is to understand that this constructing is always artificial and 
completely arbitiary. It is with the critique of this constructing (or its 
deconstructing) that I am primarily concerned. The notion of hyperreality is 
something distinctively postmodern, a concept that is constructed in somewhat 
different ways by Jean Baudriliard (1987, 1988a, 1990, 1992)69 and Umberto Eco 
(1986). It implies something artificial (consciously constructed), but something 
which is in itself (and by itself) conscious of its own artificiality and at the same 
time able to play with it. It also implies awareness that the reality that we believe 
to have hold (or at least some understanding) of is only a construction. Although 
both Eco and Baudriliard associate this concept primarily with the visual and 
semantic paradoxes that arise in their respective contacts with American (US)
ones. In situations like this, there is no point putting things in terms o f personal dislike —  if  
someone denies to someone else her or his very right to exist, academic arguments should leave the 
field for other (more active and more personal) forms o f  engagement.
68 Or, as put forth by Norris (who criticizes the concept): “an age of mass-media simulation, 
opinion-poll feedback, total publicity and so forth, with the result that it is no longer possible (if 
indeed it ever was) to distinguish truth from falsehood, or cling to those old ‘enlightenment’ values 
o f  reason, critique, and adequate ideas” (1990: 23). Of course, the concept is, for Norris, just another 
neo-capitalist and reactionary trick to evade the critical discussion o f the world (societies, cultures, 
etc.) that we live in. He fails to see how (especially in the Eastern Europe) this notion (as well as the 
ones derived from it) enabled the criticism o f reactionary and rightist ideologies. (He also fails to 
see that all political systems are oppressive —  although not in the same way, but that is another 
question.)
69 A critical and very useful appraisal o f Baudriliard on hyperreality is given by Luke 1991.
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culture, one is reminded here of the way in which Umberto Eco describes
postmodernism in the Reflections on The Name o f the Rose:
I think of the postmodern attitude as that of a man who loves a 
very cultivated woman and knows he cannot say to her, “I love 
you madly,” because he knows that she knows (and that she knows 
that he knows) that these words have already been written by 
Barbara Cartland. Still, there is a solution. He can say, “As 
Barbara Cartland would put it, I love you madly.” At this point, 
having avoided false innocence, having said clearly that it is no 
longer possible to speak innocently, he will nevertheless have said 
what he wanted to say to the woman: that he loves her, but he 
loves her in an age of lost innocence. If the woman goes along 
with this, she will have received a declaration of love all the same. 
Neither of the two speakers will feel innocent, both will have 
accepted the challenge of the past, of the already said, which 
cannot be eliminated, both will consciously and with pleasure play 
the game of irony... But both will have succeeded, once again, in 
speaking of love.
(Eco 19846: 67-68)
This is also a reasonably good explanation of what hyperreality entails, 
the paradoxical situation in which we are put even as we are aware of it. The 
main importance of this notion of hyperreality is precisely this recognition of the 
unsaid, unspoken and yet forever present, the idea that the innocence which 
people believed they had is lost.
This concept can help one understand gender relations in societies where a 
kind of a similar “double talk” is involved — as I will show later in the case of 
Prespa in Macedonia. Toni Flores sees what she calls “women’s culture” as 
examples of hyperreality; these have, according to her, become the vehicles of a 
specific, different cultural discourses — quite distinct from “men’s culture.” This
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accounts for a “schizophrenic peak in the modern, industrial, abstract, violent, 
imperialistic, patriarchal world” (Flores 1991: 141).70 She continues:
At the same time, “feminine” possibilities have not disappeared 
but have more or less “gone underground.” carried by the 
woman’s culture, they continue hidden, silent, disvalued, 
subversive, and absolutely necessary for the support of the whole 
social order. One might think of the feminine as a recessive gene, 
a set of characteristics that remain viable and possible in the 
genotype even when not showing up in the more obvious 
phenotype.
(Flores 1991: 142)
To go back to the question of (personal) social involvement, most social 
scientists prefer not to get directly socially involved in the political processes in 
their own countries, and particularly countries where they are doing research. 
Apart from obvious risks (for project/career/life), they assume that direct 
engagement would somehow blur their supposedly “objective” vision of the 
“reality” that they are observing. As already noted above, I do not think that 
anything like “objectivity” ever exists. However, this approach is likely to scare 
off (and perhaps instantly alienate) scholars that do believe in some form of 
social engagement, based on the Enlightenment ideals of rationality and 
humanism. My opinion about the concept and the meaning of “rationality” is 
similar to “objectivity.’’^ !
70 This can be related to what Langdon Winner calls apraxia: “the ultimate horror, a condition to be 
avoided at all costs” (1977: 185-187, passim). This condition refers to the stopping and breakdown 
in modern (Western) society, and feminist discourses can be seen as one way o f avoiding this state.
71 Enlightenment is a tricky notion which I will not discuss in any detail here —  I just wish to point 
to the fact that when this concept is used in anthropology, it almost invariably suggests a specific 
kind o f the Enlightenment, French in origin, and with Rousseau, Voltaire and Diderot as its main 
protagonists. German (even though Immanuel Kant is the founding father o f contemporary Western 
philosophy!), British and Italian (with some exception o f Giambattista Vico) Enlightenments are 
usually completely ignored, as well as such influential French-language thinkers as Holbach (for the
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Humanism is another big catchword for the criticism of postmodern 
approaches. To label someone as anti-humanist is almost as bad as labelling 
him/her racist, fascist, etc. What is usually meant by the great advocates of the 
concept of “humanism” is not clearly defined (most of them hardly bother to read 
some of the basic Renaissance and Enlightenment works), but it is supposed to 
represent a set of fixed norms and values that postulate belief in the universality 
of human nature, sanctity of human life, as well as belief that there are some 
universally set and understood human rights that must be respected. Of course, 
since these things are not always (or, some sceptics would say, not usually) self- 
evident, people need convincing, so someone takes charge of governing and 
convincing people what is in their best interests. Hence, we have a variety of 
highly repressive political systems, of which Nazism is the most illustrative 
example. I will not repeat here the arguments that Adorno and Horkheimer put 
forth in late 1944 in their Dialectics o f the Enlightenment, but it seems to me 
worth noting that not only great scientific discoveries (and the whole “industrial 
revolution”), but colonialism and Nazi death camps were also products of the 
universalist notion of “humanism.”
Reality72 is, as usual, much more complicated than someone’s wishful 
thinking. There is no such thing as an universal “human nature” waiting to be 
discovered and described by anthropologists. The very amount of data coming 
from the different sub-fields makes it impossible for a single researcher to cover 
successfully all the areas and sub-fields that are being included in anthropology 
(for example, the notion of anthropology as a “four fields” discipline is still
general treatment o f this period, I refer to Cassirer 1951). Foucault’s article “What is 
Enlightenment?” from 1984 is also quite illuminating.
72 My use o f the term “reality” is actually a combination o f the ordinary (I am almost tempted to 
say: common sense —  but not in the context discussed in one o f the next sections o f this chapter!) 
usage and the recognition that there are different and equally legitimate (valid within the specific 
context) “realities” based on one’s cultural, psychological, gender, ethnical, etc. backgrounds.
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prevalent in the US). As the data in specific disciplines gain in relevance (for 
example, genetic studies, molecular biology and biochemistry for physical or 
biological anthropology), so increased specialization is a fact even within the 
most conservative academic and research programs. However, the crossing of 
traditional boundaries is never easy, and since many anthropologists have lived 
for long believing that they indeed are the “super scientists” (or at least as close 
as one could get to them), they have never accepted the kind of self-questioning 
mechanisms that have enabled other disciplines (like sociology, for example) 
critically to examine their praxis while at the same time gaining access to other 
areas and other fields of knowledge (cf. Grimshaw and Hait 1994; Scott 1994). 
The pretension that someone (or something) can be omniscient has been deeply 
rooted in anthropology, and this pretension is responsible for most 
misunderstandings and deliberate misreadings of postmodernism. The 
“postmodern turn” in anthropology (Fabian 1991: 258) postulates anthropology 
as /
a field which examines the variety (or lack of variety) of human 
culture and society by giving reasoned accounts of it. As such, it 
is, like history, basically a literary enteiprise making use of variety 
of rhetoric strategies... Anthropology should enjoy at least the 
same freedom of imagination that has been demonstrated to be the 
source of progress in the natural sciences.
(Fabian 1991: 106-107)
As with any freedom (and following the famous distinction of Erich 
Fromm), one should distinguish between what this freedom of expression is fo r  
and what it is from. The distinction can be given in purely negative terms, but 
also in a sense of defining the area and the fruitful approaches more closely. 
Some of the criticism against the proponents of the “literary” or “text-centered” 
approach accuse these authors of not being specific enough about what they are 
tiying to do. In my view, some of the serious misunderstandings that critics like
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Hobart have about this approach^^ is that they believe that the proponents of the 
“literary” or “interpretative” approach are trying to impose it as the way of doing 
anthropology today.
This very concept of imposing is in shai'p contrast to one of the main 
facets of postmodern theories: namely, the concept that there is a plurality of 
truths (and, consequently, a plurality of theoretically equally valid approaches) .74 
As already noted above, the practical value of each and every approach will be 
determined within the specific context where one is doing one’s reseaich —  so 
the only measure of success will be to what extent different approaches help in 
(or facilitate) one’s intended research. Different research strategies can bring 
successful results. As pointed out by the “anarchistic” methodological approach 
of Paul Feyerabend (for example, 1987, 1993), this context-bound and context- 
based research strategy has been adumbrated and used by some of the most 
influential physicists and “classical” scientists from the late 19th and eaidy 20th 
century (Bolzano, Mach, Einstein, Bohr), but has still tended to be largely 
ignored. The great figures of Western science were quite well aware of the 
relativity of concepts on which their theories were based (as well as the 
incommensurability of their theories with alternative systems of knowledge, such 
as the ones outlined in and referred to by myth or fiction, for example), and 
contemporary rationalist crusaders have become painfully aware of these 
difficulties through the problems opened by quantum physics, physics of sub­
atomic particles, as well as phenomena such as the Heisenberg’s principle of
73 Actually, there are several different approaches, and the authors frequently lumped together are 
frequently in sharp disagreement with each other. However, most of the criticism is taking the 
“Postmodern” or “literary” approach to be a single identifiable and unified category, in total 
disregard o f what the authors involved really say.
74 I understand this to be one of the main criticisms o f Friedman (1987) directed against authors 
like Geertz. Friedman accuses them of rejecting evolutionary approaches, while at the same time 
positioning themselves as the dominant anthropologists (creators o f the current metanarrative). This 
is not my understanding o f what, for example, Geertz’s writings are all about.
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indeterminancy. All these developments have helped to shatter the rationalist 
picture that has been dominant in the Western science and philosophy since the 
17th century, when an essentially tolerant and pluralistic tradition was replaced 
by another one, based on principles of methodological monism, objectivity and 
universalist truth-claims.
WHAT DO YOU THINK YOU KNOW (AND WHY?)?: 
TWO GREAT WESTERN TRADITIONS
Postmodern science — by concerning itself by such things as 
undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized 
by incomplete information, 'Jracta f catastrophes, and pragmatic 
paradoxes — is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, 
catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the 
word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take 
place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown.
(Lyotard 1984: 60)
The last sentence of the above epigraph is of particular importance. How 
can anything produce the unknown? How can one know the unknown? How 
many paradoxes can one stand before slipping into the (academic, imaginary, or 
medical) schizophrenia or naïve positivism or something similar? To answer this 
question, one needs to go back, to trace Western intellectual history back to the 
time of the great “rationalist” break in the 17th century.
The “discovery” of the New World, as well as the debates that followed 
on the issue of slavery75 permanently changed the Western world. The encounter
75 It is a well known fact that before the 16th century, race was simply not an issue in the Western 
European art —  and, although infrequently, representatives o f other races were represented in 
sculpture or painting.
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with “the other” brought shock and amazement along with large scale ethnocide 
and at the same time ecocide, but it also broadened intellectual h orizons.76
The debates that arose immediately after the Spanish conquest of America 
are primarily associated with the name and life of Bartolomé de las Casas (1484- 
1566), traditionally regarded as a symbol (or at least, a figure of immense 
importance) of the struggle for dignity of the American Indians (or, in the current 
politically correct usage. Native Am ericans).77 Actually, Las Casas can be seen 
(in a historical context) as a continuation of the efforts of his fellow Dominicans, 
Antonio de Montesinos and Pedro de Cordoba, who were already refusing to hear 
the confessions of the Spanish settlers at Santo Domingo (Haiti), based on what 
they have considered to be inhuman treatment of the native population. Las 
Casas went a little further in asking for the abolition of encomiendas and 
repartimientosP^ as something in itself evil and immoral. In a letter to the King 
Carlos V in 1516, he wrote that “it is better to lose all the lands overseas, than to 
allow that such horrible injustices be done in the name of the king”. With the 
support of the Dominican theologians from the University of S alam anca,79 Las
76  I  am not implying that this ethnocide and ecocide was a necessary or in any way justifiable 
price to be paid for this broadening o f  intellectual horizons —  I am just stating this as a fact.
77 This brief account is based primarily on Boskovic 1990c; 15-16; but cf. also Hanke 1959; 
Boskovik 1997 and (in a slightly “Postmodern” context) Todorov 1984.
78 Without getting into the detailed explanation o f these important institutions, I will only say that 
they refer to a series of regulations that basically connected (tied) native inhabitants to the lands that 
were purchased by settlers or given away as gifts, thus keeping the native population practically as 
slaves.
79 Among the most notable ones were Bartolomé de Carranza, Melchior Cano, and Domingo de 
Soto. They were trying to prove that Pope Alexander VPs bull "Inter cæ tera” from 1494 was valid 
only in the spiritual sense —  giving to the Spanish and the Portuguese the right to christianize native 
population in the territories that they discover, but not to treat these territories and their inhabitants 
as their own property. The Dominican General, Thomas de Caeta, wrote in his commentary to the 
edition o f the Surnma theologica o f Thomas Aquinas that there are actually three kinds o f infidels:
1/ the ones that are legally and factually subjects of the Christians and live in the Christian kingdoms 
(Moors, Jews); 2/ the ones that are legally but not factually Christian subjects because they seize
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Casas eventually succeeded (with great help of the Spanish royalty!) in arguing 
for laws that abolish encomiendas and that grant (at least formally, if not in 
practice) freedom to the native population, in 1542.
However, the theoretical question of the use of force in converting the 
native population to the “true faith” and “true God” had already been raised by 
the lawyer from Cordoba, Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, in his treatise ^"Démocrates 
alter sive de iustis belli causis’' (Rome, 1535). Sepulveda stressed the fact that the 
Indians were, in his opinion, “infidels, barbarians, and slaves by their very 
nature” —  and all this led to the famous discussion between him and Las Casas in 
1548 at Valladolid in Spain. In this discussion. Las Casas claimed that the 
differentiation of the civilized peoples and the barbarians could not be based on 
ethnic, cultural and religious differences, but on the fact that there were people 
who respected freedom and the natural rights of others and people that do not 
respect these rights. Although the royal auditors never officially declared the 
outcome of this debate, the fact that shortly after the debate (in 1552) Las Casas 
published his Brevisima relacion... , while Ginés de Sepulveda never received 
permission to publish any of his subsequent polemical works, speaks for itself. 80 
However, this was one of the last instances that voices and concerns of the other 
were so publicly respected in the West European cultural and political
Christian territories (Turks); and 3/ the ones that are neither legally nor factually Christian subjects 
(Indians). He concluded that the second kind (Turks) should be treated like enemies, but the third 
kind (Indians) are legal owners of their own lands, and cannot be subjected to force. These and 
similar statements were recognized in the bull o f the Pope Paul III, “Sublimus Deus"' o f the June 2, 
1537: “Indians and all the peoples that are yet to be met by Christians, even if  they live with no faith 
in Christ, should not be deprived o f their freedom or their worldly possessions... They cannot be 
forced into slavery, and to the faith o f Christ they should be introduced by the preaching o f the 
Divine Word and the example o f the decent life.”
80 O f course, one should not forget that Las Casas on the theoretically similar grounds justified the 
slavery (and slave trade, which was becoming a profitable business venture) in Africa!
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d isco u rse .81 Another tradition, another way of obtaining knowledge was about 
to impose itself as a master nairative (or metanarrative) of the time. The burden 
of dealing (and answering to the challenges of) the unknown had become too 
heavy.
The unknown that was introduced to the Western world in the late 15th 
and early 16th century were other worlds. Of course, the contacts and the 
interchange between Western and non-Western cultures had a long history, but it 
was always limited by sheer distance or in some cases simple cultural 
incompatibility (mostly based on the premises of different religions or different 
ideological systems). In the case of the Western European expansion that started 
in late 15th and early 16th century with Columbus reaching the Antilles in 1492 
and Vasco da Gama sailing around Africa in 1498, the West put itself in a 
position of absolute domination and control, its master narrative was to become a 
master narrative of the whole world that it wanted to subjugate; it had 
appropriated (“discovered”) new worlds, and something had to be done about it.
What was done was essentially a rationalist revolution, initiated by René 
Descartes in philosophy and Sir Isaac Newton in science. This revolution 
claimed the separation between the mind and the body, it started to treat different 
systems as always incompatible, different systems of values as mutually 
exclusive, and also it set up a standard (of the Western colonial powers in 
expansion — although, to be clear, neither Descartes or Newton were particularly 
involved or interested in the colonial expansion) that was to become the standard 
for judging and evaluating all other (different) cultures. This stood in sharp 
contrast to the humanist ideals of the Renaissance (in fact, Toulmin calls this
81 For an excellent account o f the Western “discovery” of the other related to America, see Mason 
1990.
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revolution “Retreat from the Renaissance” [1990: 30]), and it has made several 
important breaks with the earlier tradition.82
First of all, the emphasis shifts from the oral to the written, rhetoric losing 
its position as a legitimate field of study, and the stress is put on the rational 
presentation of ai'guments, in the sense of producing proofs. Who presents the 
arguments, in which context, to what audience, becomes totally irrelevant. 
Decontextualization enters the West European science and humanities. Secondly, 
there is a shift from the paiticular to the universal; in the world that was 
becoming (colonially) globalized, particular cases and situations lost their 
importance, the laws are set with universalist claims (primarily in the context of 
raging religious wars in Europe).
If respecting the other was implicit in the moral and philosophical theories 
of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, from the 17th century onwards, this 
respect became irreconcilable with the strategies of domination, where the other 
had to be subsumed under the General Law of Reason. There is an important 
shift from the timely to the timeless, closely associated with the new strategies. 
While in previous centuries scholais paid much more attention to the context of 
specific situations (following the advice from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics), 
this interest is lost in the rationalist revolution. Finally, the shift in all the major 
theoretical debates (both in the sciences and in the humanities) changes from the 
local to the general, all in accordance with the new universalist claims.
Although Toulmin looks at this break primarily from the perspective of 
the actual political and historical context of the 17th century Europe (which led 
to the savage war that from 1618 until 1648 raged in Germany and Bohemia), his 
arguments deal with the characteristics of Modernity itself, its emphasis on 
rationalization, the pursuit of Truth, and the quest for certainty that eventually
82 In this section o f the chapter, I am closely following Stephen Toulmin’s account, so I am not 
giving specific page references.
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became self-fulfilling. It is against this background of universalist claims and the 
belief in “objectively” existing knowledge (usually associated with the idea and 
concept of Modernity [cf. Toulmin 1990, Bauman 1993, etc.]) that postmodern 
social scientists, humanists, and philosophers react. The postmodern reaction 
might be understood in terms of Rorty’s (1980, 1989) reference to the “edifying” 
procedure of gaining knowledge; one that distrusts the notion of essential 
rightness and single and universal logic, one that is open to relativism and 
scepticism, one that is situationalist and subjective, one that constantly doubts 
even its own premises.
Modernity, by comparison, seems never to have entertained 
similar doubts as to the universal grounding of its status. The 
hierarchy of values imposed upon the world administered by the 
north-western tip of the European peninsula was so firm, and 
supported by powers so enormously overwhelming, that for a 
couple of centuries it remained the baseline of the world vision, 
rather than an overtly debated problem. Seldom brought to the 
level of consciousness, it remained the all-poweiful ‘taken-for- 
granted’ of the era. It was evident to everybody except the blind 
and the ignorant that the West was superior to the East, white to 
black, civilized to cmde, cultured to uneducated, sane to insane, 
healthy to sick, man to woman, normal to criminal, more to less, 
riches to austerity, high productivity to low productivity, high 
culture to low culture. All these ‘evidences’ are now gone. Not a 
single one remains unchallenged. What is more, we can see now 
that they did not hold in separation from each other; they made 
sense together, as manifestations of the same power complex, the 
same power structure of the world, which retained credibility as 
long as the structure remained intact, but were unlikely to survive 
its demise.
(Bauman 1993: 135-136)
The extent of this break with the earlier tradition is becoming clear when 
the others are also able to voice their concerns. In the second half of the 16th
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century, Montaigne’s Essais (cf. a study by Frame 1969) discuss customs and 
rites of other peoples (including cannibalism), different ethical and moral 
questions of the time, as well as the pleasures of everyday life (including sex ).83 
Only a century later such writings would have been unimaginable.
From the 17th century onwards, the prevalent belief was that there can be 
such a thing as universal knowledge (or a universal way of achieving it). This 
belief was for the most part prevalent in the French Enlightenment,84 and it 
tended to influence all aspects of Western European civilization as it spread in 
attempt to appropriate and understand the other worlds. Knowledge became a 
magical catchword. What could be known and by what means came to be the 
objective that the most brilliant minds went after. The problem of the unknown, 
as well as the problem of objective limitations and relativism of any knowledge 
was for the most part denied. As much as the defining narrative before the 
“discoveiy” of other worlds has been the recognition of the differences between 
different cultures and emphasis on the specific context, the dominating narrative 
since the rationalist revolution has become a decontextualizing quest for 
certainty. This can be understood as a form of “Enlightenment rationalist 
fundamentalism” (or Enlightenment rationalism, with all of its neopositivistic 
overtones), one of whose most important representatives in contemporary 
anthropology and social theory was Ernest Gellner. I take Gellner as example 
both for his formal influence (after all, he was Professor and Chair of Social 
Anthropology at the University of Cambridge) and for his leained, often 
polemical and frequently entertaining writings — whose emphasis stands in shai'p 
contrast to the sketches of modernity and postmodernity as presented by scholars 
like Bauman (1991, 1992).
83 Montaigne has been associated with the origins o f feminism (Insdorf 1977).
84 Cf. Kant’s "Was ist Aufklarung?, ” as well as Foucault’s answer to it.
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ANTHROPOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE: 
THE WAY WE WERE
It is almost impossible to give a coherent definition or account of 
postmodernism (...) All one can say is that it is a kind of hysteria 
of subjectivity which goes beyond ‘Joyce, Hemingway, Woolf, et. 
al.’, who evidently did not go far enough: their ‘conceit of an 
interiorized and distinctive subjectivity... both drew from and 
stood at a distance from normal speech and identity’. Fai- too 
orderly, it would seem.
(Gellner 1992: 29)
One of the important influences of the rationalist revolution described in 
the previous section has been its insistence on a set of supposedly shar ed values 
and perspectives that were (are) so obvious that anyone (with just a small 
conscious effort) could see. This is what I will refer to as Western common 
sense, and it is a perspective quite commensurable with the concepts of Western 
common sense outlined by Bauman (cf. supra, p. 58). According to common 
sense, there are no serious doubts about us, the world, our place in it, our 
distinctiveness from nature, our need to explain and define everything rationally 
and logically, etc.
However, even the harshest critics of postmodern approaches recognize 
that the present world is in the state of inherent instability, with three dominant 
forces contesting for power. According to Gellner (1992: 2), these three 
contestants are:
1 Religious fundamentalism.
2 Relativism, exemplified for instance by the recent fashion of 
‘postmodernism’.
3 Enlightenment rationalism, or rationalist fundamentalism.
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I have already outlined the goals, origins, and agenda associated with the 
third force (with which Gellner aligns himself), Gellner offers a sound (if 
somewhat brief) account of the first one, but what about the haunting spirit of 
relativism? How to combat that supreme evil, that threatens common sense, 
questions the accepted logic and constantly raises doubts?
Gellner recognizes postmodernism as “a contemporary movement” (1992: 
22), laments over its lack of clarity, is a bit unclear “about the attitude of the 
movement to the human subject” (1992: 23), and generally characterizes it with 
“[t]he notions that everything is a ‘text’, that the basic material of texts, societies 
and almost anything is meaning, that meanings are there to be decoded or 
‘deconstructed’, that the notion of objective reality is suspect” (ibid.). The main 
problem with postmodernism is that it brings into current theoretical, cultural, 
artistic, ideological, and all other debates the concept of relativism.
Postmodernism would seem to be rather clearly in favour of 
relativism, in as far as it is capable of clarity, and hostile to the 
idea of unique, exclusive, objective, external or transcendent 
truth. Truth is elusive, polymorphous, inward, subjective... and 
perhaps a few further things as well. Straightforward it is not. My 
real concern is with relativism : the postmodernist movement, 
which is an ephemeral cultural fashion, is of interest as a living 
and contemporary specimen of relativism, which as such is of 
some importance and will remain with us for a long time.
(Gellner 1992: 24)
The above quoted paragraph summaiizes the agenda of one of the most 
influential and prominent critics of postmodernism from an anthropological 
perspective. It is not the “movement” itself which is a problem, it is what it 
brings with itself. Political liberation and cognitive subjectivity which have come 
to characterize the post-World War II world are among the enemies of common 
sense, at least insofar as they are not presented in a set of completely
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unambiguous, logically coherent, and scientifically positive set of axioms. Even 
worse, they tend to culminate in anthropology in a “dialogic” form, allowing for 
(at least a possibility of) the multiple voices (not only the one of the 
anthropologist, but also the ones of the people that he/she studies) to be heard in 
their own words.
In the end, the operational meaning of postmodernism in 
anthropology seems to be something like this: a refusal (in 
practice, rather selective) to countenance any objective facts, any 
independent social structures, and their replacement by a pursuit 
of ‘meanings’, both those of the objects of inquiry and of the 
inquirer. There is thus a double stress on subjectivity: the world- 
creation by the person studied, and the text-creation by the 
investigator. ‘Meaning’ is less a tool of analysis than a conceptual 
intoxicant, an instrument of self-titillation. The investigator 
demonstrates both his initiation into the mysteries of 
hermeneutics, and the difficulty of the enterprise, by complex and 
convoluted prose, peppered with allusions to a high proportion of 
the authors of the World’s 100 Great Books, and also to the latest 
fashionable scribes of the Left Bank.
(Gellner 1992: 29-30) 
Although Gellner quite precisely notes that the objections the 
anthropologists associated with postmodernism mostly have to do with the 
Caitesian legacy (1992: 37-38), his misunderstanding of the whole idea (or, 
should I say, the whole set of ideas) can be matched only by his contempt for the 
representatives of this “Movement.” He believes that the main goal of 
postmodernists is to absolutize knowledge (from a relativist perspective) and 
appropriate power which has been safely kept in the hands of the rational 
revolutionaries. In blurring different genres and different authors, he concludes 
that there are two distinct, but intertwi.^ ed arguments that the whole new 
tradition puts forward. The first one “is that the pursuit of objectivity is really 
spurious, and a form of domination: the observer insulates the objects and sits in 
judgement on it,” while the other one is “the argument that the world has become
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more complex, and that the sepaiation of roles is no longer possible” (1992: 41). 
Starting from completely different sets of beliefs and values (exactly the ones to 
which postmodernism is a reaction), Gellner accepts the second argument, but 
remains convinced that it only means that the world is more complicated now and 
that it is therefore more difficult to get to the objective truth (or reality).
The main problem with relativism is that it entails nihilism (p. 49), as well 
as denying the possibility of morality and knowledge outside the limits and the 
specific context of a specific culture.85 According to Gellner, it also 
misrepresents the present world: “As a characterization of the predicament and 
difficulties and anxiety faced by the modern mind, it is a total travesty, so strange 
and extreme as to make any handling of our problem impossible” (1992: 55-56). 
Some of the misunderstandings are more clearly outlined in the following 
paragraph:
The problem situation faced by modern thought in general, and 
anthropology in particular, is deeply unsymmetrical and un- 
relativistic. Relativism assumes or postulates a symmetrical 
world. Culture A has its own vision of itself and of culture B, and, 
likewise, B has its own vision of itself and of A. The same goes 
for an entire range of cultures. A must not sit in judgement on B 
nor vice versa, nor must B see A in terms of itself. Each must 
learn to see the other in terms of the other's own notions (if at all), 
and this is, presumably, the task and achievement of the 
hermeneutic anthropologist, as he himself envisages it. He is to be 
a neutral translator, at most. That is the picture presented by 
relativism.
(1992: 56)
This, of course is not the picture presented by relativism —  although 
there may be people that claim to be “relativist” or postmodern and support this
85 In this section o f his book, Gellner actually reacts to Geertz’s lecture on “Anti-anti-relativism” 
(Geertz 1984).
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picture as well. The image of cultures viewing each other in a totally symmetrical 
way is oversimplified and very much blown out of proportion. The question of 
the possibility of translating adequately one culture (or categories from one 
culture) into another is quite open. Personally, I think that the precise cultural 
facts of a specific culture can only be translated into the medium of expression of 
another culture under veiy special (limited and very much context-dependent) 
circumstances.86 The question of the very possibility of any neutral translation 
is even logically inconsistent with the methodological claims associated with 
postmodernism (if it is a translation, it cannot be neutral!). The picture that 
Gellner offers is a grossly exaggerated caricature; extreme cases taken out of 
context and paraded in order to fulfill a specific agenda. 87 Relativism takes into 
account the simple fact that there are different cultures, different ways of 
understanding the world, and different ways of conceptualizing it. In 
anthropology, this is not at all new —  one should only remember Evans- 
Pritchard’s famous comment on the usefulness of organizing his daily affairs 
based on the Azande oracles!88 Relativism does not postulate a symmetrical 
world —  but Western rationalism and logical positivism (which, through the 
common sense, still lives!) do. For that kind of symmetiy (rational, objective, 
logical in the first place), the antagonisms and doubts associated with 
postmodernisms present a potential danger, so
Postmodernism is a movement which, in addition to contingent 
flaws — obscurity, pretentiousness, faddiness, showmanship, 
cultural name-dropping — commits major errors in the method it 
recommends: its penchant for relativism and preferential attention 
to semantic idiosyncrasy blind it to the non-semantic aspect of 
society, and to the immensely important, absolutely pervasive
86 Cf. the wonderful example o f the first contact used in Strathern 1987Z?.
87 Feyerabend (1987) presents a brilliant critique of anti-relativist approaches that takes into account 
these facts,
88 Again, this is one o f Feyerabend’s favorite anthropological examples.
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asymmetry in cognitive and economic power in the world 
situation.
(Gellner 1992: 70)
Finally, Gellner concludes, postmodernism does not matter as such (being 
“a tortuous, somewhat affected fad, practised by at most some academics living 
fairly sheltered lives” [p. 72]), but relativism does, not because it threatens with 
the moral nihilism, but because it brings the potential disaster of cognitive 
relativism. But cognitive realism is already part of our (both Gellner’s and my) 
world —  the Western discourses are not as all pervasive and as triumphant as it 
seemed perhaps even a few years ago (one of the great misinterpretations of 
Fukuyama’s present and popular concept of “the end of histoiy”). I think that 
Gellner confused the aspects of market economy and consumerism (which do 
tend to spread throughout the Third World without many obstacles) with 
ideological and cultural aspects — for example, drinking Coca-Cola does not 
necessarily imply a full support for the American foreign politics and American 
cultural values, even though Coca-Cola is an American product. It is possible to 
buy and enjoy some products o f Western industry without actually being swept 
away by Western sets o f values. This possibility seems to evade Gellner’s critical 
account.
Gellner’s book, while offering some interesting and important criticism 
(do some postmodern authors claim that they have access to objective 
knowledge?; if they do not believe in the possible interpretation of written texts, 
why do they write?), offers no way out, no explanation, no solution to any of the 
conflicts that characterize the contemporary world. It is a step backwards, before 
authors like Evans-Pritchard and Malinowski, a step towards postulating Western 
rationalism as the way of understanding and conceptualizing our world. By 
pointing to the paradoxality of certain situations, postmodern anthropologist do 
not claim that there ar e no valid questions that can be asked. Gellner’s account
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simply rejects a healthy scepticism and open-mindedness that can only help us to 
confront the problems of the contemporary world. It postulates the existence of 
the Universal Anthropological Nature, of goals and aims (associated with the 
Western sets of values) that are deemed to be prevalent in the whole world, and 
therefore have to be respected as such. In this way, it represents an attempt to 
establish another dominant narrative (or metanarrative) which will guide and 
instruct the generations to come. But the time where new generations were 
simply accepting grand narratives — without questioning their foundations or 
agendas — is gone. And so is the “right time” for establishing such a meta­
narrative. It is a lament for a time long gone, time passed and lost with all the 
claims and pretensions to universality. By pointing at some of the dangers that 
this situation (“the Postmodern condition,” as Lyotard would say) brings, Gellner 
hopes both to advise and to warn at the same time. But his audience (as well as 
its values, wishes, and concerns) is for the most part already incorporated into the 
world which he refuses to accept. ^ 9 The concepts and the ideas from his version 
of la Lumières were already attacked, criticized and theoretically demolished, not 
by “the latest fashionable scribes of the Left Bank,” but by Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer^o in their Dialectics o f the Enlightenment, written in Germany 
in 1944.91 So much for the battle cry warning of Relativismus Uber Allés on 
page 40 of Gellner’s book.
^9 Paradoxically, even discourses o f some most prominent critics o f postmodernism are actually 
incorporated into the currents o f postmodernism. This is especially the case for Habermas and 
Jameson (who actually wrote a Foreword for the English edition of Lyotard’s book), but also for at 
least several prominent anthropologists (Scholte, Pardon, Hobart).
99 The Left Bank of the Rhine, perhaps?
91 One would also expect that Gellner would direct his anti-relativistic criticism primarily against 
scientists like Mach, Minkowski, Einstein, Schrodinger, Heisenberg, etc. —  who were there long 
before Geertz.
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POSTMODERNISM AND ANTHROPOLOGY: 
“IT’S THE END OF THE WORLD AS WE KNOW IT”
Eclecticism is the degree zero of contemporary general culture: 
one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats McDonald’s food 
for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris perfume in 
Tokyo and ‘retro’ clothes in Hong Kong; knowledge is a matter 
for TV games.
(Lyotard 1993: 42)
The full title of the song of the American rock group REM referred to in 
the title of this section is actually: “It’s the end of the world as we know it (and I 
feel fine).” The question of the “I,” the motives, wishes, feelings, etc., of the 
individual subject come into focus. To be even more subjective, and following 
the theme of eclecticism, — while I am typing this, I am wearing hiking shoes 
made in Rumunia, a Swiss-made wristwatch (Swatch), Italian-made glasses, two 
“friendship bands” woven by Amerindians from Guatemala and Brazil, while 
different pieces of my clothes were made in Great Britain, Yugoslavia, USA, and 
Sweden. The globalness of the present world has become a fact of life, as noted 
in the famous quotation from Lyotaid’s “Answering the question: What is 
postmodernism?” We do not even notice these things as something extraordinary 
or unusual, even though (at least in theory), we do communicate through the way 
we are dressed at least as much as through language or other means of expression.
Both the notion of the “I-ness” and the notion of the globalness (and 
continuing globalization) have come into the focus of contemporary research. It 
is in this somewhat paradoxical area where I believe that anthropology and 
postmodernism can communicate most profitably. I use the word with 
specifically economics-based connotations intentionally; since another important
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aspect of our world seems to be the imposition of commodities-based strategies.92 
The aim of contemporary anthropology (the aim regarding postmodernism, of 
course) is to consume postmodernism, to reduce it to a set of meanings and 
phrases within the anthropological canon and prescribed discourse (so that it can 
be easily presented in lectures; so that elegant and unambiguous exam questions 
can be made out of it, neat textbooks written about it, etc.). If they (the 
“Postmodern anthropologists”) think that nothing can be said with any significant 
degree of certainty, ask critics like Gellner, Spencer or Pardon, why do they 
bother to write and publish? (Some of “them” indeed write and publish a lot.) Is 
it really the money (salaries and research grants) that makes the (anthropological, 
academic, etc.) world go ’round? Or is there something else?93 The answers to 
these questions again depend on the side of the Great Postmodernist Divide that 
one puts oneself.
One way of answering the question of the role of anthropology in the 
contemporary world has to do with the legacy of the colonial discourses that are 
still present. In fact, as Derrida (1992:7) very playfully (and somewhat 
disrespectfully for etymologies) remarks: “The Latin words culture and 
colonialization have a common root, there where it is precisely a question of 
what happens to roots.”
Anthropologists are engaged in some form of a post-colonial discourse 
whenever they step (professionally, of course) into the world of a “strange” or
92 For the commodities-based strategies in the contemporary world and its influence on the way that 
we try to rationalize the world, I refer to Baudrillard (1987, 1988Ù, 1990,1992, 1995).
93 And, while I am typing this, I am reminded o f the most eloquent 1918 lecture by Max Weber, 
“Science as a vocation.” Some problems and dilemmas seem to be exactly the same. To quote from 
Weber: “The American’s conception of the teacher who faces him is: he sells me his knowledge and 
his methods for my father’s money, just as the greengrocer sells my mother cabbage. And that is all” 
(1946: 149). O f course, although Weber used an American example in his lecture (to contrast 
American and German attitudes towards learning), the situation is much more widespread today. 
Almost universal, I would think.
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“exotic” culture (the fact that it might be their own culture does not affect this). 
“Step into” might not be the correct expression, since one of the most important 
conditions for the understanding of another culture (and the whole different set of 
values, norms, representations, etc.) is being aware of the differences. Except in 
the cases where the anthropologist/ethnographer is himself/herself a member of a 
certain community (and sometimes even in those cases, but on a different plane), 
there is a fundamental difference. Two worlds meet. Or, alternatively, two (or 
more) cultures, worlds (sometimes literally centuries) apart.94 This “stepping 
into” should not be taken only in a literal sense, since it presupposes any form of 
communication about or with a culture or a society (or group, individual, etc.) 
that is being studied. Another thing that it presupposes is that there will be 
elements which the anthropologist will find impossible to classify or explain (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1991), so he/she should not tiy to force her/his 
preconceptions on the culture, but to accept the potential unintelligibility of 
certain elements of the studied culture as a fact, culture as a specific set of values 
for each individual and distinctive community or group.
Of course, the question arises of the objective (if there is such thing) 
validity of doing any research. It was as far as in 1881, when one of the founding 
fathers of anthropology, Adolf Bastian, remarked that
For us, primitive societies (Naturvolker) are ephemeral, that is, as 
regards our knowledge of, and our relations with them, in fact, 
inasmuch as they exist for us at all. At the very instance they 
become known to us they are doomed.
(quoted in Fabian 1991: 194)
The image of other worlds is constantly being distorted and remodeled, 
based on Western media assumptions, and it is mostly presented through the
94 Of course, there are dijferences within specific cultures as well as differences between 
anthropologists/ethnographers and cultures they come from  —  I am just using these universal 
concepts here to illustrate my point.
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Western media. In the globalized world, these distorted images then sift back 
even to the ones that they are (were) supposed to represent (for examples related 
to misrepresentations of Islam, see Ahmed 1992).95
In a sense, women are the ultimate “others.” They are an integral part of 
the world and at the same time have been throughout history excluded (partially 
or completely) from full participation in it (Riley 1988). Observed and studied in 
“primitive” societies, they have only recently become active participants in 
“mainstream” sciences and humanities, adding a specific (or should I say: gender 
specific) point of view. This opens numerous possibilities, as summed up by 
Toni Flores:
What is interesting, I think, is that because male culture is 
officially the valued and powerful one, women come with some 
determination to grasp what we have been denied — and from this 
realization come the vaiious women’s movements. On the other 
hand, because female culture, along with the feminine possibilities 
it carries, is both devalued and disempowered, it is hard for men to 
recognize or accept that they lack something, much less attempt 
actively to grasp what they hai’dly know they want.
(Flores 1991: 143)
Of course, I would not agree with phrases such as “male culture” or 
“female culture” — they both seem to be too general and too universalizing and 
totalizing, trying to subsume a great variety of different discourses under a 
common denominator. However, based on my observations and interviews in 
Macedonia and Slovenia, as well as on the relevant literature, it seem to me that 
in everyday life there exists a sense of polarity and ambivalence when it comes to 
the issues dealing with gender. Anthropology is no exception to this (Quinn
95 Another excellent example o f how one great world tradition and culture, China, has been 
misrepresented and its image distorted beyond recognition (caricaturized, even satiricized, in the 
writings that had most serious objectives) even in critical Western scholarship, and even by authors 
like Foucault (and probably also Derrida), is given in Longxi 1988.
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1977). The picture has been distorted, people realize that and begin to wander 
what the “real” image look like.
The extent to which anthropology can (or even should) reshape this 
distorted picture remains unclear, but anthropology as something standing outside 
the contemporary world, in the realm of the “pure” science is a fiction.96 it is my 
belief that anthropologists have a duty and an obligation (both as human beings 
and as critical intellectuals) to at least try to present “the others” in an acceptable 
way (acceptable for the others in the first place!). Since they depend on their 
existence (that is to say, the very existence of others is a prerequisite for their 
profession), it is in their (existential) interest to assure that the others are 
represented in an acceptable way and that the “natives” are able both to represent 
and to express themselves in a ways that they find most appropriate.^? Whether 
one will call this expression representation (Fabian 1990), evocation (Tyler 
1986), invocation, or something else (cf. Marcus and Clifford 1985; Geertz 1983 
and 1988; Marcus 1989; Strathern 1987a, 1987/?, 1991; Haraway 1991), depends 
on the context-specific cultural frame where the interaction is taking place. It 
also depends on whether one believes that any kind of 
representation/evocation/invocation/etc. is possible when one operates with 
different (culture-specific, context-bound, experience-influenced, etc.) sets of 
categories.
I do not intend to fully adopt here Asad’s (1979) thesis that what really 
matters in terms of social change today is the movement of world capital and the 
globalization of world economic processes (although I do believe that terms like 
“market economy” are nonsense invented by the people in power in order to
96 At least as much as the very concept that any science can be “pure,” “objective,” “disinterested, 
or politically “neutral.”
97 O f course, the question then arises (and I do not claim to know the answer to it): who decides 
what is an adequate representation of the other in a specific context and based on what criteria?
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retain and globalize this pow ei’98), but this thesis reflects a part of the problem. 
(On another note, as will be clearer in the chapter on Macedonia, economic 
power is quite important in gender relations: the more one has, the less likely that 
she will be marginalized.) If anthropology is to incorporate such a thesis, then 
anthropologists should be actively involved in the processes of social change.
The experience of the reality “lived” can be more helpful than the experience of 
the reality “theorized.” However, as academics, they usually claim (publicly, at 
least) no allegiance to a particular political system or ideology. As scientists, 
they are supposed to be “neutral.” Again, the idea that “neutrality” in a great 
post-romantic sense is simply impossible in any science (including anthropology) 
is nothing new or original. While most authors will claim that their interpretation 
of the data (and their field notes) are reasonably (if not absolutely) “objective,” 
they are well aware that others aie not quite that “neutral” or “objective.” 
Anthropologists need others (cf. Fabian 1990; Mason 1990, 1995), both in 
ethnography and in theory,99 even when others are actually their fellow 
anthropologists (cf. Clifford 1988; Rapport 1994).
An interesting situation also occurs when feminist authors (as “others”) 
write on women (as “others” as well): are they “feminist” or radical enough (cf. 
Moore 19946)? Where does feminism end and “pure” or “disengaged” research 
start? Is it possible to be a feminist and do this kind of research on feminist 
discourses or practices? Since others are “there” (and we are “here”) —  and there 
is no way to find out whether they have always been, or were just constructed by 
ourselves — then, the main question for me is how to approach this fact. What to 
do with the others?
98 To claim that any Third World country can just step into the “world economy” and there 
successfully compete with developed countries (much of whose development and stability was 
achieved at the expense o f the Third World) is simply perverse.
99 For the discussion o f otherness that is very relevant for my research, cf. Herzfeld 1987: 13-16.
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The answer is not as obvious as it seems. Obviously, one does not ignore 
others, although it is relatively easy to pretend that they do not exist (since this is 
only pretending, one is still aware of them and just makes a conscious effort to 
avoid them). But this attempt at avoiding does not deny their existence! Even if 
we bypass something, we implicitly acknowledge the fact that there is something 
out there (to be avoided). Others can be studied, but then the question might arise 
from whose perspective and why. What gives the right (any right) to 
anthropologists to go around and study various ethnic groups, and then 
subsequently publish the most intimate details of their lives? From another 
perspective, the dependence of anthropologists on their “informants” (the word 
has a slightly Orwellian sound for me) is almost complete, and very rarely do 
anthropologists question the data that they have obtained in the field. Very rarely 
they assume that they might have been told something simply because the 
“natives” wanted to please them or to avoid probing into the more intimate 
aspects of their l i v e s .  6^ 0  Questions relating to the privacy and the actual wishes 
of the Others (the “observed ones”) are increasingly becoming paramount in any 
serious research project. Although the situation seems to be most tricky with 
regard to the field work (positioning of oneself with his/her “objects of study,” 
questions regarding even ethics of disclosure of certain details, anthropologists’ 
personal life “in the field,” etc.), it is even worse when one actually studies texts. 
The holy scriptures of anthropology reveal more about their authors than about 
the actual people(s) studied (cf. Geertz 1988; Rapport 1994). The writings are 
irreparably tainted by the assumed objectivity of the “facts,” and in most cases, 
the only author of these “facts” is an anthropologist himself or herself. In the 
world of the academic discipline where questions multiply and dilemmas abound.
190 Several years ago, a delegation from a South Pacific ethnic group came for a farewell visit to an 
anthropologist who did his field work there and was getting ready to leave with his wife. The 
delegation expressed their gratitude for the anthropologist’s stay in their village, because that presented 
them with an opportunity to observe the life o f a white family! Participant observation at its best.
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one can opt for a way out by acknowledging that anthropology as an academic 
discipline (the way it was concieved in the 19th and early 20th century) is simply 
impossible. The study of man? The study of culture? The study of social change 
and the related processes? Or all of the above, or something else?
Of course, admitting that I am engaged in something that is impossible 
places me in a somewhat precarious position; I would be something like a double­
agent working from the inside on the destruction of something which would also 
bring my own destruction (at least where most of my work and possible career is 
concerned).
There is another way of looking at this, the way outlined in 1973 by 
Clifford Geertz, who espoused the “semiotic concept of culture,” taking as a 
starting point a view that anthropology (as “the analysis of culture”) should be 
“not an experimental science in search of law but an inteipretive one in search of 
meaning” (1973: 5). Anthropology can be attempted as a quest for meanings, 
hidden, distorted, forgotten, or simply deconstructed.
This is where the “post-structuralist,” “postmodern,” “literary,” or “text- 
centered” approaches comes into play. These approaches (Fabian 1990, 1991 
outlines them as a single approach — which I find a bit too s im p lis tic ) are 
potentially limited by the fact that (apart from some sharp disagreements on the 
approaches themselves) studying culture as a text (or a set of texts) brings a 
potential danger of reducing anthropology to ethnography (in the original ancient 
Greek sense of the word, meaning simply written description of other cultures) 
and literary criticism, and practically excluding the fieldwork. For when one can 
finish his/her work without ever going to the strange and exotic places where “the 
others” dwell, why do it at all? (Except, of course, in the cases of people that are 
naturally inclined towards travelling.)
Of course, the relationship between these approaches and the study of 
gender is in no way simple or straightforward, as noted by Marilyn Strathern:
74
[T]he constant rediscovery that women are the Other in men’s 
accounts reminds women that they must see men as the Other in 
relation to themselves. Creating a space for women becomes 
creating a space for the self, an experience becomes an instmment 
for knowing the self. Necessary to the construction of the feminist 
self, then, is a nonfeminist Other. The Other is most generally 
conceived as “patriarchy,” the institutions and persons who 
represent male domination, often simply concretized as “men.”
[Cf. Toni Flores, above.] Because the goal is to restore to 
subjectivity a self dominated by the Other, there can be no shared 
experience with persons who stand for the Other.
(Strathern 1987a: 288)
However, the questions relating to otherness and identity lead to the ones
i ton difference(s). The other is recognized as other because is d i f f e r e n t .  ^ 6 1  But the 
others are also different among themselves — and this is a particular aspect of 
postmodern approaches where feminism can offer its insights for contemporary 
anthi'opology. Several most prominent feminist authors in disciplines ranging 
from philosophy (Bigwood 1991; Flax 1990) and cultural criticism (Butler 1990, 
1993; De Lauretis 1994) to anthropology (Haraway 1991; Moore 1994a, 19946) 
and sociology (McRobbie 1994) have given the concept of difference(s) a very 
prominent place in their recent work. The notions of multiplicity and 
heterogeneity that come along with the one of difference(s) are most obvious 
signs of the recognition of postmodern approaches in contemporary 
anthropology.
6^1 However, see Baudrillard 1996 for the critique of this perception of Otherness. I refer to his 
arguments in the concluding chapter o f this thesis.
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POSTMODERNISM AND COMMON SENSE; 
BEYOND THE LOOKING GLASS
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” 
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. 
“I don’t much care where—” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.
“—  so long as I get somewhere f  Alice added as an explanation.
“Oh, you’re sure to do that," said the Cat, “if you only walk 
long enough.”
(Carroll 1992a: 55)
The conversation that Alice has with the Cheshire Cat outlines some of 
the most important dilemmas facing contemporary social sciences (including 
anthropology) and h u m a n i t i e s .  6^ 2  As far as the method is concerned, the advice 
that the Cheshire Cat offers seems quite reasonable: if one only goes (works, 
studies, researches, writes, etc.) long enough, one is bound to get somewhere 
(and find some audience, appropriate management, office, research, or teaching 
job, publisher, etc.). But how long is long enough? Should we just aim (as Max 
Planck once suggested) to outlive our theoretical opponents, and in that way 
prove that we were (are) right and they were (are) wrong?
Contemporai'y social theory is increasingly finding itself in a situation 
similar to the one Alice finds herself when she steps through the looking glass.
Things seem to be inverted, “the order of things” (to borrow the famous 
Foucault’s phrase and the title of his book) seems to be totally inverted, and if 
one tries to look at things in the way that she/he is used to (by virtue of “classical
^92 And probably even natural sciences, as exemplified by the recent discussions in physics and 
mathematics related to “fractal” theories. (As a matter o f fact, Strathern 1991 uses “fractal” 
illustrations.)
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educational approaches,” or something on similar lines), things do not make too 
much sense.
The Looking-Glass world which the brave and sensible Alice 
enters, refusing to be caught up in her own reflection on the 
mantelpiece, is not a place of symmetrical reversal, or anti-matter, 
or a mirror-image inversion of the one she comes from. It is the 
world of discourse and asymmetry, whose arbitrary mles work to 
displace the subject, Alice, from any possibility of naturalistic 
identification. Although in the transit Alice is divested of many a 
smug, self-righteous certainty, still she keeps on asking questions 
and sensibly wanting to know, who “dreamed it all?”
(De Lauretis 1984: 2)
The flourishing of postmodern theory in practically all areas of 
contemporary culture makes it difficult to avoid the paradoxicality of certain 
q u e s t i o n s   ^6 3  — not the least being the fact that even the critics of postmodernism 
must enter the postmodern discourse (and use some of the specifically 
postmodernist discourse-strategies) if they want to make their point. As put forth 
by Donna Haraway (1985: 69; also referred to by Strathern 1991: 38), 
postmodernism is not really an option, not something that someone can actually 
be for or against, it is a whole set of meanings that is already deeply embedded in 
the contemporary world. We do live in the postmodern world, whether we like it 
or not. We did not choose it or make it, but we might be able to alter it in 
accordance with our (shared? common? mutual?) needs, systems of values, and 
situation assessments. These are all not only power-based, but also to a large 
extent gender-based (cf. Flax 1987; Del Valle 1993), and so one gets to the 
problems associated with the various currents of contemporaiy feminist theory.
103 “Who dreamed it all?” being just one o f them.
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I have just referred to several important authors associated with feminist 
theory. The relationship between f e m i n i s m ^ 6 4  ^nd postmodernism (cf. Gordon 
1993; Flax 1987: 624-625; Grant 1993; Elam 1994) is interesting because, among 
other things, some of the concerns present in contemporary feminist theory 
(representation of the other in terms of gender and its relatedness to the questions 
of power and different language games in the first place) are also present in 
various aspects of postmodernism. In fact, some feminist authors claim that these 
concerns were present in the currents of feminist theory long before they were 
“rediscovered” by the postmodern theorists, especially in anthropology.
The feminist position does not merely parallel the anthropologist’s 
belated postmodern stance; the endeavours are connected to one 
another. They belong to coeval Western historical-cultural 
milieux, and if they have been slow in making cross-references to 
each other (cf. Strathern 1987a), nonetheless they derive 
inspiration from similai- sources.
(Strathern 1991: 34)
The whole idea of the partial nature of any (scientific, humanistic, or any 
other) project or enterprise, the gender-relatedness (frequently ignored in the past 
generations of scholars) of (not just ethnographic) nairatives, the need of 
inclusion of the other voices in any dialogue, all of this has been accutely present 
in different aspects of feminist theory (cf. Strathern 1988: 8). To quote again 
from Strathern:
Feminist debate is characterized by a compatibility that does not 
require comparability between the persons who engage in it, bar
104 Following Baber, I take as my working definition (Western) feminism as: “the doctrine that, 
insofar as possible, societies should be organized in such a way that men and women have the same 
opportunities at the same costs. This does not mean merely that the same options should be available 
to men and women but that the odds o f achieving the same results should be equal for men and 
women in the aggregate and that no individuals should have to pay more heavily than others for 
exercising their options in virtue o f their gender” (1993: 47).
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their engaging in it. Whether in terms of internal or external 
differences, persons travel between different positions. It is almost 
as though the disproportion were deliberate. Feminist scholarship 
is not a discipline isomorphic with other disciplines —  it simply 
invades and draws on them. Thus I cannot substitute feminism 
for anthropology or vice versa, listen to one and forget the other. 
At the same time, each constitutes a position from which to 
regard a counter position.
(1991: 35, reference omitted)
Of course, as pointed out by Strathern, even with this disjunction between 
feminism and anthropology, these are not two separate realms, she cannot divide 
herself into the “anthropological” and the “feminist” half; different sides coexist, 
and one can really perceive Marilyn Strathern (a quite specific, distinctive person, 
as well as a brilliant scholar, one might say) only as a combination of the two. In 
Donna Haraway’s words: a c y b o r g . 6^5
According to Haraway (1985, 1991), in the ongoing complexities of the 
present world, only a cyborg would stand a chance to survive. The problem with 
cyborgs is that they are actually created (by an external force), they can 
regenerate themselves, but they are incapable of reproducing t h e m s e l v e s .  ^6 6  %g 
this the adequate price that one has to pay in order to survive? And is the 
paradoxical position of an individual in the contemporaiy world somewhat 
resembling of a situation where women find themselves, both integrated in the 
worlds they inhabit and outside of them at the same time? *67 They are supposed 
to be both providers and nurturers (ffamous —  although ridiculous —  structuralist 
dichotomy of “nature” versus “culture” and women’s roles in all that comes to
195 On the concept o f cyborg, cf. also Rapport 1991.
196 On some of the questions opened by the development o f the new reproductive strategies, cf. 
Strathern 1992.
197 For example, “glass ceilings” so typical for the Anglo-American cultures —  where a woman can 
be promoted only to certain level in the business/power/prestige hierarchy.
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mind), but also metaphors (the girl in Eco’s The Name o f the Rose), symbols (like 
Italo Calvino’s Zobeide, “a city built from a dream of woman” [De Lauretis 
1984: 12 ff]), as well as respected partners and companions, the other for men as 
much as for women from different worlds and systems of values, etc. The 
passage from the Introduction of de Lauretis’ book*68 is worth quoting, since she 
nicely summarizes the situation where contemporary feminists find themselves, 
compared to the paradoxical world where Alice (hardly a feminist text in any 
sense, as pointed out by De Lauretis!) finds herself:
Fai' from proposing this Alice (or any other) as yet another 
“image” of woman as the symbol of a struggle too real and too 
diversified to be even minimally “represented” in a single text, 
character, or person, I like to think of her tale as a parable 
suggesting —  merely suggesting — the situation, the 
predicament, and the adventure of critical feminism. Like Alice 
with her ball of worsted, an unheroic Ariadne’s thread which the 
kitten keeps unravelling, feminism has dared the labyrinth of 
language, has dreamed and been dreamed by the Red King, has 
met its Humpty Dumpty and its benevolent White Knight. We too 
have been told that we are all alike and should “have left off at 
seven”; we too have been polite, as we were taught, and have 
paid compliments and tried to make conversation only to be told 
we “have no more sense than a baby”; we too have been puzzled 
to see our simplest questions taken as riddles, and acquiesced to 
the answers given, “not wishing to begin an argument.”
(1984: 2, footnote omitted)
Can a cyborg overcome such a situation? (From another perspective: 
should it? How much can or should be sacrificed for mere survival? Does
^98 Although primarily concerned with the semiotics o f cinema, this book is very interesting 
because it points at different ways in which one can (from a feminist perspective) look at the whole 
concept o f the “language game” with all its implications. Another very interesting feminist reading 
o f the same topic is provided in an essay by Andrea N ye (1987) on Kiisteva’s critique o f Derrida and 
the potential place where women critical intellectuals can find themselves.
80
anyone really care?) The notion of the cyborg implies blending and mixing 
together of (at least) two totally different worlds, the world of machines 
(technology), and the world of the human body (life). Introducing life into 
technology or technology into life becomes the only option for adequate survival 
in the world of the changing and constantly shifting boundaries. As Marilyn 
Strathern writes:
In place oA aveller whose composite experience integrates a 
miscellany of events and locations, I have substituted a cyborg. 
The anthropologist’s writings form a kind of integrated circuit 
between parts that work as extensions of another. As a field of 
extensions, the cyborg moves without travelling, as one might 
imagine the effect of jumping in one’s thoughts from one 
[Papuan] Highlands society to another, or from one aspect of 
social life to another. The circuit still seems centred, however, on 
the perceptual tools of the anthropologist.
(Strathern 1991: 55)
The problem is that there are numerous ways in dealing with the Looking 
Glass through which one looks. That the world in 1996 is different from the 
ones of any previous (or future) epoch is a tautology. That within this “ 1996” 
world there are actually numerous interrelated and parallel worlds (something 
resembling the “theory of strings” in contemporary theoretical physics and 
astronomy) — which do not necessarily get in contact with any or all of the other 
worlds —  is somewhat less obvious, but still important enough to be recognized 
if one is going to make an attempt at understanding the other. This attempt at 
understanding is as far as one is really capable of going: producing more texts, 
more narratives, engaging in various discourses, opening new gaps (for the extent 
of one’s knowledge just opens more and more questions, just like the child 
constantly asks “Why?”) to be filled by provisional and partial (Strathern 1991) 
answers.
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Partiality (in all senses of the word) is the primary notion one has to deal 
with today, in the world of 1996. It is the concept that eludes and evades, but a 
concept that is an essential aspect of the Postmodern world. There is not one, but 
numerous postmodernisms, and there is simply no way in which they can be all 
“grouped” or “subsumed” together. The problem with postmodernisms (and part 
of the reason why they cause headaches for some people and misunderstandings 
for some others) is that they mean different things for different people, and 
anyone using the (“POST”) word believes that it means exactly what she/he 
wants it to mean “— neither more nor less.” And the only real question that 
remains is: “which is to be master — that’s all.”
The image in the Looking Glass depends not only on who is looking at it, 
but also (and maybe even more) on who is actually holding the mirror. Unless, of 
course, one decides to step through it.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE: 
DEFINING GENDER
If we resign ourselves to keeping words like “feminine” and 
“masculine” it is because there is an anchoring point somewhere in 
a far distant reality. But I believe we must do our utmost to reduce 
this heritage. Let us try as quickly as possible to abandon these 
binary distinctions which never make any sense.
(Cixous 1994: 135)
The first mention of the English word “gender” almost invariably
suggests a connection with language. In fact, the Encyclopedia Britannica
(fifteenth edition) defines gender as
a phenomenon in which the words of a certain part of speech (...) 
require the agreement, or concord through grammatical maiking 
(or inflection), of various other words related to them in a 
sentence. In languages that exhibit gender, two or more classes of 
nouns control variation in words of other parts of speech (typically 
pronouns and adjectives and sometimes verbs). These other words 
maintain constant meaning but vary in form according to the class 
of the word that controls them in a given situation.
(Vol. 5: 172)
According to the OED,
In the Indo-European languages, there were originally three 
genders, the masculine and the feminine, to which respectively 
belonged the great majority of nouns denoting male and female 
persons and animals; and the neuter, including chiefly nouns 
denoting things without sex. But great numbers of words denoting 
inanimate objects were of the masculine or feminine gender, 
without even any figurative attribution of sex; and in some cases 
the names of objects possessing sex were of the neuter gender. In 
Semitic, and in the Romanic languages, there aie only two 
genders, masculine and feminine [while in Slavic languages and in
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German there are three]. In many languages, the adjectives, and in 
some languages, the verbs, have inflection depending on the 
gender of the sbs. to which they syntactically refer. Modern 
English has ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘grammatical’ gender; i.e., 
nouns aie masculine, feminine or neuter according as the objects 
they denote are male, female, or neither sex; and the gender of a 
noun has no other syntactical effect than that of determining the 
pronoun that must be used in referring to it.
(Vol. 6: 427)
Etymologically, gender, just like genre in French, genero in Spanish and 
Portuguese, genere in Italian and Latin gener, stem from Latin genus (race, 
kind), which in turn comes from the ancient Greek yevoç  and Sanskit janas. 
They, in turn, are derived from the Old Aryan * genes-, most closely related to the 
root gen (to produce or to give birth; hence the meaning also includes kin*69).
This brief etymological excursion points to the multiplicities of meanings 
that made their ways into gender studies as well — primarily through the 
distinction between sex (as a biological fact) and gender (as something that is 
primarily constructed and 6y the culture and society). *16 Although this
109 For example, the Serbian and Croatian word for gender, rod, primarily denotes kin. However, 
it is also connected with the concept o f procreation. For example, while gender is rod, relatives are 
rodjaci or rodbina, and to give birth is roditi. Similar etymologies derived from the word rod  exist 
in Macedonian, where relatives are rodnina.
 ^^9 Inasmuch as one can talk o f any “facts,” of course. The word gender has been used to refer to 
sex (OED), although one can also talk about the “gender identity.” This concept was used for the 
first time in 1963 by the American psychoanalyst Robert Stoller in his discussion o f the University 
o f California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Gender Identity Research Project, established in 1958. “He 
formulated the concept of gender identity within the framework of the biology/culture distinction, 
such that sex was related to biology (hormones, genes, nervous system, morphology) and gender was 
related to culture (psychology, sociology)” (Haraway 1991: 133). According to the Encyclopedia 
Britannica, this primarily involves distinction on the lines male/female, self-conception o f the 
individual, as distinguished from the actual biological sex. (Of course, this self-conception can also 
involve hermaphrodites — as a genuine “third sex” — , as well as transsexuals, homosexuals, etc.
The distinction between heterosexual and homosexual orientation develops later in life, well after the
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distinction has long been taken for granted (and, starting with Sheriy Ortner’s 
critique, used in different structuralist or neo-structuralist models***), the time has 
come to reexamine and reevaluate it, as recently shown by Collier and 
Yanagisako (1987) as well as Hemietta Moore (19946: 12 ff).**2
Etymologically, gender and sex have been equated (cf. the examples in 
OED, Vol. 6: 428), but in anthi'opology, it seemed a reasonably good idea to keep 
them apart.* *3 This created a series of problems and questions that led to other 
questions, not answers (Where does “sex” end and “gender” begins? What is the 
boundary between the two? How and why one becomes aware of this boundary?, 
etc.). Part of the problem was an insistence on what Moore (1993, 19946: 33; 
following Collier and Yanagisako 1987) calls “western folk models” about 
gender — since certain dichotomies seemed to be represented in Western cultures 
from which anthropologists came, they simply generalized these dichotomies and 
tried to establish them (without much success, as it turned out) in non-Western 
societies as well. Research conducted in Papua New Guinea and Melanesia, for
establishment o f a basic gender identity.) “Gender identity is not fixed at birth; both physiological 
and social factors contribute to the early establishment o f a core identity, which is modified and 
expanded by social factors as the child matures (5: 172).” The basic gender identity is usually 
established by the age o f three (Britannica', cf. also Ounsted and Taylor 1972; Abbot and Wallace 
1991). Findlay 1995 convincingly argues that even biological sex is socially constructed.
* ^  * For the criticism o f approaches based on binary oppositions, see, for example, Stolcke 1993. 
*^2 Also cf. Haraway 1991: 134-135. Actually, the German word Geschlecht combines the 
meanings o f  the English sex and gender.
*13 This is a prevailing view within the last decade. In 1987, Pat Caplan wrote:
However, ( .. .)  a distinction between sex, in the physiological sense, and 
gender, which is a cultural construct, a set o f learned behaviour patterns, 
has been proposed and is now widely used. Much work over the last two 
decades, particularly by feminist scholars, has examined the relationship 
between sex in this sense, and gender (Caplan 1987: 1).
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e x a m p l e ,  **4 points to ways of distinguishing “male” and “female” in ways totally 
unrelated to anything that these “western folk models” might have prepared us 
for. Here, gender categories are not seen or experienced as something fixed and 
bound to overt biological or cultural differences — they are something in states of 
flux and instability, more seen as substances that freely flow towards each other, 
occasionally mixing and then separating again. Similarly, different concepts of 
“gender identity” and “gender difference” can run parallel to each other, then 
converge, then separate again in completely unpredictable ways. For scholars 
like Judith Butler (1990, 1993), the sex/gender distinction is simply irrelevant.
Today, there is no way of clearly distinguishing where biological 
influences stop and where “the culture” starts its work on the shaping of gender.
In one of her suggestions for the study of gender, Judith Grant (in her first 
hypothesis) wrote that, generally speaking.
Gender is a relatively autonomous, hegemonic, ideological 
structure that divides the world hierarchically into two mythical 
[sic!] g e n d e r s , *  *5 and which reinforces itself through an elaborate 
system of rules and punishments enforced in all aspects of life.
(1993:161)
This, of course, is much more a working hypothesis than an attempt at a 
proper definition. In fact, in light of all the current controversies that surround 
debates about gender (cf. Haraway 1991; Mathieu 1991a, 19916; Grant 1993; 
Angerer 1994), one is tempted to question the purpose of seeking a fixed
**4 c f .  Gelber 1986; Caplan 1987; Strathern 1988; also the examples referred to by Moore 19946: 
23-25.
* *5 Of course, one should bear in mind that this is only one of the working hypotheses that Grant 
introduces in her book —  Grant herself questions the division into two genders. [I have some 
reservations towards the use of the word “myth” and the adjectives derived from it in a negative 
sense. It does not do justice to the variety o f interpretations and meanings that the concept o f myth 
opens.]
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definition of it. With all the fluctuations and instability that different gender 
categories present, is it possible to give a definition at all?
Therefore, the most useful approach (in the context of my present work) 
seems to me the one which discusses not what the meaning of (the concept, the 
word, the idea, etc.) gender is, but how this concept, word, idea is used in 
contemporary cultures and contemporary discourses. So, instead of properly 
defining gender, I propose to set out some questions related to it:
1. How is gender constructed in contemporary anthropology?
2. W hat is the meaning of gender in specific cultures?* *6
3. How can these meanings inform research on gender in contemporaiy 
anthropology?
I will not proceed in the same order as these questions have been set up; I 
shall start with the second one, and look at some issues related to the gender 
construction first in Macedonia (Prespa) and then in Slovenia (Ljubljana). Then I 
shall proceed with the first one and the third one in the following chapters. I hope 
that this order will make the discussion easier, proceeding from ethnography to 
the more theoretical aspects. Of course, my aim is to present the ethnography of 
discourses on gender both in a more “classical” way (Macedonia and Slovenia), 
but also in a somewhat more “contemporaiy” way — writing in a sense an 
ethnography of contemporary anthropological theory.
This chapter began with the discussion of postmodernism and some of its 
aspects most closely related to contemporary anthropological theoiy —  like 
inteipretative, poststructuralist, “text-centered” or “literary” approaches. All 
these aspects rely to a great extent on relativism, which is the basis of postmodern 
approaches. Relativism, in turn, introduces the notion of difference(s) —  
including pluralism and heterogeneity — and it is this notion that connects it to
* *6 The question which can actually be subdivided into several other questions —  all viewed within 
a specific cultural setting,—  for example: What is a man? What is a woman? What are they for 
each other? What constitutes someone as woman or man? What differentiates women and men?, etc.
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the contemporary studies of gender. It is also a concept which connects 
anthropology with feminism, since both rely on the study and investigation of 
difference(s). There can be no study of gender without the recognition of 
difference(s) — both between the genders and within them. Now I will proceed 
with the more specific exploration of the issues related to gender and 
difference(s) in two ethnographic areas.
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The other side of the window:
Gender, equality, and differencein Prespa,
Republic of Macedonia
“I can’t explain myself. I ’m afraid, sir,” said Alice, “because 
I’m not myself, you see.”
“I don’t see,” said the Caterpillar.
(Carroll 1992a: 37)
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INTRODUCTION: CONSTRUCTING GENDER
In this chapter, I intend to outline ways in which concepts of gender 
(especially in an idealized sense: what does it meait to be a man or what does it mean 
to be a woman"/) are constructed in Prespa, in the southwestern part of Macedonia. 
The term “Macedonia” refers to the temtory of the Republic of Macedonia, a country 
which gained its independence from the SFR Yugoslavia in 1991. It has a territory of 
25,713 square kilometers and approximately 1.937 million inhabitants. ^  17 As in 
many other aspects, some historical and geographical controversy surrounds this 
region as well, since Prespa is also a region divided between Macedonia, Greece and 
Albania. The Greek and Albanian parts are being referred to by the Macedonian 
population as ‘"Dolna Prespa” (“Lower Prespa”). As far as I could tell when I went 
through the Greek Lower Prespa on several occasions in the 1 9 8 0 s , t h e  villages are 
still largely inhabited by the Slav Macedonian population. In a nice example of the 
construction of “Otherness,” I was told that if I wanted to see the “true” or the “real” 
Macedonian customs and culture, I would actually have to go to the Slav Macedonian 
villages in the Albanian part. This was because, being hermetically sealed off by the 
“Iron Curtain” from 1945 until 1991, Slav Macedonians there kept all of their old 
rituals.
However, the data in this chapter refer only to “Macedonian” (or “Upper”) 
Prespa. Although I will also be using examples from Greece and a few other South 
European/Mediterranean areas, the focus of my research is on the territory of the
1^7 This is based on the 1994 census. Some Western analysts estimate the number to be just over 2.2 
million (CM World Fact Book for 1995).
These were vacation trips with my parents to the Aegean in Greece.
For example, an elderly woman told me: “The w r in g s  today, they aren’t like they used to be. If 
you want to see how it used to be done in the old days, you have to go to Albania.” I have to note that, 
unlike other ethnic minorities in Albania between 1945 and 1991, Macedonians in Lower Prespa were 
allowed to go to primary schools in their own language (up to the age of 15).
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Republic of Macedonia only, without any negative (cultural, territorial, etc.) 
implications that the use of this term might have (cf. Danforth 1993). The data are 
based on my observations and interviews conducted among the mostly Slavic 
Macedonian population (that is to say, whose first language is Macedonian) of Prespa 
(the municipality of Resen, population around 16,000) in the summers of 1993 and 
1994, as well as on the published sources available. Wherever possible, I have used 
comparisons with recorded examples from neighboring regions, as well as from 
personal experiences —  since through all my life I have spent on the average at least 
a couple of months per year in Resen. My examples from the rural communities are 
from the different villages around Resen, although the town itself (despite some 
recent developments) is still much more rural than urban —  a view shared by a 
majority of the population, Therefore, most people have land outside the town and 
working this land forms a very important addition to their income.
The extent to which “ideal” descriptions are merely sociocultural constructs 
will become obvious throughout this chapter. What makes this situation particulai'ly 
interesting from the postmodern point of view is both the notion of “double reality” 
(or hyperreality, as I would prefer to call it) where both sides know that what is being 
presented as the “official story” has nothing to do with “reality.” At the same time, 
both sides play along with this.
At the 1994 Forum Against Ethnic Violence conference on Macedonia,
Tenta Arifi, the secretaiy of the Albanian League of Women used the analogy of the 
window to refer to the situation of Albanian women in Macedonia. In A l b a n i a n  122
120 To a large extent, Resen stands in what R. E. Pahl (1968) would describe as the “rural-urban 
continuum” —  it is neither completely rural or urban, with its population freely exchanging rural and 
urban roles, complementing different ways o f subsistence, and at the same time eclectically combining 
different sets o f values.
171 The conference was held on November 11 and 12 at the Embryology Theatie, University College 
London.
122 Prespa, the word “Albanian” can also be used to refer to the Slav Macedonians from Albania 
that come and take mostly unskilled and low-paid jobs (mostly in the construction business).
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communities, it is normally the men who discuss important issues and make decisions 
in the main room of the house. Women do not have the access to these rooms, but 
only serve the men (coffee, biscuits, tea, etc.) through the small rectangular opening 
in the wall. Their “proper space” is the kitchen, washing area, or wherever the small 
children aie. They are symbolically excluded from the decision-making and 
(supposedly) have no knowledge of the “important” debates that go on. Of course, as 
Ai’ifi clearly demonstrated in her paper, this is not the case — even to the point that 
the women are able to sometimes “take the matter in their own hands” and break the 
deadlock that men frequently create (Arifi 1994). But this is still much more an 
exception than the rule; by and large, the role of women in Macedonia can be referred 
to as “someone from the other side of the window.”
This is a situation fairly typical of the rural communities in Macedonia. 
Despite the fact that a significant number of people live in cities (more than one third 
of the country’s population in the capital, Skopje), the connections (both on the 
family and on the broader economic level) with the rural areas aie very strong. These 
connections go so far that the young people that were born, raised and live in foreign 
countries (like Germany or Sweden, for example) will still come to marry in the 
villages that they (or, more precisely, their families) are from. ^ 73 The main sense of 
identity is the one that people get from their family. When people meet for the first 
time, they are often identified in relation to their parents or some other close
173 This is primarily the case with males. Girls that live abroad are given more choice. Although 
some form of family pressure exists in these matters, it seems that decisions to marry “at home” are 
influenced by a sense of responsibility for the creation o f family. In this sense, and especially in the 
rural communities, males are still regarded as “heads of the family,” so they try to make sure that the 
family will function smoothly. Stories about failed marriages between Macedonians and non- 
Macedonians (primarily those cases when a Macedonian man marries a foreign woman) are an 
important part o f local folklore; at least one o f these stories formed a basis o f a TV documentary made 
15 yeai’s ago, but recently (1994) re-broadcasted as one o f the best documentaries made by the 
Macedonian TV.
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r e l a t i v e s  174 (“son/daughter of so and so,” “nephew/niece of so and so,” 
“grandson/granddaughter of so and so,” e t c . ) .  175 This influences and to an extent 
suppresses the notion of individuality, since a person is immediately awai'e of her or 
his family background, and family’s reputation very much influences anyone’s 
individual reputation. This becomes obvious in relation to the honor/shame code (cf. 
Campbell 1964; Bourdieu 1977; Archetti 1994176), when a bad thing that a single 
individual does can relate to (that is to say, ruin) the reputation of all the family 
members — including third and fourth cousins and so on. Being from a “good 
family” means primarily being from a family whose members live by this code, who 
do not have any “shame” attached to their name. “It’s a shame!” ( "Sramota!”) is an 
exclamation that expresses both pity and disgust. Even little children are taught not 
to do certain things because “it’s a shame.”
Although in Prespa, just like in European Mediterranean societies, there are 
no specific rules about most favored or prescribed marriage partners, it can be said 
that “[t]he main principle governing marriage strategies are the maintenance of the 
family’s position in the local hierarchy 17? and avoidance of all practices that may
124 The concept o f the close relative is somewhat different to the one that is present in the West. For 
example, not only immediate family, but also second and third cousins are considered to be close 
relatives. This notion o f “close relatives” can sometimes be extended to people related five 
generations back. The Macedonian Orthodox Church prohibits marriages between people related nine 
generations back or less. Although this ruling does not have any legal sanction, in practice it seems to 
be strictly followed. Marriage between people who are related (like first or second cousin, for 
example) would be considered as incest.
125 poj. the examples from rural Greece, cf. Roger Just in Loizos and Fapataxiarchis 1991. Of course, 
I have to note that relations between kin in Macedonia do not exhibit the same amount o f ambivalence 
and perplexity as Just cites. On the other hand. Ford (1983: 21) notes the importance o f interpersonal 
connections (vrski) in the capital, Skopje.
176 O f course, following the critical remarks by Herzfeld (1987: 5 ft), I do not wish to imply that this 
is the code around which all the society is structured — just the fact that many (if not all) relations 
between families are closely related to the issues that have to do with honor/shame.
177 Milicic studied the village Selo on the island o f Hvar, Croatia. I am not sure that I would use the 
word “hierarchy” to refer to the social stratification in Prespa, since the egalitarian principles are very
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jeopardize this position” (Milicic 1995: 134; footnote added). Therefore, family 
pressures regaining the choice of the partner for maiiiage are quite frequent and 
difficult to ignore. In many cases, it is preferred for a girl living in Macedonia to 
marry “at home,” thus enabling her to remain in close contact with her parents. 
Bilateral descent is the rule, with either patrilocal or neolocal residence. Even in 
cases of neolocal residence, it is expected that the newlyweds’ parents will provide 
most of the funds necessary for the building of a house, with labor (and some 
materials when possible) provided by kinspeople. Matrilocal residence is very rare, 
and it usually happens in cases where the bride’s family is much better off than the 
groom’s. Since most people tend to marry within their social groups (i.e., rich marry 
rich, middle class many middle class, and poor many poor), this is rarely the 
c a s e .  178 Remaining unmarried is still considered very bad, e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  g i r l s .  179 of 
course, the fact that more girls nowadays attend high schools and universities has 
contributed to the increase of the age at marriage — not so long ago, a girl who did 
not many by the time she was in her early twenties would remain unmarried for the 
rest of her life, or marry some widowed octogenarian.
This is somewhat puzzling, since I found out that the marriage age between 
the two World Wars was slightly higher. In fact, it seems that the reduced age at 
mairiage is a relatively recent (post-WW II) phenomenon, not unlike the situation that 
Segalen mentions for the rural France, where between 1825 and 1975 the average age 
of men at marriage fell from 28.7 to 25.03 yeai’s , while for the women in the same 
period from 26.1 to 22.91 (Segalen 1986: 118, 140).i^o I have observed that people
strong. O f course, everyone knows which families are “well o f f ’ —  so that potential mairiage 
alliances might be arranged.
178 On the other hand, it is socially acceptable for girls to marry into families that are better o ff —  
which is normally not the case for boys.
179 However, in some instances it can be justified by “higher motives” —  nuns and scholars come 
into this category. Homosexuality is not even considered as a possibility.
l^H Unfortunately, it would be impossible to gather comparable statistical data for Prespa. Since what 
is today the Republic of Macedonia was occupied by Serbia from 1912 until 1941, birth certificates for
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in their 70s and 80s (the exact age is sometimes difficult to determine —  see footnote 
13) have children in their 30s and 40s — which is very different from the couples that 
got married in the last 20 or 25 years. It seems that the relative affluence of the post- 
1945 Prespa did push the age at marriage downwards, although the recent changes in 
society, higher percentage of women in education and employed women is pushing it 
back again.
Being mairied is “the norm” —  quite similar to the situation in rural Greece 
(Loizos and Fapataxiarchis 1991). To quote an example based on the Greek material, 
but the same applies to Macedonia: “(...) it is obvious that a Greek man cannot 
achieve full adult status until he is married. In a sense then, it is through his 
connection to a woman that a man takes his place in society. It is his ‘destiny’ also 
to be maiTied (Dubisch 1991: 45).” Di Therefore, unmarried people arouse a certain 
amount of suspicion (if not curiosity); the fact that they aie unmarried is considered 
with some apprehension — attributed to their unorthodox lifestyles (in the case of 
teachers or scholais) or perhaps to some hidden misfortune in the family.
Chastity is (at least in conversations and in public discourse) veiy highly 
regarded where girls aie concerned, but not boys — so clearly there are 
double-standards regarding sex life. ^  32 On the other hand, although regarding 
chastity highly as a principle, people (especially those born after 1950) raiely expect
boys were frequently forged —- to prevent them from being conscripted into the army. In the years 
right after the WWII, most o f the churches in Prespa were burned in a zealous display o f the new 
(communist) faith, so the the existing church records were also destroyed.
^31 Women in the Greek village where Dubisch did her fieldwork felt sorry for her for being so far 
away from her mother. The mother/daughter relationship is a very strong one in Macedonia as well. 
Furthermore, I was introduced to people in Prespa as the son o f my mother. In my case, my mother is 
an ethnic Macedonian, while my father is not —  however, I encountered several examples where 
people whose both parents were ethnic Macedonians were introduced in the same way.
132 Herzfeld (1987: 11) notes that the prudishness that Balkan peoples display regarding sex may be 
o f quite recent origin —  not much earlier than the 19th century!
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this to be a fact where the lives of their own children are c o n c e r n e d .  133 j n  
communities like Resen, it is understood that a high school couple that starts a serious 
relationship (the community is too small for such things to be successfully hidden) 
will eventually many. The expectations might not materialize if they choose 
radically different paths in life (i.e., one chooses to go to the university to Skopje or 
Bitola, while the other one stays “at home”) or if their families have very bad 
relations.
Family pressures (at least the ones expressed in a more overt way) tend to be 
especially strong regarding the non-Slav Macedonian population —  in Prespa, Turks 
and some A l b a n i a n s .  134 of course, these pressures can be ignored, but with a heavy 
price: in one instance, an Albanian woman from a nearby village refused to follow 
her family’s choice and ran away from home to marry the man she loved. As a 
consequence, her family cut off all ties with her —  and this was especially harsh 
regarding the girl’s inability to financially support herself at the time. This was no 
ordinary family, since the woman’s mother was a famous healer (in Macedonian: 
mestac, literally “bone setter” 135), so the whole story was widely known. 136 Even 
when the woman’s mother got very old and was living alone, she refused any contact 
with her daughter, receiving some help only from her Slav Macedonian neighbors, to
133 pejoska (1993: 98 ff) gives numerous examples from Macedonian oral literature that include and 
illustrate attitudes towards sex, virginity, marriage, etc.
1^ 34 The Albanians form by far the largest non-Slav ethnic group in Macedonia, with around 23% of 
the overall population. It is interesting to note that members o f other non-Slav ethnic groups in Prespa 
(like Romas [Gypsies] or Turks, for example) would frequently declare themselves as Albanian at the 
recent censuses (1991 and 1994).
^35 She used to “fix” broken bones and dislocated joints in such a way that they would heal much 
quicker than if  put into plaster and immobilized by doctors. (For example, if  a broken arm would heal 
in three to four weeks after being “set” by the doctor, the “bone setter’s” treatment would heal it within 
a week.)
136 Today, the whole story is told almost as a sort of fairy tale o f how love conquers all. The couple 
are still happily married (with two sons and lovely grandchildren), and the woman is a “bone setter.”
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whom she eventually left all her belongings (she was quite w e a l t h y ) .  137 This is just 
one example of a “strong woman” — an example that should join others in defying 
the stereotypical image of dominant men and subservient women in Mediterranean 
and South European cultures (cf. Milicic 1995 for the examples from the Croatian 
island Hvar).
Among the Slav Macedonian population, family pressures are very strong as 
well: I know of several relationships which could not end in marriage because of the 
opposition of parents. “It is for the good of the child,” is the usual answer by the 
family members opposing “bad” relationships. Most recently, particular pressures are 
exercised on multi-ethnic couples: it is preferred (socially, as well as within the 
family) that a girl or a boy chooses a partner of the “proper” (i. e., their own) 
n a t i o n a l i t y .  ^ 3 8  This should be seen both as a consequence of the prevailing Orthodox 
Christian teachings (since Slav Macedonian population tends automatically to get 
identified with the Orthodox Christianity as opposed to Muslim Albanian or Turkish 
p o p u l a t i o n  139 — the fact that very few people practice religion is of no relevance 
here), as well as one of the problems facing all small newly emerging (post-1991) 
countries in the attempts led by nationalists to preserve the ethnic “purity” of the 
nation.
Almost as bad as remaining unmarried is being without children. In a culture 
that emphasizes (and is structured around) family so much, not having anyone to
137 The power to heal is regarded as a gift — children are never taught it, unless they display interest 
by themselves —  and it is regarded as an insult if  one tries to pay the healer. On the other hand, it is 
considered appropriate to leave some amount o f money (usually the equivalent o f a price of beer or a 
coffee in a restaurant, or “instead o f buying a chocolate for the children”) for the good luck (in 
Turkish: adet, literally “p ea ce”).
138 I use words “ethnicity” and “nationality” synonymously. My preferred term for “nation” or 
“tribe” is “ethnic group.”
139 What is today the Republic of Macedonia was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from 1371 
until 1912. This plays well for nationalists when they try to evoke anti-Albanian feelings (Albanians, 
considered as Muslim, being identified as Turks) as the rallying cry for national (in this case, Slav 
Macedonian) unity and salvation.
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inherit the family name is considered quite a d i s a s t e r .  140 in a metaphysical sense, this 
leads not only to a family gradually “dying out,” but to a rupture in the whole system 
of the kinship network. This network heavily relies on the mutual help and 
cooperation between kinsfolk — especially on the occasion like the building of a 
house, preparation for a wedding or some other important family ritual, etc.
The marriage also enables closer economic ties between the two families 
(since marriage in rural and suburban communities is primarily a contract between 
the families): the groom is supposed to help his bride’s family when they work their 
land outside the village or town. In the case of Resen, a great majority of households 
own small tracts of land outside the town. I4i A tract of land is called bavca —  which 
roughly translates into English as “garden,” and the people usually use them as 
o r c h a r d s .  142 Most townspeople are fully employed, but after coming home in the 
afternoon (except in the winter months), they go and work the bavca. In cases where 
men are fully employed and women are housewives, women do most of the work in 
the orchards. The work is usually divided in such a way that men care more for the 
trees in the orchards (or for vineyards), and women for the vegetables. The 
responsibilities for domestic animals are normally evenly shared. However, there are 
no strict rules over the division of work — everyone works based on the time that
140 However, there is a way around this: some people can adopt a child (or children) o f their close 
relatives (brothers, sisters). The children are then considered to be theirs in both legal and biological 
senses. Children are offered for adoption in case o f death or illness in the family, but also in cases 
when a family is too poor to take care o f them (usually a family living in a village), in which case they 
would send them to town (or city).
141 However, the older houses (as well as some on the town’s outskirts) do have these tracts o f land 
in their own courtyards, in the town itself.
142 They also grow vegetables like tomatoes, cucumbers, beans, watermelons, etc., as well as a 
variety o f fruits (apricots, peaches, various kinds o f plums, cherries, etc.). Some people also have 
vineyards. Domestic animals are quite frequently kept in the bavcas.
Prespa is the biggest apple-producing region in Macedonia. Unfortunately, one o f the 
consequences o f the break up o f Yugoslavia was the loss o f the most important market —  a situation 
that is felt very much throughout the region.
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he/she has, abilities, etc. The only gender-specific area seems to be household chores 
like cooking (women are expected to cook) —  although I think that this has to do 
with the simple fact that the women used to be around the house (home) much more, 
and that changes in the employment patterns will affect this as well. Also, when the 
visitors come, and if both spouses are at home, women are expected to prépaie coffee 
and serve the blago (a thick and very sweet fruity jam), while the men are expected to 
cater for drinks.
There is a certain amount of ambivalence when one tries to collect narratives 
on the “status of women.” On the one hand, women aie considered as equal in terms 
of family contributions, work in and around the household, etc. 143 The “way of men” 
and the “way of women” is supposed to be different primarily because of biological 
differences. In and aiound Prespa there is a belief that “things have always been done 
in a certain way” — so that way should be followed. On the other hand, gender 
hierarchy is overtly very strong; until quite recently it was common for a married 
woman to be addressed by her husband’s name plus the female gender prefix. For 
example, a woman married to a man called Bore would be called Boreica, the one 
married to a man called Kiume, Krumeica, etc. In fact, the Macedonian language 
does have different forms of last names for men and women. For example, in a 
family whose father (and all the males) have the last name Petreski, the women’s 
surname will be Petreska, where the male name is Nikolov, the female equivalent 
will be Nikolova, etc. 4^4
Sexism is present in the Macedonian language — but not to an extreme 
extent. For example, some authors would stress that there is a gender-neutral word 
for human being, covek, which cannot be readily translated into English, because it
*^^ 3 Cases where a woman retains her own family name are extremely rare and in a suburban context 
something that is frowned upon. This is very different from Slovenia, where most recently women just 
add their husband’s last name to their own —  sometimes resulting in a middle initial.
144 A great majority o f Slav Macedonian last names finish with -ov or -ski for the males or -ova or 
-ska for the females.
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would correspond to English man — while in the Macedonian it covers both man and 
w<9mfl/î(Gjurovska 1995: 25). On the other hand, in everyday practice, the word 
covek is never used to refer to a woman\
Equality is not something that is locally discussed or questioned in any way. 
There is a notion of fundamental difference between men and women — the 
difference that is expressed in their “vocations” in life. Men are supposed to be 
“providers” in all senses of the word, do most of the work in the bavcas, etc. They 
are also expected to contribute more money to the family budget — now that women 
are frequently taking full time jobs (a situation unheard of in Prespa until the early 
1970s), the men whose wives make more money than they do are subject to jokes and 
denigrating gossip. The situation is made worse by the economic crises in the late 
1980s and early 1990s as a result of which many businesses went out of work —  the 
job losses affecting mostly men. However, this kind of situation also puts more 
emphasis on the money (and the overall labor) that women contribute. For the first 
time in their lives, many of the women in their 30s or 40s find their work really (at 
least openly) appreciated. In most cases, it is their work that literally enables their 
families to make ends meet.
“STRAIGHT FROM HEAVEN” OR “STRAIGHT TO HELL”: 
SEX, POWER, AND VIOLENCE
The problem of violence against women is unfortunately a universal one (cf.
Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project 1995) — and this goes for Macedonia 
as well. 4^5 “Batina je  iz raja izasla” (lit. “The cudgel came straight from Heaven”) 
is a Serbian saying that is frequently quoted both in the context of discussing children
145 On the problem of violence in the rural communities in Balkans, see for example Denich 1974.
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(implying usually that a little smack here or there can cause no harm) and women. In 
the latter context, the implication is that one must know who is “the head of the 
household” —  and this general view is supported by both men and women.
In the summer of 1994, newspapers like the Skopje-based Vecer and Nova 
Makedonija and the independent weekly Puls widely reported on an incident that 
happened during a reception in London. The then mayor of Skopje, Goran 
Nikolovski, beat up his wife because he did not like the fact that she spoke to 
someone at the reception. (The fact that he had had a few drinks before might have 
contributed to his behavior.) The incident spilled over into a massive fight and police 
had to intervene. The fact that the journalists wrote about it was immediately 
attacked by both the mayor’s office (he belonged to the main opposition party, 
VMRO-DPMNE) as some kind of a political ploy to discredit the young and gifted 
(in his early 30s) politician. However, no one seemed really interested in the issue of 
violence, its causes or the consequences. The mayor’s wife, Vesna Nikolovska, 
wrote a letter to the media accusing them of “sensationalizing” the “private life” of 
their family. So even the victim (and this was definitively not an isolated incident 
that took place “behind closed doors” or “in private” !) went along with the stance that 
there was essentially nothing wrong with violence. Or at least that there was nothing 
wrong where married couples are concerned. This is a dangerous situation when 
even the victim starts perceiving the world through the eyes of the perpetrator — 
somehow believing (genuinely believing!) that he has “the right” to resort to 
violence. Even when the violence gets so far that the police are called, the authorities 
aie reluctant to intervene.
In eveiyday conversations, and especially among the older people, it is 
usually “understood” what the “ideal woman” should be like: hard working, tidy, 
clean, and capable of taking care of the children and the household. ^ 46 if she fails in
^46 It is interesting to note that these are also the characteristics for the “ideal man” —  with the 
exception o f the ability for taking care o f the children and the household.
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any of these aspects, some violence is seen as justified. (“She should know who is 
the boss in the house!”) Of course, very few (if any) people would actually approve 
of violence against their daughter or sister or kin — although approving of it “in 
principle” ! If a woman feels mistreated, she can just leave her household and go 
back to her own family. In some cases, male members of her family are likely to 
beat up her husband or boyfriend as a revenge. Younger women (and this goes for 
younger couples in general) seem less inclined to support the old sayings and beliefs, 
and this contributes to the higher divorce rates in recent years.
According to the data from the Center for Social Work in Skopje, there are 
currently 600 to 750 divorces per year (compared to 4,000 to 5,000 marriages per 
year) in the Skopje area, and in the majority of cases women initiate the divorce 
(Zlatanovilc 1994). According to the official data for the whole country, in 1993 there 
were 15,080 mairiages and 636 divorces (Government of the Republic of Macedonia 
1995: 8) — which would mean that almost all divorces occur in the area of the 
capital.
Domestic violence is not recognized as a crime within the Macedonian legal 
system. This is part of the reason why most cases of domestic violence never get 
reported. The disparity between the legal and the real even goes as far as the penal 
code regarding sexual assault as a crime only if inflicted on a stianger! According to 
a recent investigative article by Macedonian journalists Suzana Ahmeti and Ljubica 
Balaban,
[a] common complaint is that the existence of domestic violence in 
Macedonia passes almost unnoticed in the courts. It is not mentioned 
in the criminal law. Milka Risteva, a former judge and an advisor in 
the Ministry of Justice, is among those who believe Macedonia should 
adopt a domestic violence law following the American model, in 
which even threatening violence can be considered a crime. Such a 
law is not being considered now. But Risteva said that a proposal
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[which is] now [being considered] in the government would change 
the family law [in such a way as] to ban sexual violence in mairiage, 
in love affairs and during the process of divorce.
(Ahmeti and Balaban 1996)
The problem of violence is more present in highly urbanized areas such as the 
capital, where people are still seai'ching for their “true” iden tity . ^ 47 o f  course, this 
does not mean that when people find (or suddenly stumble upon) their “true” identity 
they suddenly become non-violent — it only means that more violence tend to be 
produced under stress. Hardship is invariably a contributing factor.
In Prespa, the issue gets more complicated by the increased economic power 
of women as well as by the need of both sides of the family (as well as both families 
together) to coordinate their activities when issues like the working of the bavcas, 
vineyards, care of animals, building or repair of the houses, etc. come into play. 4^8 
On the other side of the spectrum, the more rural communities take the more 
patriarchal (and pro-violence) view. According to Dusko Minovski, director of the 
Center for Social Work in Skopje, the situation is especially bad for the Roma 
women, who seem to be mistreated almost on a regular basis (Zlatanovik 1994). In 
the highly acclaimed^49 recent film Before the Rain, an Albanian girl pays for falling 
in love with the person of the wrong nationality with her own life.
'^^ 7 On the question o f the “mapping” of the urban identity in Skopje, see Thiessen 1995.
148 It has been pointed out to me (Ilka Thiessen, personal communication) that this might be the 
determining factor regarding the status of women in Prespa. In other areas (like in the vicinity o f  
Prilep, for example) women are practically prevented from inheriting the property (by the family 
pressures and tradition according to which sons inherit everythung). They are asked to take a token 
sum o f money in return for the formal refusal o f the right of inheritance, but it is considered “good 
manners” for daughters to refuse even this token sum.
149 A film by Milco Mancevski won the “Golden Lion” at the Venice Film Festival in 1994 and was 
nominated for an Oscar in 1995.
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Somewhat suiprisingly, violence has nothing to do with the level of 
education. Highly educatedi^i men tend to be as violent towards their partners as the 
less educated ones (Zlatanovik 1994; Ahmeti and Balaban 1996). Unfortunately, it 
usually takes a most extr eme situation before the problem of violence is discussed in 
public. There were eleven murders in Macedonia in 1994, and in nine of them 
victims were women (Ahmeti and Balaban 1996). In a highly publicized case in the 
summer of 1994, a 101-year old Bitola man killed his 73-yeai' old wife because he 
suspected that she was having a “fling.”
However, it is still difficult to generalize on the problem of violence. All of 
my informants in Prespa born after 1950 were strongly opposed to it. I know 
personally of only one  ^  52 younger couple where violence did occur —  but the 
woman did put up with it (the fact that her family does not live in the region might 
have contributed to this). Violence is based on the notion of hierarchy: men are 
presumed to have “higher” status in society and violence can be seen as a way of 
reasserting their domination. But while notion of hierarchy has been often assumed, I 
found it difficult to notice it in the actual ethnographic con tex t 1^3 jn  prespa. In all 
the contexts that I have observed, one can speak about the notion of complementarity, 
quite similar to the examples that Segalen provides from 17th and 18th century mral 
France:
The central hypothesis of the book is that the man-wife relationship in 
peasant society is based not on the absolute authority of one over the 
other, but on the complementarity. This relationship is determined by 
the particular nature of peasant sociability: before being a couple, the
At least for me, since I did expect that the more educated people are, the less likely they will be to 
use violent means to resolve their disputes.
That is to say, men with the university degree.
^^7 O f course, even one is too much!
153 Pqj. notion of context, I refer to Holy 1994.
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man and wife form part of the male and female groups which make up 
the basic framework of human relationships.
(Segalen 1983: 9)
This image that Segalen presents for rural France is to a large extent 
applicable to Prespa. There is no strict hierarchy in the family or in the society. Men 
and women are recognized as different — and these differences enable them to 
function together. Of course, in the case of Macedonia (and Prespa in particular), one 
cannot talk about “groups” in the same sense —  but there are clearly defined 
categories in which men and women “fall” — and they seem to quite similar. The 
notion of complementarity rather than of subordination requires different attitudes. 
Women in cities, away from their families, are more likely to become exposed to 
domestic violence than the ones in rural and semi-urban communities.
Furthermore, while family pressures may be detrimental and highly 
oppressive in terms of choice of partner, they frequently serve as an effective 
deterrent against domestic violence (because, as already noted, woman’s male 
relatives might just decide on revenge). Of course, only effective changes in the legal 
area can provide a significant step forward.
KEEPERS OF THE FAMILY: 
GENDER ROLES AT THE CROSSROADS
According to the 1994 census, women form 49.6% of the total population of 
the Republic of Macedonia. They also form 37.5% of the employed —  the fact that 
47.6% of women are capable of work shows that in many communities it is still 
considered “natural” for a woman to stay at home. On the other hand, the percentage 
of women among the unemployed has fallen to 48.5 from 50.4 since 1991
105
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia 1995: 15-17) — although this is more 
due to the fact that more and more men lose their jobs, than to some trend towards 
increasing employment of women. One of the most notable statistics is a large 
discrepancy in illiteracy rates: for the rural population, it is 5.1% for men but 15.2% 
for women (total 10%), and for the city population 1.75 for men and 5.7% for women 
(total 3 .7 %).154 These numbers should be put in the context of age, since 75.58% of 
illiterate women were aged 55 or over — a remnant of the time when it was believed 
unnecessaiy for a girl to attend a school or even to learn to r e a d .  155
When it comes to education, there are “feminine” and “masculine” fields — 
based on the numbers of students that enroll for certain courses or colleges. Among 
the former ones are chemical-technological training courses, aits, services, textile, 
leather-processing and medical cares; while the latter ones include electrotechnics, 
mining, mechanical engineering, and wood-processing. When it comes to 
university-level education, the majority of students (52.8%) are women, but the 
majority of them still do not continue their education as far as their male counterparts: 
in 1994, out of 67 M.A. and M.Sc. degrees, 25 were received by women, while out of 
49 Ph.D. degrees, only 18 were awarded to women.
The role of women is still traditionally regarded as something that has to do 
with family and children. Several women’s organizations that were formed in the 
early 1990s are based either in Skopje (the capital, with around 700,000 inhabitants) 
or its immediate vicinity (Tetovo) — so it is open to debate how much of an impact 
these groups (set up by educated, city-dwelling women) can have in the mral and 
suburban ai'eas.^^6 The women organized in these groups would definitively not
154 The data are based on the 1991 census and cover people aged ten and over (Government of the 
Republic o f Macedonia 1995: 12).
155 jyiy own grandmother was illiterate.
156 These groups are: Organization o f Women o f Macedonia, The Alliance o f Organizations o f  
Women o f the Republic o f Macedonia, Women’s Organization o f Skopje, Women’s Club “Spark of 
Life,” The Association o f Vlach Women in the Republic o f Macedonia, The Humanitarian 
Association for Emancipation, Solidarity and Equality o f Women of the City o f Skopje (Skopje), and
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accept the “family + children” equation as the definition of the place of women. 
However, in the last general elections (in 1994), only 3 women became MPs (in the 
120-seat National Assembly), and of the 20 ministers in the Macedonian government, 
they hold only two posts (in the properly “feminine” aieas: science and education).^^7
On the other hand, the “family + children” equation seems to be the one that 
women themselves are ready to accept. For example, a recent survey in a textile 
factoiy indicated that most workers (the majority were women) would (if given the 
opportunity) rather stay at home and take care of their children (Gjurovska 1995: 45). 
Much less than a longing for the “male-dominated world,” I would interpret this as a 
reaction to the dramatic (and swift) changes in the politics and economy in former 
communist countries —  confronted with the immense insecurity (“market economy” 
here means a 40% unemployment rate and more than half of the population living 
below the official poverty line) of the “brave new” (post-communist or post-socialist, 
as it is sometimes called) world, people simple want to be back to the basic unit of 
their society, the unit that always cares and provides for its members: the family.
Macedonia is not as industrialized as Slovenia, for example, so some of the 
problems regarding transition of the family into industrial and post-industrial age are 
not present in Macedonian contex ts. ^ 58 Second and third cousins (as well as their
Albanian Women League (Tetovo), These groups are fairly strictly organized along ethnic lines, and 
the cooperation between, for example, the ones that consist o f Slav Macedonian women and the ones 
that consist o f Albanian women is practically non-existent.
1^7 This is comparable to the situation in Croatia, where women account for slightly more than 50% 
of the population, 43% of the employed —  but only 4% of the memebers of Parliament (Scavina 
1996). See also Einhorn 1993: 150-151 for the comparison with East Central European countries.
On the other hand, according to the data for 1992, more than half o f all the employed in the 
Parliament (273 out o f 495) were women (Government o f the Republic o f Macedonia 1995: 10). This 
probably signifies that if  they are participating in politics and in decision-making processes, women’s 
proper place is seen primarily as secretaries or low-ranking assistants.
In most general terms, some o f the problems are a loss o f the cultural ties o f migrant workers that 
com e into the cities, a rising number o f abandoned children and illegitimate births, an increasing rate 
o f juvenile delinquency, etc. (cf. Segalen 1986).
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children) are readily recognized as “members of the family.” The practice of putting 
elderly people in special “old people’s homes” is seen as extremely savage and brutal: 
one has a duty towards one’s p a r e n t s *59 —  the only exception being illness which 
requires hospital treatment and intensive care.
Women are traditionally seen as the “pillars” of the family. Of course, it is 
through men that the family name is passed o n ,  *60 but the role of women is 
recognized veiy clearly. In her 1995 paper “Women of the family, women of the 
nation,” Anastasia Karakasidou traces the changes that occurred in the families of 
Slav Macedonians in northern Greece after 1903. Quoting from the 1931 book 
Agrotika by Kostas Karavidas, Karakasidou refers to the Slavic Macedonian women,
as being of a ‘special kind’: they were individuals of great physical 
stamina, wives and mothers who worked not only for the family’s land 
but also its cottage industry (...). Behind the superficial silence of the 
zadruga women, Karavidas saw human beings who were lay experts 
on religion, rituals, superstitions, songs, proverbs, legends, populai’ 
wisdom, and experience.
(Karakasidou 1995: 8, footnote omitted)
Karakasidou then mentions the example of slava. Slava is by far the most 
important family and religious holiday among many Orthodox Chi’istian peoples. It 
commemorates the family patron saint and it is a ritual of great significance. It is the 
most important day of the year, when all the members of a family and their close 
friends get together for a meal and (in case of wealthier and more “traditionally 
oriented” families) a blessing from the priest. According to Karavidas, “by the
1^^ In the same way as parents have a duty to care for their children. This duty ends only when 
children are able to financially sustain themselves —  so it can go even after the children are 25 or 30 
years old.
160 The curse “May your name be extinguished!” is one of the worst things that Macedonians can say 
to each other. Families without male children are frequently looked upon as the ones which are 
“losing” their name, and by extension, the ones that are in the process of disappearing. (A way out is 
sometimes adoption o f the children o f close relatives who are too poor to care for them.)
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second decade of the twentieth century, some families had rescheduled or recast their 
slava as a commemoration of a meaningful political event, such as ‘the local 
revolution of 1903’ ” (Karakasidou 1995: 9, footnote and reference omitted). The 
‘local revolution of 1903’ refers to the Ilinden uprising against the Ottoman Empire, 
started by Macedonian revolutionaries in and around Krusevo on 2 August 1903 — 
the uprising failed after some ten days, but the date is celebrated as the Macedonian 
national holiday. Obviously, changing the date of such an important/am//y ritual 
influenced by a major political event meant a very important step in the process of 
establishing the national identity. And it was the women of the family that played the 
crucial role in this process:
From pagan deities to Christian patron saints to national political 
movements, the slava provided a symbolic metaphor for the family’s 
identity as well as an institutionalized forum for the ritual expression 
of the family’s place in the cosmos, both secular and supernatural (...). 
Women played a critical role in this process, for while even though the 
decision to reconstitute the family slava as a political commemoration 
could very well have been made by the male family head, it was the 
women who controlled the ‘hidden meaning’ of the slava symbolism 
and taught it to their children.
(Karakasidou 1995: 9-10)
This combines well with my own observations that women are more likely to 
be involved with children and their homeworks, they will more often attend the 
teachers/parents meetings at schools, etc. Of course, this is again dependent on the 
amount of time that the parents have ■—• men are more likely to be away from the
There are two elementary schools in Resen, “Mite Bogoevski” and “Goce Delcev.” The first one 
is “mixed” —  that is to say, has classes both in Macedonian and in Turkish —  while the other one is 
“purely” Slav Macedonian. In recent years, and with the upsurge of nationalist feelings in the 
Balkans, some parents whose children would have normally attended the first one opted for the “Goce 
D elcev.” However, the teachers from “Mite Bogoevski” are more than happy to point out that “their” 
children are much more successful when they continue their education and proceed to the high school.
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household during the day — especially in the spring and summer, when the working 
of the bavcas is most important. In the cases when women work and men are more at 
home, they will attend the school meetings. This further exemplifies the notion of 
complementarity referred to in the previous section. Pejoska (1993: 123) notes the 
paradoxicality of the situation where women actually have some powers 
“traditionally” reserved for men (for example, the mother has a very important power 
to approve or disapprove of her son’s marriage), but at the same time consciously 
abstain from using them. For her, this represents both the “support” for the 
patriarchal structure of the society, as well as the seeds of its destruction.
One of the most striking features of everyday discourses in Prespa is the fact 
that men like to present things in such a way as if they aie “in charge.” At the same 
time, they know very well that they are not “in charge” — the whole structure of the 
family collapses if the woman decides (or is forced by mistreatment) to walk away or 
simply to abstain from family duties. However, men still go on with this kind of 
presentation and women let them get away with it, while at the same time both men 
and women know (and they know that at the same time “the other side” or “the other 
sex” knows it all too well) that what is presented as the “official story” has nothing to 
do with the way things are.
To conclude, both the concept of hyperreality and the concept of difference(s) 
plays a significant part in the understanding of gender relations in Prespa. Although 
superficially there is an established hierarchy (with women subordinated to men), in 
practice, this hierarchy seems to be a rationalizing illusion. I do not claim that men 
and women are completely equal (in particular, women lack significant political 
power), but their relations can be understood much better if one bases her or his 
observations on the concept of complementarity, where men and women because they 
are different provide different (and mutually compatible) elements that enable this 
community to function.
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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING “FEMINISTS”
Woman is by her very being more conservative, representing better 
her own species then herself, she does not like abstract things — that 
is why we, men, tell her that she is not logical (and she really is not!), 
she intuitively realizes the right position, she is very emotional, etc.
(Bozo Skerlj, “Men and women: Is the woman less 
valid?” [1929]; quoted in Zavirsek 1994: 160)
In this chapter, I will look at the situation in Slovenia, insofar as it relates to 
the issues of gender construction. Going back to the questions outlined above (p. 87), 
I will attempt to answer the second one, what is the meaning o f gender fo r  men and 
women in specific cultures? I am especially interested in the ways in which feminist 
authors themselves construct gender, and how this relates to “the global picture” — 
as far as Slovenia is concerned (that is to say, how do their writings and activities 
relate to the “ordinary people” and everyday discourses). I will begin with data 
referring to some recent gender-related debates in Slovenia, proceed with the notions 
of “gender construction” including questions related to violence, and conclude with 
some empirical data referring to the gender-related socialization of children.
The data are based on observations and inteiwiews which I conducted during 
August and September 1995 in and around Ljubljana,*62 as well as on numerous 
written materials that I have access to. Most of the materials that I shall refer to are 
indeed written by leading Slovenian feminist authors and scholars.
To declare oneself as a “feminist” in Slovenia can be quite risky. On the one 
hand, it can earn oneself some prestige in intellectual (especially academic) circles.
*^7 Ljubljana (population: around 350,000) is the capital o f Slovenia. The Republic o f Slovenia 
gained independence from the SFR Yugoslavia in 1991. It has a temtory o f 20,256 square kilometers 
and approximately 1.989 million inhabitants.
112
On the other hand, this relies to a great extent on the social milieu that a person is 
situated in. Intellectuals ( w o m e n can be “feminists,” but then the question arises 
as to whether they actually become enclosed (and their respective discourses 
encapsulated) within their own social group. Within the group, everyone understands 
everyone else, and everyone knows what the point of discussion is —  but the further 
one gets away from the group, the less intelligible these discourses become, and the 
more it seems that the people involved in them are just talking to themselves 
(something like talking to one’s own image in the mirror). Finally, there are large 
segments of society (middle class, working class, people without higher education) to 
whom feminist discourses mean nothing at all. In everyday life, even the intellectuals 
tend to shy away from using the “f  ’ word (Salecl 1995:46).
Unlike in the West, men (at least, a great majority o f them, and this does include intellectuals) do 
not consider themselves as “feminists” —  the word can be used in a derogatory sense when applied to 
them. The Slovenian word feniinizem  is a male-gender noun, while the derivatives fem inist and 
fem inistka are o f male and female gender respectively.
Slovenian intellectuals are usually (the exception being writers) people with second-degree 
University level education or higher (the equivalent o f British M.Phil., as well as Ph.D.). They have 
comparatively well-paid jobs —  usually within the Universities (there are two Universities in 
Slovenia, University o f Ljubljana, and University o f Maribor), or research institutes. Their higher 
eainings and job security clearly set them apart from the majority of the population. This perhaps 
contributes to a sense of isolation, which makes their discourses very different from the ones that one 
would normally encounter in everyday conversations.
164 By “feminist discourses,” I mean all the discourses that address the questions relating to the 
disproportion o f powers and rights, inasmuch they relate to gender. For a working definition of 
feminism, I again refer to Baber (1993:47). The aim of these discourses should be, among other 
things, “that a female applicant’s chances o f being hired as a dishwasher, computer salesperson, 
gardener, mail room clerk or fork-lift operator should be the same as male applicant’s. It means in 
addition that women should not have to work harder than men to get the same recognition, or 
undertake a “double-shift” if they work outside the home, or forego having children in order to have a 
career, or be [the] subject o f isolation, ridicule or harassment if  they succeed in obtaining “non- 
traditional” jobs. It means, in short that the male/female playing field should be level” (Baber, ibid.). I 
understand the contemporary feminist discourses in the Republic o f Slovenia to be oriented exactly 
towards making “the playing field” level. But it is not the understanding of the majority o f Slovenian 
people, a point to which I will come back to later.
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To give an example of attitudes towards feminism, in a recent televised debate 
on the greater inclusion of women in politics, arguments that stressed “biological 
superiority” as the reason why women should take the most powerful and 
decision-making positions in politics were presented. It is exactly because they are 
women and (as such) have specific characteristics which define them as women: 
greater patience, good intuition, greater ability to cooperate and to listen to “the other 
side,” etc., that they should be given important positions and greater responsibilities. 
So the (desired) greater participation of women in everyday political life has nothing 
to do with their professional capabilities, but rather with their (biological or socially 
constructed^^^) nature. On the other hand, it has to be stressed that some feminists in 
Slovenia do occasionally take the “biological argument” in order to justify the need 
for more women in the decision-making arenas, in politics, legislature, etc. They 
seem to be lost when the same “biological arguments” are used against women in 
general.
This “biologically-centered” view of men and women (and the differences 
between them) is a legacy of both the communist ideology (Slovenia was part of 
Yugoslavia since Slovenians decided to unite with Croats and Serbs in 1918; a 
communist ideology was the official state ideology in Yugoslavia from 1945 until its 
dissolution in 1991 ^^ ^^ ) and the specific world view stressed by the influential 
representatives of the Catholic church. On the one hand, during the communist 
period, equality was officially proclaimed — although it did not persist in everyday 
life. Of course, certain positive things that happened in this period (like the 
introduction of day-care and kindergartens, maternity leave, equal pay for the same
1^^ It is clear that in the present (Slovenian) context the female “biological” self is actually a social 
construction. That is to say, women are expected to be patient, intuitive, cooperative and to listen to 
the others —  it certainly does not mean that it is always (or even in the majority o f cases) happening.
I am very grateful to Vesna Godina for pointing this out to me.
Many o f the current Slovenian politicians are former communists and some (like the Slovenian 
president, Mr Milan Kucan) held important positions for many years within both the Slovenian and the 
Yugoslav communist hierarchy.
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work, etc.) did improve the position of women, but with all this the problem of 
gender inequality did not disappear, it just became less visible. Patriarchal 
ideology was still incorporated in all segments of the society. To quote from 
Renata Salecl:
For example, the liberalization of abortion did not come into being as 
a realization of a woman’s right, but as a primarily hygienic measure, 
which both put an end to illegal abortions and enabled women to 
quickly return to work. Socialism promoted a specific type of women 
— revolutionaries, communist activists — who entered politics 
through a system of quotas. This was the image of a woman dressed 
in a grey suit, without any make-up, and who was also a die-hard 
proponent of communism.
(1995: 46)
The problem is, as Salecl says, that today in Slovenia the word “feminist” 
provokes exactly the same set of associations and imagery, feminists being described 
as sexually fmstrated women deprived of any femininity. In this context, whenever 
the word is used in Slovenia, it is necessary to stress that feminism does not actually 
advocate the extermination of men —  merely the equal treatment of women. It is 
hardly surprising then that the female TV presenter of the debate referred to above, 
quickly pointed out that “of course, there is no feminism involved here!”
The other important influence is the legacy of the Catholic Church. In fact, 
the very beginnings of anthropology in Slovenia (primarily associated with the name 
of Dr Bozo Skerlj) are connected with the ideological discussions about gender 
differences and differentiation (cf. Zavirsek 1994: 161 ff). Skerlj, who published 
works that would today be broadly classified as falling within the parameters of 
“gender studies,” mostly in the 1920s and 1930s, was a radical proponent of
This is a term relatively frequently used by Slovenian feminists, as well as the phrase 
“androcentric culture.” Although it seems to me that both terms lack a proper definition and might be 
too general, I will use them when referring to writings o f feminist authors that do use them —  likeVSalecl in this instance (cf. also Jogan 1990, 1991, 1994c; as well as Jogan and Sadi 1994).
For the specific references, cf. the bibliography in Zavirsek 1994; 297-298.
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eugenics (which he saw as a way of improving the “quality” of the society that he 
was living in) and some of his views could well be classified as fascist. However, he 
was continuing a line of thinking (initiated by the Slovenian sociologists of Catholic 
orientation) that accepted the gender hierarchy as something “given,” as something 
already “there” (in the “real world”), so that the only thing that the scholars could do 
was not to question this hierarchy, but to try to explain it. '^^^  If the hierarchy was 
there, the thinking was, god had something to do with it. Therefore, the gender 
hierarchy is a part of his original design. But why is it so? In order to give the right 
answer to this question, social scientists from the late 19th and the early 20th century 
had to, ultimately, justify the norms and regulations of the society they were living in. 
These justifications and explanations were, according to Maca Jogan “supposed to 
contribute to the harmonization of society in general, and to peaceful relations 
between the genders. By these explanations, rooted in the Thomist doctrine, the 
‘proper’ answers regarding the burning demands of equal rights (in the field of 
economy, politics, education) for both genders were constructed” (1994a: 90). To 
quote further from the same article:
These explanations have been justifying male authority [on all levels] 
from the family to the state, and even in Heaven, by stressing the 
“natural” role of the woman as mother and housewife with specific 
basic personal characteristics ([she was supposed] to be obedient, 
passionate, modest, suffering, awe-stricken). The constant advocacy 
of women’s domestication also presented the basis for the evaluation 
of women’s entrance into the public sphere. Women’s public activity 
was allowed only if they were aware and prepared to accept their 
primary “natural” role. In this way, the notion of the material and
1^^ Of course, this also has to be seen within the context of the rising dangers that the emergence of 
the first feminist groups created in Slovenia (which was until 1918 part o f the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire); the first Slovenian women’s organization was formed in 1887 as a part o f a worker’s 
syndicate in Trieste. The Association of Slovenian Women Teachers was formed in 1898, and the 
Women’s General Association in 1901 (Jogan \994a: 95n).
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moral overburdening of women who are also active outside home has 
been established as a self-evident (i.e. natural) fact (Jogan 1990).
(Jogan 1994a: 90-91)
Although this kind of legacy is not present among the social scientists today 
(quite the contrary, a great majority of them being left-wing, Marxist or post-Marxist 
oriented), it is very prevalent in everyday discourses (on the street, in the bai's, cafés, 
etc. —  Slovenian girls definitively do not want to be described as “feminisf’ '^ i^). The 
situation on the political scene is quite different: with the emergence of a multi-party 
system, the Catholic Church tried (successfully, as some of the recent debates 
indicate) to put its weight and influence behind different right-wing parties like the 
Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, 7^2 etc.
The important factor to be considered here is that religiosity in Slovenia does 
tend to be influenced by gender. To give an exam ple , 1^ 3 in 1978 39% of men and 
52% of women described themselves as being religious; in 1993 the respective 
shares were 57.6% and 63.7%. In 1991 81.4% of all adults had some sort of 
Catholic education. Among the whole of the religious population in 1993, 56.4% 
were women. Among the “core believers” (a sub-group that amounts to 13% of all 
respondents), 71% were women. (Among the unbelievers — 23.2% of all
171 But they certainly have nothing against having equal opportunities and equal pay to their male 
counterparts.
172 One has to be very careful with the political terminology in the newly emerging (post-1990) 
countries; so the Social Democrats in Slovenia (SDSS, led by Janez Jan^a) are essentially a right-wing 
party (just like the Liberal Democrats are extreme right-wing in Russia, the Democrats in Serbia, etc.). 
The problem is that there are as well parties whose name does depict their political orientation —  like 
the Social Democrat Action in Croatia, Serbian Social Democratic Party (SDSS/J), etc. I am aware o f  
the confusion that this creates with people used to the “common sense” political denominators, but 
there is a sense among the newly emerging political elites in former communist countries that 
(following Humpty Dumpty) words can mean many different things.
^73 I am closely following here an account given by Jogan 1994a: 92-94, where she follows the 
results o f longitudinal research on a representative sample o f the adult Slovenian population. This 
research has been conducted since the late 1970s by several prominent Slovenian sociologists (Roter, 
Tos). For the exact references, cf. Jogan 1994a: 96-97.
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respondents — there were no significant differences between genders.) The 1992 
data indicate that God is “very important in life” for 38.1% of women, but baidy 
30% of men. 61.6% of women, but only 38.4% of men agreed with the statement that 
“Only the existence of God makes sense of life.” (As Jogan points out, these 
numbers should also be seen in the context of the much more limited choice that girls 
have as to whether they will attend some sort of religious education or not. They are 
usually just told by their parents to go — especially in the rural communities.)
As a direct consequence of the growing importance of the Catholic Church in 
political life, 7^4 interesting coalition of “pro-life” organizations and paities like the 
Christian Democrats came up with the proposal that maternity leave should last for 
three years. ^ 75 This is (according to all feminist scholars whom I have met, as well as 
for Salecl 1995: 47) a highly unusual example of the right-wing paities and 
organizations demanding women’s rights. The question of the three-year maternity 
leave 176 was presented as a matter of “free choice” (that is to say, any woman could 
freely choose whether she wanted to be a mother or a career w o m a n ) .  177 This debate
174 Although not necessai'ily in everyday life —  Jogan (1994a) strongly argues that Slovenia is 
actually becoming a more secularized society. Here is an example o f a specific “clash o f values” —  
on the one hand, the rural and predominantly patriarchal households where girls are frequently told to 
go to religious schools (while boys are given much more choice); on the other, urban communities 
where secularization is “the way o f life” and the legacy o f the previously dominant communist 
(atheist) ideology still very strong.
^75 More about this proposal and the whole context o f this debate in the next chapter.
^76 The materials, opinions, survey results, etc. were published by the Office for W omen’s Policy, 
Government o f the Republic o f Slovenia 1995a. The surveys o f the representative sample o f the 
population conducted in January 1995 indicated that 41.7% of the respondents believed that the three- 
year maternity leave would have a negative impact on the possibilities for young women to get jobs 
(as opposed to 19.7% who believed it might have a positive impact). Even more, 50.6%, believed that 
this would hinder women’s possibilities for promotions —  as opposed to 7.9%, who thought that it 
might have a positive impact (Office for Women’s Policy, Government of the Republic of Slovenia 
1995a: 13).
^77 Of course, not much o f the “free” or “choice” would remain in terms o f the position in which a 
woman looking for a job would be put after three years o f maternity leave.
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became connected to that concerning universal child benefits. Proponents of the 
latter suggested that it would mean that all children would he treated as “equal,” 
forgetting that just as all people are not equal when it comes to their social status, so 
their children cannot be equal. As a matter of fact, poor families would (if the new 
proposal becomes law) get up to 40% less in child benefit than they do now (Salecl 
1995: 47)! 7^8 The proposal of a law that would effectively ban abortion was 
defeated, but the doctors are given the opportunity (at any point that they might 
choose) of becoming “conscientious objectors” and simply refuse to perform, or give 
their patient any information on the operation. The paradoxical situation is that many 
rights that were taken for granted during the communist era (and the freedom to 
decide how many children a woman [or a couple] will have is certainly one of the 
more obvious ones) are suddenly becoming the subjects of debates. These debates 
frequently have very strong political overtones, since everything connected with the 
communist past (pre-1991 Slovenia) tends to be equated by the right and the 
nationalist parties as bad a priori and something that should have perished with the 
communist system. This is definitely not a view with which either feminist authors 
or a significant number of women would agree. As a prominent Slovenian journalist 
summed it up: “In spite of all the slander, we have to admit that the old regime had 
guaranteed a firm level of social and economic rights to women, even if some were, 
politically at least, more equal than others” (Korade 1994: 36).
178 Salecl (ibid.) quotes an example from the women’s magazine Jana: a family with tliree children 
with parents on minimum wage currently gets 21,000 SIT (approximately £ 120) in child benefits. 
However, if  the new law came into effect, from January 1996 the same family would get only 13,600 
SIT (approximately £ 71).
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DEBATING WOMEN: 
SEXISM AND FEMINIST RHETORIC
What’s in a name? asks Juliet, who is a woman and knows the tide, 
the ebb and flow, the pull of the real.
(DeLauretis 1987: 51)
The emergence of feminist groups 179 in Slovenia is to a large extent 
associated with the “pro-democracy” movements that originated in the then 
northernmost part of Yugoslavia in the early 1980s. A variety of independent groups 
started questioning the “technologies of power” (cf. Longinovic 1994), as well as the 
foundations of the official (i. e., communist) ideological discourse. As the most 
important date for the emergence of feminist groups in Slovenia, one should probably 
take the theoretical supplement of the independent weekly Mladina published in 
March 1985 with several feminist articles (Mirjana Ule in Bahovec 1993a: 122). The 
emergence of the first independent women’s groups immediately followed.
These groups were associated usually with the Socialist Youth organizations 
(like the ZSMS) or their offshoots, although they had no official ideological (in 
terms of party politics) platform of their own.^^*  ^ Some more radical groups
179 Among them still active in the late 1980s and early 1990s were: “Lilith,” “Lezbicna LL skupina,” 
Zenska sekcija pri Socioloskem dru^tvu, “SOS telefon za zenske —  zrtve nasilja,” “Inicijativa,” 
“Prenner klub,” “Zenske za politiko,” “Zenska inicijativa/Iniziativa delle donne,” “Zenske z idejami,” 
and others (cf. Parliament o f the Republic o f Slovenia et. al. 1992: 45-53, Office for Women’s Policy 
1995/î: 12,1995/). Several political parties have women’s caucuses, but there is no institutional 
organizing o f women MPs. However, it has to be noted that women form 14% of the members o f the 
Slovenian parliament, as well as 22% of the leaders o f various parliamentary committees, and they 
have 15% of elected ministerial posts.
180 They all shared the emphasis on the heterogeneity and pluralism o f discourses, as well as 
questioning the dominant (political) narratives —  gradually endorsing multi-party elections (which 
happened in Slovenia in 1990). It is interesting to note that the formation o f independent women’s
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(primarily associated with the gay and lesbian movement, like the “LL lesbian group” 
or “Lilith”) were marginalized even within these early g r o u p s , w h i c h  consisted of 
mostly middle or upper class well-educated urban women or university students. In 
an ideological sense, most of these early groups were still constituted within the 
framework of (then-dominant) Marxist ideology, although more and more tended to 
see that the problems of inequality did not have to do exclusively with questions of 
class domination and class struggle.
However, these groups did not readily describe themselves as “feminist.” The 
notion of feminism implied, throughout the former Yugoslavia, something that was a 
“dangerous import from the West” (Malesevic 1989: 8 3 ).^^2 This a priori negative 
attitude in the former Yugoslavia was caused, on the one hand,
by an authoritaiian-patriai'chal complex of the whole culture and the 
in-built idea of the “otherness” and the lesser value of women, who 
were considered incapable of paiticipating in the areas that “naturally” 
belonged to men. On the other hand, the official antagonism towards 
feminism as a primarily bourgeois phenomenon has its roots in the 
p r e - w a r  I ^ 3 Yugoslav revolutionaiy movement. The feminists (...) 
never [theoretically] questioned [the essentials of] the actual 
[capitalist] political system, despite severely criticizing it in practice.
(Malesevic 1989: 84)
Taking all of this into account, it is not very surprising that the official 
(communist, post-WW II) ideology rejected the feminist movement as something that 
was not for or from “the people” (Serbian and Croatian: nenarodno), and something
groups happened in Slovenia 10 to 20 years a/fer first similar groups were formed in Zagreb (Croatia) 
and Belgrade (Serbia).
Although these groups could (and still can) be contacted through the Student Cultural Center 
(SKUC) in Ljubljana.
182 Neither Miroslava Malesevic or Isidora Jaric actually discuss the situation in Slovenia. However, 
both o f their articles are highly relevant for the understanding of gender relations in Slovenia as well, 
since the basic cultural patterns o f what an “appropriate women’s movement” is (Malesevic) or what 
are the ways in which children’s concept o f gender roles are constructed (Jaric) are the same.
183 w  II, to be exact.
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essentially elitist (Malesevic, ibid.). Therefore, it is no surprise to find the 
aforementioned hostility and uneasiness about “feminism,” despite the fact that many 
people (especially women) who feel uncomfortable with the term would not 
recognize it as coming from the previous dominant nairatives. This uneasiness is 
especially visible in the writings of Jogan and some other authors of the “Marxist” 
wing of Slovenian feminists. This tradition was based upon the idea that there were 
no specific “women’s issues” — all the issues had to do with the society as a whole 
and the injustices within the social sphere (i. e., women should have equal pay for 
equal work, proper health and child care, etc.). There should be no political 
organizing of women (cf. the example that Ule quotes in Bahovec 1993a: 121), since 
it would only muddle up the otherwise cleai' situation. Consequently, all the 
problems would be solved when the more general issues related to society as a whole 
were dealt with.
This situation is even more interesting when one looks at the Slovenian 
feminists and the traditions that they come from: the “Marxist” wing was 
incorporated in the official ideological discourses, and there was no official 
displeasure at the research conducted by them. This factor contributed to an 
emerging tradition of “women’s clubs” in major political parties. On the other hand, 
the “psychoanalytical” wing (Bahovec and the authors around the journal Delta, 
Salecl, etc.) was regarded as potentially dangerous and obstructive. 1^ 4 Any 
questioning of the underlying ideological discourses that enabled gender bias was 
seen as a potential threat for the “official” ideology. Even after the fall of
184 Again, I w ish to emphasize the plurality o f fem inist discourses: for example, I would regard 
authors like Zavirsek today as “post-Marxist” —  and there are certainly great differences within the 
two influential groups that are mentioned here. On the other hand, there are important authors like 
Dragica Korade or Mojca Dobnikar who do not easily fit within these categories.
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communism in Slovenia, this uneasiness is obviously present, for example in the fact 
that there are still no established gender studies programs in Slovenian universities4^5
FROM POSTER TO SEX AND BACK: 
THE HIDDEN “FACTOR”
[W]hy do we enjoy watching old movies? Or, better, how do we 
enjoy them? Well, let us take just a detail: we can discuss whether we 
like Meryl Streep or not, we can agree or disagree — while Greta 
Garbo is “beautiful” for everybody; and for always. Why? Because, 
together with her face, with her figure, we also see the point from 
which she was, and is, a “fascinating woman.” The gaze for which she 
is fascinating, the fascinating gaze is now part of her appearance.
(Mocnik 1994: 82)
The spring and summer of 1995 were marked by, among other things, a 
debate about an advertisement for a sun tan lotion: a poster featuring the backsides of 
five girls in bikinis. The accompanying text was: “Each one has her own factor” 
(“VSAKA IMA SVOJ FAKTOR”), with the obvious stress that the word “factor” 
could be interpreted as a different level of sun block protection, as well as (on the 
other side) stressing a difference between five backsides belonging to different girls 
in different bikinis. On the other hand, the Slovenian 'wovd.faktor (“factor”) also 
implies something that puts something into motion. Therefore, the image of five 
almost naked backsides implies that each one of them has something (i. e., a penis)
185 Of course, there are several courses within the area o f gender studies (coordinated by Svetlana 
Slap^ak) at the (postgraduate) Institute for Humanistic Studies in Ljubljana. These courses include: 
History and anthropology o f genders, Gender concepts. Feminisms, Women’s rituals, presentations 
and discourses, and Feminism and psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, the Institute does not have a 
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Fig. 1 “Each one has her own factor” — the sun tan lotion advertisement.
that would put them “in motion.” Therefore, the poster could also read: “Each one 
has her own penisT^^^
It is easy to see why the campaign caused an outrage among some feminist 
groups, articulated mostly through the Office for Women’s Policy. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the debate about the creation of the “denigrating imagery” of women did 
not polarize public opinion: I was a little bit surprised to find out (in my interviews 
as well as in the interviews conducted by the Slovenian media) that both men and 
women felt largely indifferent towards the ad or just liked it. Some women felt that 
there was something wrong with it only when specifically asked to elaborate on the 
image of five female backsides on posters all over the country.
Two things seem to be combined here:
1/ The image of five almost naked parts of female anatomy represents something 
“other” (just an advertisement), different, belonging to a different reality from the one 
that everyday people live in. In a way, the image belongs to a dijferent culture, and 
as such does not threaten the (actual or perceived) position of women. This is a 
culture of high paid chief executives, models, actors and actresses, “high culture” 
which stands apart from what the ordinary people perceive to be “theirs.”^^ ^
2/ The obvious fact that there is a gender hierarchy in wider Slovenian society (or, 
more precisely, societies) creates a situation (well known from numerous 
anthropological examples) in which the sub-dominant group identifies itself through 
the concepts and discourse of the dominant group (or segment of the society). In this 
case, women perceive themselves through men’s eyes (the sexual symbolism 
inscribed all over the poster) and see nothing wrong with that. That is the only way 
in which they are able to see themselves — and that is why criticism coming from 
women’s groups fell on deaf ears.
186 The linguistic/cultural overtones were pointed out to me by Vesna Godina.
1^7 O f course, this does not imply that the majority of people would regard this “high culture” as 
non-Slovenian or in any way “foreign” —  it just represents “the other” in regard to the norms with 
which they identify themselves. These can be understood as Baudrillard’s “silent majorities.”
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On the one hand, there is a whole new reality (or hyperreality) being 
constructed (and actually lived!) here: the reality of men’s gaze as something 
“normal,” “natural,” or even “neutial.” Although this reality is there (in “real life”), 
its existence is not readily acknowledged — and the majority of women would not 
agree with this statement. But feminist scholars certainly would. How men see 
women is “the norm” — both fo r men and fo r women. On the other hand, the 
objections to the language and the (sexist) implications of the ad are perceived as 
belonging to the same “high culture” as the image itself. As such, it is also 
constructed as “the other” in relation to everyday lives (people did not pay much 
attention to it prior to the debate anyway), and has no actual relevance to the “lived” 
(as opposed to perceived) reality. This was clearly correlated to the small minority of 
people who did have problems with this sun tan poster: the higher one stood on the 
social level, the more likely it was that she/he would be offended or in some way 
disturbed by this ad.
On the other hand, the attitudes towards the body are much more liberal in 
Slovenia than they are in the West^^^ —  public displays of magazines with naked 
(female! —  it would be interesting to see if the reaction would be the same if some of 
these naked bodies were male^^9) bodies can be seen all over the country. 
Pornography was practically liberalized in the late 1980s thioughout the former 
Yugoslavia —  so the mere sight of a naked or semi-naked body does not create a 
public scandal. In fact, it is fair to say that in most cases these images do not draw 
any attention at all. It is possible that some of the people that approved of the 
aforementioned advertisement simply did not want to be seen as “backwards” or 
“stupid” by objecting to five female bodies in g-strings.
188 With the important exception of Scandinavian countries, Holland and Denmark.
Although I have to note that the attitudes towards homosexuality are much more liberal than the 
ones in the UK, for example. Office for Women’s Policy is preparing a draft o f law which would 
legalize same-sex marriages —  probably within the next few years.
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Therefore, feminist critique and feminist discourses in general tend to be 
perceived as a part of “high culture” as well. Of course, this does create certain 
problems for the women (feminist scholars and authors) wishing to speak for other 
women as well (although leading feminist scholars have undoubtedly experienced 
sexism personally, most of them seem to be well-established professionally, with 
permanent, full-time teaching posts, etc.) —- but they tend to find themselves in 
opposition to traditional discourses, traditional culture, and traditional prejudices.
In a way, being organized in different groups and different faculties helps the 
feminist authors reassert their own identity (and establish a kind of “semantic 
competence,” as Rorty [1992] would say). This is still the kind of situation that many 
Macedonian women intellectuals can only dream of — the public pressures based on 
the legacy of “feminism” in former Yugoslavia are much stronger there. But the 
points of reference to ordinary women, to silent majorities (Baudrillard 1983), to 
everyday life (or lived reality) are missing. This is where the problem of naming 
comes in: most of the relatively recent articles and discussions tend to focus on the 
questions regarding terminology and the methodological problems associated with it 
(Ule 1988; Zavirsek 1991, 1995; Bahovec 1992; JaM ic 1992: 121 ff, etc.). So 
what’s in a name^90 — as far as some Slovenian feminists are concerned?
190 por example, De Lauretis 1987: 51; Shakespeare, Othello IV.2; Bahovec 1992: 134; Riley 1988. 
Eva Bahovec, who is one of the leading Slovenian feminist scholars today, makes references to all 
three sources on the problem of naming and the whole concept o f it in her seminal article. De Lauretis 
also brings in Umberto Eco and The Name o f the Rose (1983).
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GENDER, FEMINISM, AND “LIVED REALITY”
She believed that men had it best; even the lowest good-for-nothing 
had a wife to boss around. And years later I reached the conclusion 
that she may have been right, although I still cannot imagine myself in 
a man’s body, with hair on my face, a tendency to order people 
around, and something unmanageable below my navel that, to be 
perfectly frank, I would not know exactly where to put.
(Allende 1989: 42)
In Slovenia, like anywhere else, feminism is a way of life  191 as much as a 
way of seeing things, a way of perceiving everyday occurrences. The “everyday 
occurrences” are quite specific in areas like education and employment, where there 
is a clear distinction of interests that can be related to gender. To go to some official 
s t a t i s t i c s :  192 fo the secondary schools (14-19 olds), 97.7% of the students that take 
textiles, 91.7% that take social sciences, 90.2% that take education and 85.5% that 
take medicine as their main subject, are female. Among the most “masculinized” 
areas in secondaiy schools are internal affairs (police) with 100%, forestry with 
98.4%, electrical engineering and computer science with 97.6%, mining, geology and 
metallurgy with 97.2% and mechanical engineering with 92.7% male students. When 
one gets to higher education, the split is also obvious: in the two-year programmes 
(18-20 year olds) of Medical college (94.9%) and Administrative college (67.7%) the 
majority of students are female. On the other side, 91.5% of students in the Internal 
affairs college and 90% in the Technical-security college are male. When it comes to 
the university-level education, girls tend to figure predominantly in education
191 Which does not imply that there is a unified “Slovenian feminist perspective” —  as shown above, 
there are substantial differences between different authors.
192 The follow ing statistics were compiled by the Office for Women’s Policy and published in 
August 1995.
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(86.2%), philosophy (80.8%), social sciences (72.8%), economics (62.9%), medicine 
(62.1%), and law (60.7%). Male students forai the majority in mechanical 
engineering (97.4%), electrical engineering and computer sciences (95.6%), 
engineering (81.7%), sport (64%), organisational sciences (59.9%), and theology 
(59.1%). It is obvious that there clearly are areas distinguished by gender; the more 
“technical ones” (involving more “scientific” or “exact,” “rational” type of 
knowledge) are for boys, and the more “arty ones” (involving more some kind of a 
“relational” or “social knowledge”). This almost looks like a dichotomy where girls 
(being essentially closer to “nature”) do not need the “technical knowledge” of the 
world, but boys (being essentially farther away from “nature”) do. Girls are supposed 
to be “naturally” inclined towards social work (91.8% of the students in the College 
for Social Work), while boys are supposed to deal with the sciences and more “exact” 
things.
This kind of constructed dichotomy is then perpetuated in everyday life: it is 
quite unusual for a girl (or very “unfeminine” — to say the least) to study 
“masculinized” subjects like mechanical engineering, for example. There aie jobs 
that are automatically considered “feminine” or “masculine,” and such a distinction is 
also stressed in the advertisements when, for example, a job opening for a secretary 
(a word which can be used in both male and female gender in the Slovenian) is 
advertised in the female gender only. This is a kind of situation which unites 
different feminist groups in debates pressing for more equality.
This brings us to the issue of the sexist (or non-sexist) use of language. The 
analysis of the job advertisements in the daily Delo for the six-month periods 
(January 1 to June 30) in 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1993, shows that only 4.1% of the 
jobs were advertised using both male and female gender, or a third (neutral) gender 
form. On the contrary, 88.4% of the jobs were advertised using the male gender only 
— particularly the ones for the managerial positions, as well as for the jobs that 
require higher level of education (Office for Women’s Policy 1995b: 63). With all
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this, one has to bear in mind the relative high proportion of women among the total 
number of employed (48.4%). A recent debate organized by the Office for Women’s 
Policy (a Government agency founded in 1992, which has an enormous impact in 
feminist debates, supporting the publication of various books and monographs on 
gender-related issues, organizing conferences and round tables, etc.) highlighted the 
differences between the linguists and the feminist scholais (Office for Women’s 
Policy 1995b). Even the question that there is such a thing as a “sexist” use of 
language was questioned. Then, again, the problem arises of the factual removal of 
certain segments of population (the majority in Slovenian case) from the theoretical 
discussions (a great majority of supporters of the “VSAKA IMA SVOJ FAKTOR” ad 
were women! 9^3) jn which feminist scholars engage themselves. One can see levels 
of hyperreality here: the experience of “everyday women” leads to the debates which 
in turn remain completely incomprehensible to “everyday women.” In a sense, they 
can even reinforce a feeling of a gap between “everyday women” and intellectuals. 
Like two ships going without navigational equipment across the ocean in a dark and 
stormy night, the chance of them meeting at some point seems almost accidental.
A sense of hyperreality also exists around the examples of discrimination 
which are “unofficial.” The best example is the practice of some companies 
(including very important ones, like the “Zavarovalna Triglav”) to ask their female 
employees to sign forms in which they promise that they will not have children.
For example, 32-year old Irena (not her real name), married with a child, well 
educated (M.A.), working in a health institution was invited for a chat with her boss. 
They were discussing the new position for which she applied, when the boss said: 
“Well, if another one was on its way, it wouldn’t be that easy?” Irena laughed, not 
really understanding what he was trying to say, when he said “Well, would it? Will 
you have another child?” He went on to explain that he did not want her to have any 
more children, because if she got the new position, in the next few years they would
193 I ani grateful to Sandra Ba^ic for pointing this out to me.
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need to go on with an important project with very few people involved. After being 
asked what he specifically wanted her to do, the boss replied that he wanted her to 
sign a contract promising that she would not have children during the work on the 
project. Irena knew very well that contracts like these were illegal, but her boss said 
that while he was well aware that the contract would have no legal value, it would 
still oblige her morally, so that she could expect some consequences if she broke the 
contract. She signed the contract and got the job (Doupona Horvat 1995: 8). In 
some cases, the “contract” is submitted for signature even before the girl starts to 
work {ibid., p. 9). The fact that these contracts are illegal does not affect their 
existence. The reality in which they are tolerated exists side by side with the reality 
in which they are illegal. I was told in November 1995 (by Ms Jasna Jeram from the 
Office for Women’s Policy) that an action is underway to prevent this practice, in 
coordination with the Workers’ Unions. This issue is further complicated by the fact 
that Slovenia has one of the lowest birth rates in E u r o p e ,  ^ 9 4  which in turn serves as an 
argument of the ultraconservative and anti-abortion groups and political parties. 
However, the practice of keeping female employees “in check” in this way 
definitively seems profitable to many companies and small enterprises.
Equality and difference are two key concepts for the understanding of 
“women’s issues” in Slovenia. 9^5 w hile men and women are seen (theoretically, in 
everyday discourses, etc.) as “equal, ” the fact that they are also “different” becomes 
obvious when questions related to the family care come into focus.
194 According to the data for 1992, there is an average of 1.34 children per woman in Slovenia (since 
1992, the number is likely to be even lower). This compares to 2.21 for Iceland, 2.11 for Ireland, 2.09 
for Sweden, 1.76 for Denmark and 1.73 for France, for example. The current birth rate in Slovenia is 
lower than in any other European country, with the exception of Spain (1.23) and Italy (1.25) [Office 
for Women’s Policy 1995a].
195 According to Darja Zavirsek (personal communication, 1995) many o f her students at the College 
for Social Work do not see the need for any gender- studies-type course because they feel “equal” and 
they feel that there is nothing that can be added to their notion o f “equality.”
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With the increased urbanization and changes in everyday life 
(“Westernization” and independence after more than 40 years of communist rule) the 
concept and the understanding of the family is going through radical changes, and 
one of the most obvious consequences of these is the problem of violence. Many 
aspects of family life that were probably just as present in the past are becoming more 
public with the efforts of women’s groups such as “SOS telefon za zenske — zrtve 
nasilja” (“SOS telephone for women — victims of violence,” started in 1989). 
According to the official police statistics, in 99% of the cases of violence in the 
family among adults, the victims aie women and the perpetrators men (quoted in 
Zavirsek 1994: 63). In many cases, the perpetrators see nothing wrong with their 
actions —  even in cases of sexual abuse. Violence against women is sometimes seen 
as the “normal” course of action. This seems very difficult to reconcile with the view 
that women should be loved and respected, but there seems to be again a kind of 
“double reality,” where apparently totally irreconcilable concepts (violence is wrong/ 
violence might be acceptable) go side by side. If one compares this situation with the 
one in less developed societies (such as in the case of Macedonia), it seems that the 
women are in a somewhat worse position partly because of the loosening of family 
ties. In the more patriarchal context, women would still be “protected” by members 
of their own family and kin. In the situation where a significant proportion of income 
depends on the cooperation of both families (such as working of the bavcas, care of 
domestic animals, etc.), it is mutual cooperation and consent that seem to come 
f i r s t ^ 9 6  — violence would seem not only wrong, but also completely 
counterproductive.
It is unfortunate that there aie no organized shelters where women victims of 
violence can come and stay (with their children if they like), and people dealing with 
them are not sufficiently qualified (cf. Zavirsek 1994: 78). At the same time, the
196 Of course, I am talking about the ideal circumstances here and generalizing a bit —  as mentioned 
in the chapter on Macedonia, violence against women is a problem there as well.
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legal system tends to let the victims down, since victims “must have injuries that 
would exceed a broken nose, rib, light concussion or teeth knocked out — if they 
want the perpetrator to be criminally prosecuted” (Zavirsek 1994: 79).
UNDERSTANDING CONSTRUCTS: 
GENDER IN EDUCATIONAL DISCOURSES
“Happy is the man whose wife is a good cook!”
(writing on an apron, quoted by Blazic in Office for Women’s 
Policy 1995c: 53)
I have shown so far how different images combine in current feminist 
discourses in Slovenia. The points of view aie dependent on one’s education and 
background, as well as on gender. The view that women are the “gentler sex” (until 
quite recently, the anchorman at the main evening TV news would begin the 
broadcast with “Dear female viewers and respected male v i e w e r s ” ^ 9 7 ; )  goes side by 
side with instances of domestic violence and maltreatment, and the view that men 
and women are equal goes side by side with feelings that they are different 
biologically (“How can we be equal? Men can’t have babies!”). The biological trap 
is the most obvious one for the feminist authors who demand more rights based on 
maternity leave, additional pay etc. and then speak about equality in ideal terms.
What it means to be male and what it means to be female is something that is 
woven into all levels of education — from kindergarten through to the primary school 
and later. At a relatively recent round table debate on sexism in the Slovenian
^97 In Slovenian: “Drage gledalke in spostovani gleda|ici”(emphasis mine). The example was used 
by Professor Joze Vogrinc in his paper at the International conference Democracy and Gender: 
Question o f Gender and Citizenship, on 9 November 1995, Ljubljana. Cf. also Office for Women’s 
Policy 1995c: 12-15.
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language, Milena Blazic pointed out the history of the different approaches to boys
and girls in education. In Slovenia, this can be traced as far back as 1842 (in the
Slomsek Reader for the Sunday Schools). The pattern in which boys are encouraged
to be assertive, self-confident, overt, and aggressive — while girls are supposed to be
quiet, obedient, accommodating, and gentle can also be traced through the elementaiy
school readers of Slovenian language published in 1909 and 1910. The most
stunning thing for Ms Blazid, however, was that the same pattern was replicated in
the 1992 r e a d e r ^ 9 8  f o r  g  and 9-year olds.
The book is divided in two parts: for the girls, Mojcas, I  shall 
become a famous princess today [Danes bom slavna princeska 
postala], while the second part is entitled The knight is coming[Vitez 
na obisku], for Andrejs (...) The first part contains primarily stories 
where the main characters are girls: Sanjas, Nokas, Veronikas, Spelas, 
animals like goats and squirrels, stories like I am more beautiful (...) 
The second part is for Andrej, a brave knight. Almost exclusively 
boys appeal* here: Jan, Janko, Martin Krpan, Peter Klepec, Brkonja 
Celjustnik, Drejcek and three Martians (...)
(Milena Blazic in Office for Women’s Policy 1995c:
21; footnote added)
As noted elsewhere, and using the same example:
There are twice as many fairy tales in the first part [of the book] as in 
the second [one], there is more on sleeping and dreaming, it seems that 
the objects of the real world and their treatment aie somehow more 
becoming for boys, in the second part. Taking the two parts together, 
there is half as much on female professions in comparison to male 
[ones], and a more elaborate analysis would show a whole range of 
other differences and contestable details (...)
(Drglin and Vendramin 1993: 56; cf. also Drglin in 
Bahovec 1993a: 153-154)
198 This is a third-grade reader which is used throughout the country.
199 Mojca and Andrej are very common names for girls and boys, respectively.
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Fig. 2 Illustrations for the two parts of the First Reader; for Mojcas (left) and 
Andrejs (right). After Bahovec 1996: 110.
This corresponds to the view by several authors (Drglin, Vendramin,
Bahovec, Ule) of the deeply embedded sexism present in the school system. It is 
almost as if “anything goes” where the boys are concerned. (“He is supposed to be 
naughty! He’s a boy I”) In several cases, boys would refuse to read from the first part 
of the above mentioned reader: “I won’t read that! That is for girls!” But they are 
able to get away with it.
Teachers tend to encourage boys much more than girls. As a result, girls tend 
to feel less confident in themselves, even when they actually show better results and 
get better marks. According to Zalka Drglin (in Bahovec 1993a: 146), there are no 
obvious gender stereotypes on the level of the “official” curriculum. However, she 
claims that there is a “hidden curriculum,” which incorporates all the mechanisms of 
gender stereotyping and gender-based segregation. These are easy to measure and 
prove, as seen in the previous example, so there is clearly a possibility for these 
elements of the “hidden curriculum” to get into the “official” one.
In her quantitative analysis of the readers for Slovenian elementary schools 
(2nd to 8th grade; ages 6 or 7 to 14 or 15), Alja Ros^oo showed that, for example, in 
the 7th grade Slovenian reader there are 147 male characters depicted in some public 
context —  as opposed to only 18 female ones! In the 8th grade there are 117 male 
ones and only 6 female ones. In all the readers used in the school year 1992/93 there 
are 265 males depicted in some public activity (or profession) and only 36 female 
ones (Jogan in Rener, Potocnik and Kozmik 1995: 53). It is interesting to note that 
the situation actually gets worse after the 1st grade, where of all the characters 
depicted there are two thirds males and one third females (in percentages, 66.7 and 
33.3, respectively). In the 8th grade, the percentage is 86.2 for the male ones and 
13.8 for the female ones (Jogan in Rener, Potocnik and Kozmik 1995: 54).
200 Thig was her D iploma Thesis, Sexism in School Textbooks [Seksizem in solskih ucbenikih] 
defended in 1993 at the Faculty of the Social Sciences (FDV) in Ljubljana. Unfortunately, I did not 
have access to this thesis, so I refer to Maca Jogan (in Rener, Potocnik and Kozm ik 1995: 49-63).
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In the present context, I think that it would be useful to compare the data from 
other parts of former Yugoslavia where similar research has been done.201
For example, Isidora Jaric did a study of the gender-related imagery in 
Serbian textbooks. In the illustrations for the First Reader, male char acters appear 61 
times, while female ones appear 27 times. In terms of percentages, women are almost 
always depicted in the context of the family (55.6% — compared to 14.8% for men), 
while men appear much more often in a professional context (44.3% —  compared to 
3.7% for women). No women are even mentioned as “historical” figures. The 
number of illustrations where a man is the main or the only character depicted is 35 
—  compared to 19 where a woman is the main character. As noted by Jaric: “a great 
majority of female characters are actually hidden in the group illustrations, where 
they serve more as decoration or to fill a gap than some concrete function” (1994: 
107). Illustrations where children are depicted always show boys as playing football 
or playing in the woods — while the ones depicting girls always have them 
performing some work: feeding chickens, or going shopping with mother. There aie 
no illustrations in the book that would depict several women doing something 
together —  implying that women are not very sociable and that they do not socialize 
with each other (ibid., pp. 107-108).
The images of girls promote responsibility (they finish their homework on 
time), cuteness (they smile much more often than boys), clumsiness where sports are 
concerned (there are very few girls in the illustrations depicting sport events^^^^), and 
complete technical ineptness (boys sit and work on computers, girls just watch them) 
[Jaric 1994: 108].
^01 Comparisons between Macedonia on the one hand and Slovenia and Serbia on the other had been 
done (Gjurovska 1991: 5), as well as between Slovenia on the one hand and other parts o f the former 
Yugoslavia (for example, by U le in Bahovec 1993a).
202 There are 56 male characters involved actively in the sports events —  compared to only 3 female 
ones. In the readers for older children, sport becomes exclusively a domain for boys.
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Family-related imagery is strictly dichotomous: father and son on the one 
side, mother and daughter on the other. There are no depictions o f father and 
daughter or mother and son. Boys aie depicted studying or engaged in some sort of 
an intellectual activity (like playing chess with the father), or studying the world 
around them (father and son fishing)... On the other hand, girls and mothers are 
depicted in a very passive way, sitting or standing, and overall looking like little more 
than mere ornaments {ibid., p. 109).203
In the analysis of Serbian-language readers, Jaric points out that there are two 
and a half times more male characters than female ones. Female characters tend to be 
depicted more in terms of immediate family members or kin (p. 110). In the readers 
for grades 5 to 8 (for 10-15 year olds), the percentage of male characters is 59.3. 
While there is approximately the same number of males depicted in some 
professional setting (usually something that has to do with the military) as the ones 
without work, with females the ratio tends to be three to one in favor of ones without 
work (30 compaied to 11).
The analysis of texts displays a very similar structure of gender-related 
differences: there aie 84.64% of male characters and 15.35% of female characters. 
Boys are depicted as the main characters in stories four times more than girls (28.16% 
compared to 7.04%); and the same proportion goes for the adults: men aie the main 
characters in 41.78% of the texts, and women in only 10.79%. Women still tend to 
be depicted mostly as nameless “faces in the crowd.” When the depictions of family 
are concerned, there is an obvious emphasis on male children as the “preferred ones,
” whose birth will cause celebration and gifts (p. 115). There is no cause for 
celebration or gifts when a girl is born — the only thing worse seems to be not having 
children at all.
203 Yhis kind o f family portrait slightly changes in the later readers, but still, there is not a single 
depiction o f a father and daughter together, representing “family!”
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It is obvious, then, how a certain type of imagery tends to be constructed and 
then reproduced. In the Slovenian context (cf. Drglin in Bahovec 1993a, Drglin and 
Vendramin 1993), teachers of both sexes accept these stereotypes as the “norm.”
Insofar as anthropology tries to approach these questions in a specific social 
and cultural context, it can be very helpful for the understanding of reproduction of 
gender-based and gender-related stereotypes. There is both a question (already 
mentioned above) of the sub-dominant group accepting the discourse of a dominant 
group and “modelling” its behavior on the expectations projected by the dominant 
group. But there is also a widespread belief that things “have always been this way” 
—  so the way to change them would be to point out the potential different or 
alternative approaches. A lot of this has to do with education, but there is also a 
possibility that this might create a gap between the educated (usually, university-level 
or higher) and the uneducated. The question of the connection between gender 
studies and anthropology comes into focus as well — both areas are quite 
mai'ginalized in Slovenia, despite the fact that there are some very good recent 
articles that establish a connection between them (Ule in Bahovec 1993a; Zavirsek 
1991, 1995; Zavirsek in Bahovec 1993a). In 1995, Delta, the first Slovenian journal 
for women’s studies and feminist theory was started with Eva Bahovec as the editor. 
Besides being influenced by contemporary psychoanalytical theory, the journal also 
publishes articles that take a point of view that I would describe as “anthropological”: 
taking into account and situating the constructs based on gender as well as putting 
them in the specific cultural context. But still, much remains to be done in this area. 
The interest is definitively there, as will become more clear' in the next chapter, with 
the study of the Slovenian Maternity Leave Law and the debates that issues related to 
family generate.
In this chapter, I have tried to outline the current gender-related debates in 
Slovenia, with examples ranging from the TV debates to advertising (the poster 
campaign for sun tan lotion) and educational discourses. In one of the next chapters
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(“Writing gender”), I will give more examples of attitudes towards the body —  these 
attitudes seem to be an important part of contemporary consumer culture. I have used 
the statistical data whenever possible to corroborate and emphasize the views that 
were expressed to me in my interviews and observations. The use of statistical data 
also provides for a more balanced segment of the population,204 since most of my 
meetings were with feminist authors and scholars. It can be seen that most debates 
about gender revolve around the notion of difference as well as other concepts that 
are culturally constructed. At the same time, just like in the previous chapter, I have 
tried to present the situation in a somewhat broader context, with references to the 
studies in neighboring regions (Serbia), as well as the legacy of the attitudes towards 
feminism derived from Yugoslavia’s recent communist past.
204 Qf course, no two statistical samples are identical —  so some of the differences in answers must 
be attributed to differences between the samples!
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Gender, identity and rights :
Mothers, fathers and the rest in Slovenia
The family also holds some of the keys to our future as a nation. 
Should families cease to produce enough children as some 
demographers, historians and politicians have already claimed with 
alarm, should couples break up and teenagers harass people in the 
streets, then the state will look for ways and means of setting the 
family on a path with less disastrous significance for the future, and at 
a lower social cost.
(Segalen 1986: 1)
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INTRODUCTION; “THE GREAT SMLL DEBATE”
Public discourse dominated by nationalist ideologies and often 
sanctified by the church defines the family as the basis of the ethnic or 
wider national group, and gives it, and women as mothers within it, a 
mission in the name of that community. The overburdened 
worker-mothers of state socialism have become the revered mothers of 
newly nationalist democracies.
(Einhorn 1993: 7)
In this chapter, I intend to focus more on questions of identity and difference 
in Slovenia. Taking as a stai'ting point the proposed changes to the Slovenian 
Maternity Leave L a w , 205 i shall point to some of the similarities that all the newly 
emerging (post-1989) states in East Central Europe share with Slovenia. I try to 
provide some historical background to the debates regarding the “proper” place of 
women in society. The family and the issues related to it provide an interesting 
opportunity to see how men and women see each other. Also, questions like what is 
the “essence” of “manhood” or “womanhood” can be approached from this 
perspective. While there are some dichotomies (primarily based on biology) that 
appear to be false, there is at least one (between the public and the private sphere, or 
politics and family) that is really present and whose consequences are being felt. 
While this dichotomy was analyzed relatively recently by some Slovenian feminists 
(Ule, Ferligoj and Rener 1990), recent economic and political developments make a 
situation somewhat comparable to the one in the East Central European countries. 
Finally, I will concentrate on some historical data206 that show how discourses
205 first information about this was provided to me by Dr. Tanja Rener. I am most grateful to 
Alenka ^vab for giving me a copy o f her M.A. thesis, where the issues surrounding the Slovenian 
Maternity Leave Law are discussed in greater detail.
206 I am aware that examples such as the medieval commune o f Piran might seem to take the 
discussion too far (at least in time), but my aim is to show how gender related discourses refer to
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claiming that what is today considered an “essence” of being male or female (and 
acting accordingly) and as deeply rooted in tradition, are actually a relatively recent 
construction.
On 24 December 1994, three members of the Slovenian Parliaments^? 
proposed some changes to the Work Relations Law — more specifically, to the part 
which covers maternity leave and leave granted for the care of children. Following 
Alenka Svab (1995, 1996a)S08, f will refer to this proposal and to this pai t of the 
Work Relations Law as the Slovenian Maternity Leave Law (SMLL).
As the proponents of change put it. Article 80 of the Slovenian Work relations 
Law stipulates that the (female) workerS09 is guaranteed 365 days as a maternity 
leave: 105 days before and 260 days after the childbirth. Taking into account the fact 
that fewer children are born in Slovenia every year (in 1979: 30,604; in in 1984: 
26,274; in 1990: 22,638; in 1993: 19,982), and that this actually endangers physical 
survival of the Slovenian nation (Office for Women’s Policy 1995a: 8),2^0 the 
following changes to the Article 8 O211 were proposed:
1/ That the leave for the care of a child should last 36 months instead of 105 days; 
and
2/ That instead of taking the leave, mother or father would work part-time until a 
child is 65 months old.
different times and places. I also hope to show that the notion o f complementarity which 
anthropologists have noted for the South European/Mediterranean societies (Loizos and Papataxiarchis 
1991; M ilicic 1995; Herzfeld 1987) is not just a recent anthropological invention.
207 They are: Nada Skuk, Miroslav Mozetic, and Stefan Kociper from the Christian Democrat party.
208 por the translation of the SMLL (based on Svab 1995), see the Appendix.
209 In Slovenian: delavka.
210 The phrase “physical survival of the Slovenian nation” was not actually used by the MPs 
proposing the changes. They point to the fact that for the “renewing of population” (in Slovenian: “zcz 
obnavljanje prebivalstva") at least 30,000 children need to be born every year.
211 For the translation of the relevant Articles of this law, see Appendix.
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In effect, the proposed changes were supposed to influence positively both the 
Slovenian population policy and (by extending the maternity leave) the employment 
situation (since Slovenia, like many other post-communist countries, faces problems 
connected with the transition of the economy). The reasoning went as follows: if 
women would just take care of the children, they would at the same time “free” 
additional working places. Therefore, the proposed changes were supposed to 
contribute both to the physical survival (and regeneration) of the Slovenian nation, 
and, at the same time, to its economic well-being. In a situation that can be related to 
Anastasia Karakasidou’s paper “Women of the family, women of the nation,” it was 
(again) the women that were supposed to bring “better times” for the whole nation. 212  
The role of mothers was to be extended to the whole of society — by taking care of 
the young, they were contributing to the society’s future; by vacating jobs (while 
taking care of the young), they were contributing to its present.
A young Slovenian scholar, Natasa Djuric, pointed out in her Diploma Thesis 
some of the images of women in fascist and Nazi discourses. These images are 
strangely similar to the ones demanding that women find their “proper place” in the 
kitchen and, especially, through children. This imagery is readily associated with 
some of the most oppressive social and political systems in human history.213 For 
example, in the 1920s and 1930s, Mussolini raised taxes for the single people and 
childless couples, and instituted money rewards for every new child. “The more 
children, the better, ” was the message, and it was considered particularly convenient 
if families would have more than four children — since in that case it was assumed 
that they (the children) would also be healthier. “Fertile” mothers were especially 
highly regarded — just before the 1937 New Year, 95 largest families in Italy were 
awarded money prizes and special medals (Djuric in Bahovec 1993a: 60).
212 Cf. Also Einhorm 1993: 221-224.
213 Cf. Einhorn 1993: 9 and Chapter 3 for the situation in East Central Europe. Serbian nationalists 
have also recently called upon the mothers to bear more children (Einhorn 1993: 105).
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Following some of the ar guments and examples that the late Wilhelm Reich 
used in his brilliant Mass Ideology o f Fascism, Djuric also traces the identification of 
motherland with mother. In these discourses, mothering is seen as the main function 
of the woman, and the image of woman as a mother and protector is subsequently 
projected onto the state. This protector then has its “chosen representatives”— for 
example, when Hitler was asked when he intended to get married, he replied: “I am 
already married. My wife is Germany” (quoted by Djuric in Bahovec 1993a: 62).
The strength of a nation is judged by, among other things, the number of its 
inhabitants. As a result of this, any proposals that might reduce the number of 
inhabitants (and anything dealing with birth control and reproductive rights of 
women!) can be regarded as hostile to the well-being of a nation. And nationalists 
are always quick to point this out.2i4
Like many other post-communist (or post-socialist) countries, Slovenia faced 
an upsurge of nationalism just before and shortly after its independence. “Slovenia to 
Slovenians!” was the battle cry of some of the most ardent nationalists, but also of 
different political groups and organizations that tried to put a distance between 
themselves and (especially in the late 1980s) the federal Yugoslav authorities. In 
many cases, former communists suddenly became nationalists (sometimes literally 
overnight) — claiming that they had always been “on the right track.” On the one 
hand, this was made easier by the fact that in the ethnically mixed SFR Yugoslavia, 
the (then) Socialist Republic of Slovenia was the most ethnically homogenous 
(around 87% of its population declared themselves as Slovenian at the 1991 census, 
now the percentage is over 90). On the other hand, however, even before 
independence (June 25, 1991) Slovenia was faced for some time with the very slow 
increase or even decline in the number of its inhabitants. An almost chronic shortage
214 Barbara Einhorn points at the fact that when the newly emerging states o f East Central Europe 
started modifying and changing their legal systems, reproductive rights were very high on the list o f  
priorities that needed to be erased from the recent communist past. In fact, they were second only to 
reversing the abolishment o f private property.
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of semi-skilled and unskilled workers influenced migration from other, less 
developed parts of Yugoslavia (especially Bosnia and Herzegovina), a fact that 
contributed to the creation of an “underclass” which gradually started incoiporating 
itself into “mainstream” Slovenian society. The intermarrying worried some of the 
ardent nationalists (although in reality, children from ethnically mixed marriages or 
“guest workers” account for a tiny fraction of a population), who were even then 
being worried about the ethnic and cultural “purity” of the Slovenian nation. The 
belief that things could only get better after the fall of communism did not quite 
materialize for a considerable proportion of population. Therefore, scapegoats had to 
be found.
The scapegoats became all the people and groups identified as the “Other.”2i5 
“Otherness” in this context meant eveiy thing that was not in a positive way (positive 
defined by nationalists and the “healthy forces”2i6 that stood for the newly emerging 
society) contributing to the new country and its well-being, and people that supported 
birth control (most of the laws were inherited from the communist period [1945-1990 
in Slovenia]) found themselves suddenly as the “Others.” Birth control and rights of |
women as already defined meant in “reality” (everyday life, especially where 
Slovenia is concerned) less children. This, in turn, meant both that the “purity” of the 
nation is going to be polluted by the increasing proportion of children of “guest 
workers” (or children of mixed marriages between Slovenians and non-Slovenians, 
which for the nationalists accounted for the same thing), and, more importantly, that
215 Cf. the Hungarian historian Istvan Rev, who analyzed the East Central Europeans’ need to define 
themselves “by right o f birth” as “insiders,” thus providing what he calls “post-Communist national 
identity” which “has a constant need for the ‘Other,’ the ‘enemy’ who can be held responsible for past 
and present hardships" (Einhorn 1993: 8).
216 The phrase “healthy forces” was used during the communist era to describe all the people and 
groups within the society that approved o f the official ideology and accepted it without any hesitation 
or questioning. On the opposite end of the spectrum stood a handful o f dissident students, artists and 
intellectuals, ready to question dominant discourses, but they were totally marginalized (as the 
subsequent events after the break-up o f Yugoslavia showed) by the “healthy forces.”
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the physical survival of the whole nation was in danger. This is an important 
background for looking at gender/family-oriented issues in the public discourses, and 
it became especially prominent (not oveitly, of course) during the “SMLL debate.”
The belief that women’s primary (“natural”) role is to be mothers is obvious 
among the legislators (one of whom is a woman) who suggested the change. In the 
debate that followed this proposal, it emerged that the majority of people who 
supported the changes were mostly oriented towards right-wing pai'ties like the 
Christian Democrats (SKD) or the National Party (SNS) {Office fo r  Women’s Policy 
1995a: 40). Some of the articles and commentaries most bitterly denouncing the 
criticisms of the proposed changes were published in the National Party’s official 
newspaper, SlovenecP-^'^ Their message was clear: women do have a place in the 
family —  and that place is with children. This opinion is especially prevalent among 
the non-urban population. In general, as well as in the public opinion polls, the 
predominant views were quite different.
In public opinion polls, it emerged that 41.7% of the respondents thought that 
extending the maternity leave to three years would have an adverse effect on the 
employment opportunities of women, especially younger ones (as opposed to 19.7% 
who thought that it might have a positive effect). When asked about the possibilities 
for promotion, 50.9% thought that the proposed changes would have a negative effect 
on women — as opposed to just 7.9% who thought that it might have a positive effect 
{Office fo r  Women’s Policy 1995a: 1 3 ).2 i8 On the other hand, according to another 
opinion poll,219 only a slight majority of the respondents (45.8% as opposed to 
44.9%) were against the extension of the maternity leave. Doctors suggested that the 
ideal maternity leave would be 18 months, and most people had no problem with the 
idea of extending it to two years. So, while a significant proportion of the population
21? Extensive extracts from the debate —  especially regarding the articles and opinions published in 
daily newspapers —  were published in Office fo r  Women’s Policy 1995a.
218 The poll was conducted by the agency Varianta between 6 and 8 January 1995,
219 This opinion poll was published in a daily Delo  on 4. February 1995.
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believed that the status of women regarding maternity leave should be improved, they 
also (in most cases) disagreed with the way(s) in which the changes were proposed.
I used the phrase “status of women” quite intentionally —  even though the 
SMLL is supposed to refer to both men and women . The connection between 
women and parenthood in general is implicit thioughout the law. As a matter of fact, 
according to the data from December 1994, out of 15,631 individuals using this leave, 
only 77 (0.49%) were fathers! According to the young Slovenian researcher Alenka 
Svab, although the SMLL does offer a possibility for leave for men as well, this is 
presented in such a way that it actually indicates exceptional circumstances, and not 
something that can (and should) be a part of everyday practice.
This is done by placing the article about this possibility at the [very] 
end of the chapter. Therefore, the form of the law itself imposes the 
possibility that men (fathers) take child care leave as very rare and 
exceptional and thus imposes child care on mothers.
How deeply the role of mother is perceived not only as 
biologically grounded but also as closely linked to child care is seen in 
the use of two different formulations: the optional caie taker (father) 
is mentioned as WORKER-father, while mother is mentioned as 
MOTHER-worker, emphasising stereotyped images of man’s work 
role (worker) and woman’s role as a mother.220
(Svab 1996a: 8-9, footnote added)
Svab continues by pointing out that “[t]he content of the aiticle which deals 
with father’s child care leave is also shaped in a way that [implies that] fathers are 
supposed to take child care leave only in exceptional cases.” These cases are: 
mother’s death, mother leaving the child, or mother being temporary or permanently 
incapable “for independent life and work.”
This [also] appears to be discriminating, since it implies that it is the 
mother who has to be capable for independent life and work, by which 
[the adjective] ‘independent’ further [implies] that men are not
220 Sgg also Einhorn 1993: 5 ,40 .
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supposed to be involved in child care. The whole aiticle is structured 
and defined according to the concept of mother-worker: men can take 
child care leave only on the basis of a previous agreement with 
mother, [or] when she cannot realise the role of child caring, which 
has been [“naturally” or “biologically”] ascribed to her.
(Svab 1996a: 9)
Some of the stereotypical images of what does it mean to be a woman are 
very obvious here. The dichotomy nature/culture is clearly superimposed onto the 
female/male one. The primary task of men is socialization, while women should take 
care of the children — except in very special and very specific circumstances. Men 
are supposed to be “public,” while women are supposed to be “private.”
However, as I will show in the next section, there are also dichotomies that 
seem to be constructed by both women and men quite consciously — and at least one 
of these dichotomies (public/private) is a very important contributing factor to what 
many women see as real emancipation.
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“TIE ME UP, TIE ME DOWN”: 
EAMILY TIES AND FEMINIST DISCOURSES
What is a family? A group of people which is connected in a legal 
way into a system of marital and kin ties and in a certain way does a 
certain mutual (group) work.
(Bogdan Lesnik in Rener, Potocnik and Kozmik 1995: 11)
As Martine Segalen pointed out in her excellent book Historical Anthropology 
o f the Family, there are conflicting and mutually exclusive ways in which one regards 
the “family.” On the one hand, the media “echo the same clichés and talk of the 
‘disintegrating family’, ‘the weakening of the family’, ‘state aid for the family’, ‘the 
family at risk’ (...), stressing the link between the idea of family and the notion of 
crisis” (Segalen 1986: 1). The contemporary Western family is “a unit of 
consumption rather than of production,” fewer people are regaided as part of the 
family, it has become a refuge from the outside world. On the other hand, of course, 
it can be seen as the place where our true emotional potentials are fulfilled, as the 
focus of numerous emotions that we are unable to express in a dehumanized society 
(Segalen 1986: 2). The same patterns can be observed in some societies outside 
Western Europe.
For most people in Slovenia (as well as in Macedonia and in other parts of 
Central and Eastern Europe) the notion of family automatically implies something 
nice, stable and comfortable. A place where one is “safe” — where nothing bad can 
happen. This almost provides the concept of the family with some mythical qualities 
(in the Eliadean sense of illud tempus , the great time — now long gone — where 
eveiy thing was just the way it should be) that almost automatically imply other 
comforting concepts like the cradle, security and love. There is also a sense that 
things were somehow much better in the past, that it is only in the hectic world that
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we live in that one can talk about the “crisis of the family” and the crisis of the 
“family values” (the second one being also an important canvassing slogan for many 
conservative and neo-conservative politicians).
Of course, as pointed by the sociologist Tanja Rener, studies into the concept 
and structure of the family show that this image is very much idealized and distorted. 
For example, family life in the past was very far from stable or static, and people in 
the past lived in numerous and very different forms of family. The average family 
size in Europe has hardly changed since the 16th century.221 To come closer to 
Slovenia, a number of single people and what Rener calls “reorganized families” (in 
Slovenian: reorganizirane druzinef-'^'^ was quite high between 1550 and 1850. In the 
17th century, 30% of all the inhabitants of what is today Slovenia lived alone, and 
50% of all the families were “reorganized families.” In the same period, the average 
length of marriage was only half of what it is today.223 Finally, there is no historical 
evidence that the dark sides of family life like violence, neglect, alcoholism, sexual 
abuse and the like were less common in the past than they are today (Rener, Potocnik 
and Kozmik 1995: 17).
Of course, “classical” patriarchal discourses are at work where the family is 
concerned. For example, when presented (in 1991) with the statement “The role of 
man in mairiage is to provide money, the role of woman is to take care of the 
household and the family,” 44.4% male and 36.8% of female respondents agreed, 
while 35% of male and 44.2% of female repondents disagreed. Answers to the same
221 Pqj. example, the average size o f the family in England before the industrial revolution was 4.7 
people.
222 This would include families where one or both partners have been divorced, same-sex partners, 
separated couples, as well as single-parent families. I do not know what the legal situation is now, but 
up until 1991 some o f the issues regarding families were legally regulated comparatively well 
throughout the former Yugoslavia. For example, children born outside marriage had all the same legal 
rights as the ones born in marriage, and unmarried couples living together were legally equal to the 
ones that were married.
223 pojj. exact references, see Rener, Potocnik and Kozmik 1995: 17.
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question in 1993 were slightly different; 41.5% males and 38.4% females agreed, 
while 38.5% males and 45.9% females disagreed. The gap between the percentage of 
male respondents who agree and the ones who disagree is much smaller, and there are 
more women who would disagree with the above statement. These changes occured 
over the period of only two years, and there are several possible explanations for this.
There is a possibility that there is simply an increased awareness and 
radicalization of women, and that it simply begins to show at a certain moment. It 
still remains to be seen whether this trend will continue or not. But there is also a 
possibility that people respond differently from the way in which they would act in 
their own life: Jogan quotes an example of a public opinion poll conducted in mid- 
1980s in West Germany, where 80% of male respondents agreed with the statement 
that “Man should work, woman should stay at home.” However, only 44% would 
personally wish that in their own family situation (Rener, Potocnik and Kozmik 
1995: 55).
Another very important point to be made is the omnipresence of the “men’s 
gaze”224 and its influence (already demonstrated above in the case of the sun tan 
lotion advertisement); a public opinion poll in 1992 registered 72.1% men and 68.2% 
women who were very much in agreement with the statement “It is OK for women to 
work, but what they really like the most is home and children.” Only 17.2% male 
and 24.8% female respondents disagreed. When the same question was asked at the 
end of the next year (1993), 59.8% male and 62.5% female respondents strongly 
agreed, while 19.7% men and 18.8% women disagreed.
According to these numbers women seem to be less inclined towar ds the 
changing of the “traditional” (“patriarchal”) picture, than men. Or is it another 
syndrom of the changing attitudes of the “man of the 90s”? Jogan sees the potential 
answer in the “recatholicization” and “repatriarchalization” that is sweeping Slovenia
224 See Mocnik 1994: 82, quoted in the previous chapter. The gaze that Mocnik mentions is actually 
“men’s gaze” only!
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after independence (Rener, Potocnik and Kozmik 1995: 56). I think that part of the 
reason lies in the feelings of insecurity brought by the economic and political 
changes: in a world that seems much less certain and much more fragile than it used 
to be, “the family” is seen as an ideal, as a place which is “safe” from the horrors of 
the outside world, and therefore offers enough protection in these turbulent times. 
Although this idealized image never corresponded to what “families” used to be like 
in Slovenia (or probably anywhere else, for that matter), this projection is a very 
powerful symbol.
Still, in the 1992 opinion poll, 54% men and 64.6% women disagreed with the 
statement that when it is difficult to get a job, men should have an advantage over 
women. 32.9% men and 23.5% women agreed. It is interesting to compare these 
numbers with the reply to the question “Do you think that a woman has to have a 
child in order to have a meaningful life?”, where 49.5% men and 58.6% women 
thought that having a child does fulfill “the essence” of woman’s life (while 43.9% 
male and 35.9% female respondents thought that it was not really necessary). More 
women than men (15.7% to 14.4%) agreed with the statement that pre-school child 
will probably be at a disadvantage if its mother is employed. On the similar lines, 
more men than women (51.3% to 44.5%) disagreed.
So, one might ask, what is wrong? Are Slovenian women more for the 
“family+children” ideal than their male counteiparts? More than two thirds of the 
respondents (69.6% men and 66.5% women) agreed with the statement that “Overall, 
the family suffers if a woman works full-time” (Jogan in Rener, Potocnik and 
Kozmik 1995: 56-57).
The proponents of the changes in the Maternity Leave Law (as well as the 
ones who would claim that a proper place for a woman is at home, with children) 
would claim that these data empirically support the notion that there is a dilemma that 
the population faces: full-time work or family. However, when it comes to absolute 
priorities in life, the same percentage of female respondents (96.9) regards both work
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and family as “very or most important” (the numbers for men aie quite similar:
96.9% regard work and 95.5% family as “very or most important”). So, in practice, it 
seems that people go for both family and work — believing that they could and 
should be compatible.
It is interesting to note that in another opinion poll, conducted only among 
young p e o p l e , 225 aspirations both to have a family and to work seem to be shared. 
The “classical” division of work in the family (father secures money, mother takes 
care of the children) was rejected by 83.7% of the respondents. Sharing of work at 
home equally was supported by 73.6%, and the right to an abortion by 82.5% of the 
r e s p o n d e n t s .2 2 6  Everyone wanted to work, 79.3% wanted to have children (47.5% 
wanted to have two children, 31.8% three or more). However, a great majority of the 
respondents also expressed the belief that the society should be able to provide 
economical and social opportunities for their future (housing, childcare, reduced 
working hours, etc.) (Rener in Office for Women’s Policy 1995c: 17-19).
On the other hand, and in the opinion polls among all the segments of the 
population, the “family+children” formula seems to be more present in the minds of 
men; 44.6% men and 36.1% women agreed with the statement that “It is just as 
fulfilling for a woman to be a housewife as it is to work full-time.” 24.4% men and 
35% women disagreed — so there is a clear gender division here. Also, more women 
than men (24.8% to 16.4%) strongly agreed with the statement that “the best way for 
a woman to be independent is to work full-time” (26.3% men and 19.9% women 
disagreed). In the 1993 opinion poll, slightly less people strongly agreed with the 
same statement (13% men and 20.4% women). Women were more in favor than men
225 Ti-jg opinion poll “Youth ’95” was conducted last year among 1830 students o f the universities in 
Ljubljana and Maribor.
226 Even the opposition to abortion should be seen in a specific context: several women that I talked 
with who were against abortion were strongly opposed to the state regulating this matter. They 
thought that if  other women want to have an abortion, they are wrong, but it is their right to be wrong.
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of both husband and wife financially contributing to the family (50.9% to 40.2% 
“strongly agree”).
One could ask, how come so many women agree with the statement that their 
“proper” place is at home and with children? Is this just a sign of pervasive 
androcentrism and reestablishment of the patriarchal values that the communist 
system for such a long time kept “in check”? I believe that the answers to this are not 
as simple or straightforward. More importantly, this can be seen in light of what 
Einhorn (1993, especially Chapter 4) describes as the institution of the “double 
burden” for women in the (former) socialist (communist) countries.
It was considered “normal” and therefore “expected” from women to be 
“there” and to pick up their “proper” duties —  both in the workplace and in the 
family. Above all, it was the sure sign of their emancipation. By refusing this 
“double” (or even “triple” — in cases where women w e n t 227 into politics) burden, 
women in Slovenia (just like in other East Central European c o u n t r i e s 2 2 8 )  are finally 
demanding a voice and clearly expressing their opinion. To put it in simple terms: 
they see as their right to stay home if they want to. The return to “family values” in 
this context also signifies a return to emancipatory discourses.
A good example of this overburdening is the case study of 86 women in chief 
executive or chief managerial positions in Slovenia, conducted in 1989/1990. The 
study clearly showed that the image of “career woman,” who pursues her professional 
interests and leaves everything behind has nothing to do with reality. All these 
women had was an additional strain and pressure — being in positions of leadership.
227 Or were just delegated —  mostly through the system of quotas.
228 This geographical determination is a bit vague. Although Slovenians generally consider 
themselves to be a Central European nation, they would never consider themselves to be an East 
European nation —  “East European” being identified (until 1989) as “pro-Soviet” and actually part o f  
the Warsaw Pact. Most people from the former Yugoslavia consider them being referred to as “East 
Europeans” as an insult. It is interesting that Einhorn does mention (but only mention) Slovenia, 
Croatia and Serbia in her book, although some of her data (especially on the emergence o f women’s 
groups in former Yugoslavia) are extremely inadequate and incomplete.
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they were supposed to prove themselves “worthy” of it (perhaps even more than their 
male colleagues). At the same time, they had to prove (to both the men and the 
women they were working with!) that they were “real women” — that they take care 
of the home and children (Ule, Ferligoj and Rener 1990: 71-72).
Although Barbara Einhorn’s book Cinderella Goes to Market does mention 
Slovenia only very briefly (as well as several other countries that emerged after the 
fall of communism and as a result of the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia), the situation 
there certainly can be compared to the trends that were (and are?) present in what 
used to be East Germany, what used to be Czechoslovakia, Hungary and P o l a n d . 229  
In these countries, Einhorn claims, women aie more than happy to get rid of the extra 
“burdens” and make choices that they think their “sisters” in the West always had.230 
By doing this, they leave issues like politics and economics (including questions 
dealing with employment) to men, while they tend to retreat into the “private” 
domain. In this way, a dichotomy is posited between what many women see as 
“dirty” or “tainted” — the public sphere of politics and capitalism ( m a l e ) 2 3 i  on the 
one hand, and the “pure” private sphere of home and family (female). During my 
stay in Slovenia, I was never in a situation where women would spontaneously start
229 Two countries mentioned here (Czechoslovakia and East Germany) “used to be” —  but not any 
more. This is another hyperreal point that one can make abouth the world we live in.
230 She also points to the differences between Western feminist discourses and the realities o f East 
Central European countries. For Western feminists, the private sphere was considered to be the main 
factor in a constant disadvantaging of women and undervaluation o f their work (since housework 
including care of the children is not paid, it is therefore less valid than paid work —  the domain of 
men, in the public sphere). While Western feminists frequently asked for the enablement for women 
to leave the constraints o f the private sphere and enter into the area where things “really matter,” the 
public sphere (where power and politics are located, among other things), the reality of many women 
in the newly emerging countries is that they are more than happy in the private sphere. For them, it is 
there that the really important issues really happen and it is there that they feel most in power or in 
control to influence what seem the most important things (cf. Einhorn 1993; 6 and Chapter 2).
231 Einhorn mentions that in countries that she studied the number of women in parliaments fell from 
around one third under the communist regime (largely based on quotas) to less than one tenth in the 
newly emerging societies (1993: 10).
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discussing p o l i t i c s  (232 This is quite unusual and untypical for the part of the world 
where everyone has something to say about the way that the country (or community) 
is run, where most jokes have political overtones (or are about specific political 
personalities), and where the media are generally inundated with politics, political 
scandals and the like.
By postulating this public/private dichotomy (and positioning themselves in 
the “pure” half of it), women do not retreat to some form of (neo)conservât!vism or 
escapism, but actually opt for choices that enable them to reject both the excesses of 
socialism and the “brave new world” of capitalism and the “market economy.”
BETWEEN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: 
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE
Fragmentation is not something just negative or the result of a failure.
Fragmentation is a sign of success.
Lynne Segal (Bahovec 1993a: 20)
The popular thinking is usually that men are somehow “above” or “more 
important” than women and that “things have always been that way.” Although 
women and men had the same pay for the sa m e  jobs233 in the former SFR 
Yugoslavia, this is another aspect where backlash against the former communist 
régime is present. Many men resent that women should have the same pay (as is 
postulated in the Slovenian Constitution). There are women that themselves believe
232 Family and children, on the other hand, came quite frequently and quite spontaneously as 
conversation topics. I have to note that I did not mind this lack of talk about politics —  quite on the 
contrary!
233 Which, o f course, does not mean that they were taking the same jobs  —  men tended to take more 
highly-paid jobs like the chief executives, managers, and the like.
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that men should be paid more. They see the equality propagated by the communist 
system as in some way diminishing them as women and at the same time 
emasculating men. This is seen as one of the primaiy causes of different problems, 
both within and outside the family. Things, they believe, were very different in the 
past.
However, this is not necessarily the case. I have pointed to some statistics 
regaining families in the previous section. One can go even further into the past. The 
main reason for this “time travel” is to show how the claims that women have always 
been totally subjugated and that things were this way “always” are wrong. If women 
had a certain level of autonomy as far back as the 14th century CE, it just adds to my 
thesis that the gender construction that justifies oppression is a cultural process, in no 
way necessaiy or irreversible, and that it has nothing to do with categories like 
“history” or “tradition.”
According to the data presented by Darja Mihelic (1978), the 13 th and 14th 
century urban and semi-urban population in the region of Piran, on the Slovenian pai't 
of the Adriatic sea, had views and laws which would be considered quite “liberal” by 
today’s standards. For example, both male and female children had equal rights 
regarding inheritance, and husband and wife were supposed to split all of the family 
belongings equally in case of divorce.
Girls could maiiy when they were 12, boys when they were 14. In case of 
divorce, both could marry again. The dowry was negotiated in advance, and there is 
at least one example (a dowry arrangement of December 13, 1288) where it was 
specifically written that the bride brings no dowry into the marriage —  although she 
was entitled to the half of everything that she and her husband earned 
(Mihelii 1978: 26)!
The Statute of Piran specifically notes that both spouses have equal rights in 
administering the property. The husband could not borrow money without his wife’s 
approval, the wife could not borrow money without the approval of the podestat
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(local lord).234 There are examples of women investing in the local market, and in 
particular in the salt trade. Widows frequently owned stores by themselves — and 
some independent trade was also done by both married and single women.
In the case of an unlawful divorce initiated by the husband (that is to say, if 
the court would determine that there were no valid reasons for it), the wife was free to 
return home. Overall, even though they were not yet in the positions of political 
power, women did have equal economic rights.235
The biological differences between men and women (primarily seen in the 
“natural” role of women as “mothers” [Ule, Ferligoj and Rener 1990: 13ff]) have 
been used as an explanation for the neglect of women’s rights — both individual 
(especially regai'ding the reproductive rights!) and political (poor representation of 
women in the political life as a consequence). This has been attempted primaiily 
through a certain construction of the past: in populai' (and usually populist) 
discourses, men were dominant and women were subservient, and life was much 
better.
This is a good example of the idealization of the past: by creating a certain 
narrative (in this case, of the past when everything was perfect and far removed from 
all the uncertanities of the present), the politically and economically dominant 
structure seeks to justify its domination. The image that “things were much better” 
because “eveiyone knew his or her proper place in the family” is a gross exaggeration 
and oversimplification of the complex system of relationships, and it has to be put in 
the context of the present political and ideological battles. Even if things were much
234 Although there was a period (from 1307 until 1332) when they had to secure three persons to 
guarantee for them. The local lord was an elected (male) official, who was performing duties 
comparable to those of a mayor.
235 Which was quite similar to the situation in some other communities on the Adriatic — like 
Dubrovnik, for example.
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b e t t e r ,236 the fact that one gender was in a position of absolute domination would not 
necessarily provide the logical justification for the continuation of this practice.
In this chapter, I started with the debates related to the proposed changes in 
the Slovenian Maternity Leave Law, and proceeded to put the debates related to 
gender identity and difference in the context of political debates, as well as in the 
context on the debates on the role of the family. My main purpose was to analyze 
certain types of discourses and trace them to the similar examples in the past (for 
example, the nationalists’ claim that women should have more children). The 
biological argument (women as nurturers and providers of the harmony and love 
within the family) that is the basis of the proposed changes in the SMLL postulates 
women as different but fundamentally unequal to men. Both the statistics and some 
of the preserved historical records show that one cannot just simply speak of absolute 
oppression and absolute subordination. I am not claiming that women from the 14th 
century commune of Piran were equal to men — they definitively did not have equal 
access to political power — , but they definitively had certain important rights. Both 
comparative data (primarily studies of peasant communities in France 
[Segalen 1983]) and my own observations in Prespa show that a certain level of 
economic rights is a necessaiy prerequisite for what might be considered as a road 
towards equality. This road is by no means straightforward or easy to navigate —  it 
is more like a narrow winding mountain path.
In the next chapter, I will follow this naiTOW path, first through the writings on 
equality and difference, and then through some representations of gender as both a 
subject and an object of contemporary anthropology.
236 And in cases o f both Macedonia and Slovenia they were not! People born before the WWII 
definitively remember all the econom ic hardships they had to go through. (In the case o f Macedonia, 





“But I don’t want to go among mad people,” Alice remarked. 
“Oh, you can’t help that,” said the Cat: “we’re all mad here. 
I’m mad. You’re mad.”
“How do you know that I’m mad?” said Alice.





L ’É C R I T U R E  F É M I N I N E
To demand equality as women is, it seems to me, a mistaken 
expression of a real objective. The demand to be equal 
presupposes a point of comparison. To whom or to what do 
women want to be equalized? To men? To a salary? To a public 
office? To what standard? Why not to themselves?
(Irigaray 1993a: 12)
In the last three chapters I have offered some examples of the construction of 
gender difference(s) and attitudes towards equality in Macedonia and in Slovenia. In 
this chapter, I will suggest other directions for the discussion of gender construction 
in contemporary anthropology. These directions will take the discussion from 
Macedonian public and Slovenian feminist (as well as public) discourses “back” to 
Western gender-related discourses.
I will begin with a discussion related to the concepts of gender equality and 
difference, most clearly developed in the works of the representatives of what is 
sometimes referred to as l ’écriture féminine, especially Luce Irigaray. Irigaray seems 
particularly appropriate since many contemporaiy Slovenian feminists (authors 
around the journal Delta, especially Zupanc Ecimovic 1995) operate within the 
methodological framework influenced by psychoanalysis, especially by Lacan.23? 
Since Mgaray’s concern with difference(s) is also reflected in the attitudes towards 
the body (for example, 1993a: 38-41), I will proceed with an outline of body imagery 
relevant for contemporary culture. This is also something which is readily 
recognizable in the context of Slovenian feminist discourses: a significant part (five
237 Irigaray was recently (November 1995) in Ljubljana co-hosting a conference on gender and 
citizenship.
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articles + an interview with the State Prosecutor) of the second issue of the review 
Delta (published in November 1995) was devoted to what the editors call “Politics 
and Ethics of the Body.” Finally, I shall examine some (“idealized”) everyday beliefs 
about gender and their relationship with anthropological research, finishing the 
chapter with the one area of anthropology where “the second sex” has had a truly 
remarkable impact.
Important breakthroughs in gender studies were initiated in the last two 
decades with the publication of works of French critical feminists, some of which 
became better known as the theorists of “feminine writing” {Vécriture féminine). One 
of the major figures associated with this direction in gender studies is French 
philosopher and psychoanalyst Luce I r i g a r a y . ^ ^ s
Irigaray pays great attention to gender-biases in languages (1985a, l9S5d, 
1990, 19936: 172-176, etc.), although this is somewhat limited to the extent that her 
examples work best in the French language only.^^9
She published several of her essays in 1974 under the title Speculum. De 
Vautre femme (Irigaray 19856),240 and this publication provoked her expulsion from 
the Lacanian psychoanalytic group, as well as from her teaching post at the
2^ 38 j am not interested here in the properly psychoanalytic aspects o f her work, such as that involving 
alternative genealogies (mother-daughter and mother-son or father-daughter instead o f the all prevalent 
father-son), or her criticism o f the “phallocratie” theories o f Lacan, so these aspects w ill be omitted in 
this brief discussion. For a sympathetic treatment of Lacan from a critical feminist perspective, see 
Grosz 1990.
239 They are much less clear in English translation, and I do not find such an extensive gender bias in 
the South Slavic languages that I am familiar with (Macedonian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, 
Bulgarian). However, the fact is that a gender bias is present (albeit in varying degrees) in possibly all 
human languages. For a very good analysis o f radically sexist discourse in English (both as words and 
as images), see W ii^nt 1990.
240 The title itself is a play of words, not readily translatable into English; although in the English 
translation is Speculum o f the Other Woman, it seems that Irigaray would prefer Speculum: About the 
Other Woman, or even Speculum: On the Other Woman, with much stronger sense o f the woman 
perceived as the other in the dominant (androcentric or at least male-oriented scientific) discourse.
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University of V in c e n n e s .241 The book itself presents a brilliant deconstruction (one is 
almost tempted to say a vivisection) of Freud’s views and misunderstandings of 
women, emphasizing the fact that Freud (and his followers in this regard as well) 
knew nothing or (at best) very little about the female body, and that the only kind of 
sexuality for which Freudian analysis allows is male sexuality. Female sexuality 
seems to be defined only in terms of lack or unfullfilment, its main characteristic 
being its failure to be male. Irigaray’s critique is devastating, and it is easy to see 
how it must have infuriated her “colleagues.” (It is less easy to see how it justified 
their actions against her.) Speculum has initiated a series of works aiming at the 
social and cultural transformation of the ways in which gender and gender relations 
are represented. Irigaray’s particular emphasis was on the (mis)representations of the 
(female) body, and she traced these (mis)representations in the history of the Western 
thought (in Speculum, with a wonderful presentation of Plato’s fragments about 
women). As she put it in an interview with Alice Jardine in September 1987,
Speculum criticizes the exclusive right of the use(s), exchange(s), 
representation(s) of one sex by the other. This critique is 
accompanied by the beginnings of a woman’s phenomenological 
elaboration of the auto-affection and auto-representation of her 
body: Luce Irigaray, signatory of the book. What this implies is 
that the female body is not to remain the object of men’s discourse 
or their various arts but to become the object of a female 
subjectivity experiencing and identifying itself. Such research 
attempts to suggest to women a morpho-logic that is appropriate to 
their bodies. It’s aimed at the male subject, too, inviting him to 
redefine himself as a body with a view to exchanges between 
sexed subjects.
(1993a: 59)
241 Fortunately, she did manage to keep her post at the National Center for Scientific Research 
(CNRS) in Paris. Today, she is a practicing psychoanalyst, and she also teaches philosophy at the 
Collège Internationale de philosophie.
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The emphasis that I am primarily interested in is present in her discussions of 
gender differentiation and difference. Each gender is postulated as the other in regard 
to the other (again) gender. Their value is (at least, it should be) equal, but with the 
recognition of all the differences. Although some of Irigaray’s historical 
considerations leave much to mere speculation (for example, a consideration of 
ancient matriarchy as the “rule of the female genealogies,” when the world was 
supposedly a much easier place to live in, starting from Bachoffen’s Mutterecht, 
etc.242), her analysis of factual inequalities (or, as she would say, the collapsing of 
both male and female genealogies into male ones only, with all its cultural and social 
implications [19936: v]) offers a solution in realizing that the basis for a meaningful 
relationship between the sexes (and for Irigaray, the true extent of the relationship of 
men and women as equals is expressed in and through love [Irigaray 1992a, 19926]) 
should be negotiated in terms of different identities. Male and female identities are 
essentially different, and one has to realize that in order to comprehend “the other” in 
this relationship. Male and female identities complement each other, but they can 
never be “translated” or in any way subsumed in one another. Some of the basic 
problems in gender relations today lie in the fact that too often people try exactly this, 
some kind of “translation,” and Irigaray realizes that the roots of this are actually 
much wider and part of the specific cultural milieu. Claims for equality are 
somewhat paradoxical, because they usually do not question the underlying power- 
structures that govern societies:
If the female gender does make a demand, all too often it is based 
upon a claim for equal rights and this risks ending in the 
destruction of gender. Comedy arises out of this collision of rights 
and duties since it expresses the contradiction of an absolute in 
opposition.
(19936:115)
242 c f  i^ er brief analysis in 1993a: 17-19, which is based on stereotype that there was at some point 
some kind of a “matriarchal” society, when goddesses ruled over gods, and the life was much less 
violent and more oriented towards genuine human needs.
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Irigaray almost mocks women that “decide to become equal” in a more
traditional sense:
In order to escape this situation, a certain number of women have 
decided to become men’s equals (...) Identifying with men allows 
them a sexuality which seems more free and ‘sporty’, part masculine, 
pai't feminine. It does not fulfill them emotionally or culturally.
(19926: 3)243
In another lecture (in 1984), Irigaray makes her objections to the claims of
equality clearer, as well as the wider context in which the events that she is writing
about take place:
Claims that men, races, sexes, are equal in point of fact signal a 
disdain or a denial for real phenomena and give rise to an 
imperialism that is even more pernicious than those that retain 
traces of difference. Today it is all too clear that there is no 
equality of wealth, and claims of equal rights to culture have 
blown up in our faces. All those who advocate equality need to 
come to terms with the fact that their claims produce a greater and 
greater split between the so-called equal units and those authorities 
or transcendencies used to measure or outmeasure them (...) Any 
woman who is seeking equality (with whom? with what?) needs to 
give this problem serious consideration. It is understandable that 
women should wish for equal pay, equal career opportunities. But 
what is their real goal?
(19936: vi)
The real goal, according to Irigaray, should be that women should demand 
that their status in society be negotiated on the basis of a system of d i f f e r e n c e s .  244  
They should also make clear the message that “without women, there is no society.”
243 It is interesting to compare this view with the one expressed by Baudrillard 1996 —  quoted in the 
next chapter.
244 Irigaray starts from a different premise, but her question is identical to the one posed by bel 
hooks; “Since men are not equals in white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal class structure, which 
men do women want to be equal to?” (quoted in Svab 1996a: 6).
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This is related to the whole series of underlying assumptions that are prevalent in our 
(Western or Westernized) cultures and societies, for:
It is clear that our societies assume that the mother should feed her 
child fo r  free, before and after the birth, and that she should remain 
the nurse of man and society. She is the totem before any totem is 
designated, identified, represented. This state of affairs must be 
understood if we aie to learn how a woman, or women, can find a 
place without remaining shadowy nurses. This traditional role that 
is allotted to women almost ritually paralyzes male society as well 
and permits the continued destruction of the natural reserves of 
life. It sustains the illusion that food should come to us free, and, 
in any case, can never fail us. In the same way, women could 
never fail us, especially mothers.
(19936:83)
One of the most important points that Iiigaray repeatedly makes is the notion 
of dependence (women can never fail us), which she connects with the 
mismanagement of the environmental resources, ecological crisis, etc. (in fact, she 
has published several lectures about the moral and psychological consequences of the 
1986 Chernobyl disaster). This is a very important point, and the fact is that it figures 
much more prominently in the writings of female scholar s.
Despite the explicit claim that the kind of factual inequality that Irigaray 
describes (dependence instead of interdependence) is directly responsible for 
ecological disasters and warfare (and that, essentially, by their “nature,” only men are 
responsible for them), Irigaray somewhat idealizes the image of woman the nurturer 
herself. Would everything be just fine if only women were in charge? Well, we 
simply do not know. What we do know, however, is that it is a fact that women are 
supposed to give (rent?) their bodies for pleasure (not necessarily their own) and for 
procreation.
According to Irigaray (for example, 1993a), most legal and cultural codes 
justify these uses of the body (particularly the procreation part) in terms of some
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“natural right” or obligation. But, if every other transaction in the contemporary 
(Western or Westernized) world has a price and is formally (legally) regulated, 
Irigaray has the right to ask: why not put a price on how much it costs to raise a 
c h i l d ? 2 4 5  (If someone wants to do it for free, she can, but this should not be set as an
obligation for e v e r y o n e . ) 2 4 6
The way out of this paradoxical situation lies in the recognition of female 
genealogies as both different and equal to male genealogies,^^? as well as in the 
recognition and codification of this culture of difference (to paraphrase the title of her 
recent book). As she wrote in 1988 (in the introduction to the Japanese translation of 
the Elemental Passions):
While man has a spiritual and natural reference as he becomes a man, 
woman no longer belongs except biologically, and the world of man 
has made that biology its own. Men exchange virgin daughters in 
order to establish families or tribes or states, they marry women to 
found their dynasties, they impregnate them to become fathers and 
have a posterity.
(19926:2)
However, when Irigaray steps on the terrain of codification (legal protection 
of women both as virgins and as mothers [1993a: 86-90]), it is difficult to see how 
she intends to convince the holders of power (the (X males?) to give up their hold on 
it. If I enjoy certain rights and privileges, even if it means that some other people 
have less rights and privileges, why should I give them up? It seems that the appeal 
to the culture of difference is based on the (in my opinion completely unjustified)
245 por the examination o f the “naturalness” o f associating women primarily with childbearing, see 
also Collier and Yanagisako 1987: 32-33 and Quinn 1977: 188,191-193.
246 Although this line o f argumentation may appear shocking or at least fairly unpleasant, I do find 
Irigaray’s argument reasonable. If certain things or categories are constructed by society in a certain 
way, it still does not mean that they could not be reexamined and perhaps reevaluated.
247 She frequently points at the importance of the mother/daughter relationship as the one relationship 
that is frequently being neglected. A somewhat different perspective is offered by Julia Kristeva when 
she discusses the paintings o f the Italian renaissance aitist Bellini (Kristeva 1980).
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assumption that there is something inherently good in “human nature ”248 something 
that strives to make life for other fellow human beings as nice and easy as possible. 
The entire human history teaches us exactly the opposite.
On the other hand, Irigaray continues, women have a powerful weapon 
exactly because they are different. Sexual difference, apart from being a source of 
miscomprehension, is also the cai'd that they can play with, by exploring and (in a 
way) utilizing their own sexuality. This implies primarily that women should be 
made aware of their own bodies and be able to accept them in a different dimension. 
The key term that Irigaray uses, jouissance, implies a word play that is 
untranslatable in English, the main meaning being “enjoyment” (although in a sense 
that is stronger than the meaning of this concept in English250), “joy,” or “bliss,” but 
the closest translation would be the kind of happiness and joy that comes with and 
follows immediately after orgasm. The message that Irigaray tries to put across is not 
that this makes women inherently superior to men (of course, in terms of possibilities 
of experiencing jouissance, it does, and Irigaray frequently points to the essential 
plurality by and through which women experience their sexuality25i), but that by 
realizing their own true potential (as well as their difference), women could and
248 I would object to the notion that anything like “human nature” even exists.
249 The same concept is used, although in a slightly different context, by Julia Kiisteva in her 
writings on motherhood and pregnancy (Dallery 1990: 275-276). Cixous uses jouissance to refer to 
“pleasure,” for example in her discussion o f the “econom ies o f pleasure” (1994: 131-136),
250 Por example, jouissance de la vivre would mean “enjoying life to its fullest.” The word 
jouissance  also implies happiness connected with the possession o f some valuable thing. Its root 
comes from the verb jouir, one o f whose main meanings is “to come,” and nowadays is used in French 
almost exclusively in the sexual context.
251 Which can also serve to stress the plurality o f possible experiences o f sexual pleasure that women 
have, a universe of possibilities from which men are (by biology) excluded. A point that is also 
discussed in detail by Cixous, for example 1989: 107.
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should be able to overcome obstacles that cultures and societies put before t h e m .252 
Or, as summarized by Irigaray:
For this culture to advance, therefore, new models of sexual identity 
must be established. Woman must be valued as a daughter (a virgin 
for herself, and not so that her body has an exchange value amongst 
men), as a lover, and in her own line. This means that she should not 
be subordinated first to her father, her uncle or her brother, then to her 
husband’s line, nor to the values of a masculine identity, whether these 
be social, economic or cultural. She therefore needs her own 
linguistic, religious and political values. She needs to be situated and 
valued, to be she in relation to her self.
(19926: 3)
This also opens the question of identity, as well as of generalization. For even 
in the (Western) societies that Irigaiay is talking about, there is not one i m a g e 2 5 3  or 
obstacle to be overcome. There are as many wrong images and forced identities as 
there are oppressed women — so is it really possible to define (or even to concieve) a 
single voice speaking for them?
252 c f  the ancient Greek perspective as outlined by Winkler (1990: 205-206), which closely 
corresponds with Irigaray’s views. Female sexuality is seen as a source (not the only one, o f course) 
o f female power, not weakness.
253 Or perception; the perceived image o f some situation as in any way “natural.”
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I SING THE BODY ELECTRIC: 
BODIES, SEXES, ANTHROPOLOGISTS, METAPHORS
A European friend, significant in the field of semiotics, told me in 
1980, “You know, I could never love a woman with a body like a 
Rubens.” In a café, lots of laughter between us, he spoke a 
learned, perverse little discourse that all my experience and theoiy 
confirm. Just the flavour of it: ''Playboy is in my head. I can’t 
help it. I decode, a centerfold, say, and it’s sex between two 
autarchies. There 7 am, learned before the class, connotation, 
ideology, blah blah, flush with my students’ praise. And she's 
there too. She subsists, I want her —  all the while I ’m decoding. I 
never dismantled anything.”
(Blonsky 1985: xxxv)
7 l\e  previous section illustrated some important points regarding the uses and 
iconography of the body — insofar as it relates to gender difference. In the chapter 
“What’s in a name?” I referred to a paiticular way of representing body (the 
advertisement poster campaign in Slovenia) in order to illustrate some of the “local” 
(Slovenian) attitudes towards a specific way of body objectification. The concept of 
the body was also discussed in the context of gender differences in education in 
Slovenia (for example, Bahovec 1996: 114-115). In this section, I will try to present 
similar iconography in a slightly wider context.
The image of the body, the sexed body, the eroticized body, has always been 
an integral part of Western culture. In classical Greek culture, this image was 
expressed in different ways in art, religion and philosophy. However, it is only 
relatively recently that more attention has been paid to this part of the “classical” 
Western heritage. Studies like the one by Winkler (1990) point out the importance of 
the gender category and the gender/sex perspective that is too often absent from the
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studies of cultures and societies throughout Western intellectual h i s t o r y .2 5 4  of 
course, the paradox is that the gender(ed) image was always present. The image of 
the gender(ed) body with all its implications is an integral part of Western artistic, 
aesthetic, and other forms of expression. The images, the bodies, and the meanings 
we attach to (or project into) them are always present. They are part of our 
understanding of the world. But this does not mean that it is easy to accept them as 
such. In the recent words of a feminist scholar:
What we have to do is stop apologising. There is no right way to look 
and be a serious thinker, if you are young and female in this culture.
It’s time to say fuck you. I’m gonna have footnotes, I ’m gonna have 
breasts. Yes, I like nice sweaters. I do. Sue me.
Naomi Wolf (Pearson 1993: 17)
The above outburst came in an interview by one of the most popular feminist 
authors of the younger generation.255 It came as the question of physical appearance 
was being raised,256 and whether it contributed to the publicity surrounding the books 
and public appearances of Naomi Wolf. Her first book. The Beauty Myth, exposed 
the degree of prejudice regarding looks (different ideals of beauty), and the way it 
was reflected in literature. Some critics were quick to point out that the author herself 
(a very attractive young woman, to say the least) could not have known what the 
“beauty problem” really must be for a great number of women — by virtue of her 
looks, she would have found all (or most) of the doors (especially the ones related to 
publicity) wide open. This is true to an extent, but one should not forget that the 
visual media presentation has its own rules, which do not necessarily correspond to 
the Western idealized concept of “beauty.” Any TV producer (or anyone in the
254 Sex and sexuality always have to do with gendered bodies, and these bodies have to be gendered 
in a certain way precisely in order to be erotic,
255 Naom i W olf was born in 1962.
256 It is interesting to compare W olf’s attitudes (“I like nice sweaters”) to the ones expressed by 
Lovibond (1989), for example. Sabina Lovibond finds almost any mention o f women’s (and 
fem inists’ in particular) physical appearance (in terms of “presentability”) offensive.
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business of photography) knows very well that there are beautiful men and women 
who just look awkward in front of cameras, and there are many who have nothing 
exceptional about their looks, but somehow cameras seem to “love” them. The 
publicity issue has more to do with the possibility of successful visual presentation 
than with looks itself. Which does not alter the fact that the “beautiful” woman (or 
man) will probably be much more successful in job interviews (especially if they are 
conducted by members of the opposite sex) and similar quests. It is not my intention 
to discuss here the “beauty myth” (Wolf did it already), but to point to some of the 
facets of contemporary anthropology that have to do with the concepts related to the 
body.
The imagery of naked girls from the pages of Playboy 257 (referred to in the 
epigraph at the beginning of this section) is just one of the examples of this 
genderedness. Of course, this imageiy has wider meanings (the quotation was taken 
from a book on semiotics) both within the culture where it is produced and 
reproduced and within the context of something like the “American way of life.” The 
imagery from this magazine is interesting because it seems to display the female body 
(usually girls in their late teens or early 20s) in a culturally acceptable way.
Somewhat surprisingly, I have found that many of my American female friends do 
not object to Playboy (the fact that this magazine also has some excellent stories and 
interviews helps), although they would not put the centerfolds on the walls of their 
rooms. They normally do object to more “serious” magazines of the same type, like 
Penthouse or Hustler (cf. Rodgerson and Wilson 1991; for a slightly different 
perspective Zizek 1989). Since I find that the basic imagery is the same, the question 
that seems to be worth asking here is: how is this different imagery mediated? What 
is it within the specific culture that makes some representations of the human (in this 
case, female) body more or less “ a c c e p t a b l e ” ? 258
257 Or even on the Internet, more recently.
258 I have to note that I am not interested here in the sem iotic aspects o f the imageiy and the changes 
that it may reflect within popular culture; my only interest is in representations o f the
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The answer to this question depends to a large extent on the prevailing 
cultural and social norms within each culture or s o c i e t y . 2 5 9  While there is no 
universal criterion regarding greater or lesser “acceptability” of particular types of 
imagery, the fact is that many industries (from clothing to cosmetics) rely heavily on 
certain types of images that enable them to sell their products (Rodgerson and Wilson 
1991). Note that the porn and soft-porn industry of the Playboy type is not even 
mentioned here — as a matter of fact, it is quite unimportant and relatively benign in 
terms of actual profit-making or market-influencing strategies.2^ 0 The body, 
especially if it conforms to current cultural and social aesthetic ideals (norms) 
becomes something that can be bartered, exchanged, or sold. (Not only rented, which 
is one of the main points made by Irigaray and Kristeva.) The body has become a 
commodity, a fetish. The appropriate (“politically correct”) image of the body results 
in its veneration (as an ideal) and promotes a whole set of values behind the image.26i
gendered/sexualized body in the context o f the gender relations in the postmodern world, and the 
implications that these representations have for contemporary anthropology (i.e., does anthropology 
respond to the challenges that are posed in this form, and if  it does, in what way?).
259 The first question after I presented a paper on feminist discourses in Slovenia (Boskovik 1996) 
was whether pornography is a big problem in Slovenia —  as it seems to be in other former communist 
countries.
260 Just like the hard-core pornographic industry, which is highly publicized and frequently taken as 
an example o f the ultimate degradation o f women (“women as sexual objects”). However, in terms o f  
images and values that this industry projects, as well as in terms o f its actual influence and reach, 
compared to other, perfectly acceptable and “decent” industries, it is completely marginal.
261 pqj. incredibly sexist and racist set o f values behind the images displayed on the early 20th 
century French colonial postcards from Africa, cf. Corbey 1988. I found the degree to which the 
women and girls depicted in these pictures were dehumanized (and at the same time both animalized 
and eroticized in an “exotic” fashion) almost incomprehensible (and so did Corbey). But it shows very 
well and very clearly one way o f dealing with images o f bodies. While the representation o f the naked 
body is strongly discouraged in Western contemporary culture, the “natives,” being symbolically 
desexualized and deeroticized (by the very fact that they were and are the objects o f  study) can be 
depicted nude. Their sexuality is abstracted, hidden, or disguised —  depending on the researcher’s 
interests. A  friend o f m ine has recently (1994) suggested to me ÛxoiNational Geographic actually
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Therefore, it is interesting to look at the way(s) in which the body is promoted and 
advertised: the body as an integral part of consumer culture (Featherstone 1991; 
Vestergaard and Schr0der 1986), and body as a construction.
Advertised and idealized bodies are, of course, only ideals. Ordinary 
heterosexual males (to take one example) do not really expect to meet someone who 
looks like Kelly LeBrock or other glamorous actresses/models. The image itself is 
somewhat reminiscent of a fairy-tale plot: most (if not all) of us like to dream (or 
daydream) of the prince or princess (on the white horse, on the white sailing ship, or 
in the white Lamborghini, for example). Although not omnipotent in “reality,” we 
dream of the day (or hour) of our omnipotency, when everything wished for can 
materialize. The fact that we are well aware that these are only dreams does not 
prevent us from dreaming about this. The image that is projected in and thiough 
advertising is able to offer for a fleeting second (“girls, buy this, and you can look 
just like me/ guys, get this after-shave and you can be with someone just as beautiful 
as me” and the like) the sensation that is more than real (in the words from a U2 song: 
even better than the real thing), the feeling that crosses right into hyperreality.
To go back to Marshall Blonsky’s “European friend” from the beginning of 
this section, why could he not feel attracted to a woman “with a body like a 
Rubens”? The answer is part of the coding of what is “admissible” and what is 
“inadmissible” in contemporary culture. The cult of the body, at least as far as the 
late-Victorian era (Bordo 1990: 83ff) promotes and markets a specific kind and shape 
of body: the firm, slender body (especially with regard to a female one) becomes an
serves as substitute for Playboy in her country (USA), since “little boys can look at the tits o f native 
women.”
The question o f the relationship between pornography and ethnographic imagery is also mentioned 
by the performance artist Coco Fusco (referring to a performance/installation piece for the 1993 
Biennial Exhibition at the Whitney Museum o f American Art): “We wanted to connect 
pornographically inflected voyeurism with ethnography —  the voyeurism involved in turning us into 
ethnographic objects on display. Looking at naked women of color in National Geographic constitutes 
the first pornographic experience for a lot o f American boys” (Lavin 1994: 82).
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ideal. “Working out” has become an important aspect of contemporary life in 
Western industrialized societies, but this “required” (in a cultural, not necessarily in a 
physical or biomedical sense) exercise is part of the coding. The messages coded are 
that the people who “work out” (almost necessarily middle or upper class, or the ones 
aspiring to these classes) are somehow “in charge”: “I work out” (jog, do weights, 
etc.) means “I am in control of my body” and, by extension, “I can control my 
sexuality.”262 Everything is organized, systematized, put under control. As Susan 
Bordo puts it:
Muscularity has had a variety of cultural meanings (until recently 
largely reserved for male bodies) which have prevented the well- 
developed body from playing too great a role in middle-class 
conceptions of attractiveness. Of course, muscles have symbolized 
masculine power. But at the same time, they have been associated 
with manual labor and chain gangs (and thus with lower-class and 
even criminal status), and suffused with racial meaning (via numerous 
film representations of sweating, glistening bodies belonging to black 
slaves and prizefighters). Given the racial and class biases of our 
culture, they were associated with the body as material, unconscious, 
or animalistic. Today, however, the well-muscled body has become a 
cultural icon; “working out” is a glamorized and sexualized yuppie 
activity. No longer signifying lower-class status (except when 
developed to extremes, at which point the old associations of muscles 
with brute, unconscious materiality surfaces once more), the firm, 
developed body has become a symbol of correct attitude ; it means 
that one “cares” about oneself and how one appears to others, 
suggesting willpower, energy, control over infantile impulse, the 
ability to “make something” of oneself.
(1990: 94-95)
Although it is usually assumed (within the “general public” —- that is to say, 
the consumers) that the imageiy of the body primarily has to do with images of the
262 It has already been noted by Iona Mayer that “any assertion of status distinction demands a tight 
handling of the body” (1975: 260; quoted in Ardener 1987: 114).
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female body, this is actually not the case. As Naomi Wolf wrote: “Advertisers have 
recently figured out that undermining sexual self-confidence works, whatever the 
targeted gender. Using images from male homosexual subculture, advertising has 
begun to portray the male body in a beauty myth of its own” (quoted in Kane 1996). 
But the whole culture of body imagery can also be seen as a result of the relative 
affluence of certain segments o f society — poor or homeless people generally do not 
go to gyms, and it is highly unlikely that one will encounter any of them happily 
jogging through some park with their walkman on full volume.
For men who have never done manual labour — and in these 
post-industrial times, that must mean most of them —  the gym is like a 
gleaming parody of proletarian work: arms, legs and torsos subjected 
to the punishing demands of heavy machinery. And in a weird 
reversal of the factory floor, the labouring serfs often deliberately 
increase their level of toil — programming their treadmills to even 
higher speeds.
(Kane 1996; emphasis mine)263
The newspaper columnist Suzy Menkes (1996a) observes that:
It is symbolic of all the changes in women’s role in the 20th century 
that the feminine, maternal ideal of rounded breast and stomach should 
be replaced by broad shoulders, slim waist and hips, flat stomach and 
well-muscled legs — all the features that have traditionally 
represented virile masculinity.
263 O f course, in all fairness to Pal Kane, she does not seem to mind very much these processes o f 
body marketing and construction. When men are portrayed as sexual objects, she seems to see it as, 
basically, men tasting their own medicine, and even a possibility for enjoyment, as she wrote 
commenting on a fashion show:
It was like an army o f perfection: the geometric pecs like headlights on a 
Seventies Cadillac; the hairless bodies and gloopy grins, loping behind the 
fashion guru like some job-lot of white slaves. They looked like objects, 
and I felt objectified by them. But what beautiful objects.
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Of course, it is not entirely clear whether in this sort of body construction one 
gender is trying just to emulate the other as means of its own redefinition. Do women 
actually want to look like like men? Do men want to look like women? In a full 
circle from some nationalistic discourses refered to in the previous chapter, the image 
of woman as mother is not “in.” It is not fashionable e n o u g h , 26 4  it cannot be properly 
mai’keted and sold. Since the current trend and the fashion in the Western world is 
going more towards the muscular (“manly”) body, critics like Irigaray would point 
out that that actually means very little for women’s emancipation (“equal to what?”). 
Authors like Wolf consider the male beauty myth even more dangerous than the 
female version, since (according to her), males are very ill equiped to deal with 
insecurities and self-depreciation that the outside constructed imagery can inflict on 
them.
Of course, everything gets more consumer-oriented and market-conscious. 
Leading fashion designers make their products now only for the ones who are “fit,” 
who are in perfect shape. If you want to weai* the latest fashion, you have to look 
appropriate (or you have to look like the latest fashion trend) — “even in high 
fashion, the body comes first” (Menkes 19966). By portraying these trends through 
high-profile personalities, contemporain designers can design and envision a new 
reality. (Not that they actually believe that more people will conform to the “ideal” 
standards —  that is perfectly irrelevant. What is relevant is the image.)
Among the Slovenian scholars writing about the body politics, I find 
particularly important265 the article “Female body in the field of vision” by Eva 
Bahovec (1995). In this article, the author focuses on the issues related to body and 
power — in paiticular, women’s power over their own bodies. This power has in the
264 Certainly not regarding the consumers in this context —  the Western upper class (or aspiring 
upper class) individuals.
265 This article is particularly important for me because, among other things, it devotes a significant 
space to the media representation(s) o f the body —  I certainly do not wish to claim that it is better than 
other articles on the body in this issue o f Delta  (Vol. 1, Nos. 1-2, 1995).
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past been frequently feared or repressed or b o t h  26 6  Bahovec, using in her conclusion 
as an example the movie The Crying Game'^^^ takes issue with feminist critics who 
“read” oppression and the “men’s gaze” into current debates on the (fashion-derived 
and designed) imagery and iconography of the female body. She concludes, on a 
Foucauldian note, that women are not merely “objects,” that the problem of 
representation is essentially that of a “masquerade” (Bahovec 1995: 38-39), which 
women themselves can influence and use to their own advantage. The female position 
is not one of a mere object (of denigrating men’s gaze), but one of a void symbolic 
subjectivity (1995: 40). There is no “essence” or some hidden “true meaning” in 
these images — it is always the participants that “fill in” the mosaic. By realizing 
that they are not just passive objects, women can express and model their own 
images, representations of their own bodies.
A marketing of the body, a reconstruction of the body in accordance with the 
current standards and stereotypes, forms a significant part of the construction of 
reality in the media. Of course, marketing the body in various forms has a long 
history; but the main characteristic of it in the contemporary world is its fetishization 
—  the body becomes an object in consumer c u l t u r e .2 6 8  Contemporary consumer 
culture, as recently portrayed by Mike Featherstone:
uses images, signs, and symbolic goods which summon up dreams, 
desires and fantasies which suggest romantic authenticity and 
emotional fulfilment in narcissistically pleasing oneself, instead of 
others. Contemporary consumer culture seems to be widening the 
range of contexts and situations in which such behaviour is 
deemed appropriate and acceptable.
(Featherstone 1991: 27)
266 Apple 1993 provides interesting examples for teachers —  one o f the “naturalized” professions for 
women.
267 The same movie, with its gender swapping/ gender fluctuating iconography, has been used by 
another important Slovenian scholar, Slavoj Zizek (1993).
268 pqj. (ke approaches and possible definition of the term “consumer culture,” I refer to Featherstone 
1991.
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By becoming an object it is a part of the construction of hyperreality; a new 
way of mar keting underlines and emphasizes the strategies that work best in the 
consumer culture that we are a part of. It also influences a construction of a new 
symbolic language, a visual language that promotes the “right” values or a t t i t u d e s .2 6 9  
The strategies of this kind of marketing are difficult to follow in detail, but they can 
be observed in film and the visual media in general (De Lauretis 1984, 1987; 
Showalter 1991), as well as in other aspects that deal with gender relations (Giddens 
1992; Jacobus, Keller, and Shuttleworth 1990, etc.). It is not my intention to dwell on 
these strategies here in detail — this is very much the realm of semiotics and related 
disciplines — but it is worth pointing to awareness of these strategies as a very 
important feature of contemporary cultural communication. This awareness makes 
the construction of gender in the contemporary world a much more interesting issue, 
since it includes a kind of “double talk” by both men and women (as seen in the 
chapter on Macedonia, also documented in the recent research on gender in 
Greece270), where every side says only what it is expected to say by the other, while 
at the same time being very well aware that the other side knows that this is just a 
game and that what is said is not necessarily what is meant (as in Eco’s words quoted 
above). Both anthropologists’ discourses and the objects of their research also play 
their parts in this game of meanings. However, in order to see what exactly is meant 
by gender and gender relations in contemporary anthropology (with its postmodern 
overtones), we need to make an excursion into another of its sub-disciplines.
269 A  good example o f how this new language is constructed in advertising is presented by 
Vestergaard and Schrpder 1985, especially pp. 81-108.
220 Por example, in Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991.
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“FEMALES READILY AVAILABLE”: 
APES, MONKEYS, AND HUMANS
People look at animals, even to learn from them about human beings 
and human society. People in the twentieth century have been no 
exception (...) We polish an animal mirror to look for ourselves. The 
biological sciences’ focus on monkeys and apes has sought to make 
visible both the form and the history of our social and personal bodies. 
Biology has been pre-eminently a science of visible form, the 
dissection of visible shape, and the acceptance and construction of 
visible order. The science of non-human primates, primatology, may 
be the source of insight or a source of illusion. The issue rests on our 
skill in the construction of mirrors.
(Haraway 1991: 21)
It is interesting to note that the research on gender in anthropology started to a 
large extent as a result of the research in primatology (related to physical or 
biological anthropology) and related disciplines. It would also be interesting to see 
how much this aiea of research had to do with purely “political” and much less 
academic reasons (since it was probably much easier to say certain things in physical 
anthropology, than it was in social or cultural anthropology), as it was easier to 
question certain “given” domains that had to do with hierarchy and power. These 
primarily had to do with issues related to violence and aggression (something that 
quite a few scholars — paiticulaiiy of the feminist persuasion — were quick to 
identify as the “core” reasons behind the male supremacy) and whether violence and 
aggressive behavior were particular to humans throughout the process of evolution or 
whether they have been acquired as a set of specific “responses” to specific cultural 
situations. To put it in very simple (and perhaps even simplicistic) terms, popular 
thinking went as follows: men are stronger, have more physical power and therefore 
aie more likely to resort to violence when things don’t go their way (see the specific
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references in Quinn 1977: 186-190). Therefore, they are in a position of domination 
in almost every human culture. One of the dominant narratives in anthi'opology was: 
Aggressive behavior “works” — that is why males resort to it. And the question of 
domination extends way beyond nature and into academia — and anthropology is no 
exception. For, as Di Leonardo notes:
In fact, despite the admiration and envy of feminists in other fields, 
women have historically done poorly in anthroplogy departments: 
Mead never held an official departmental position, Benedict was 
passed over as chair for a man when Boas retired, and Elsie Clews 
Parsons achieved her influence through the use of an independent 
fortune to finance her own and others’ field trips and publications.
(Di Leonardo 19916: 5)221
The more recent developments in some areas of physical or biological 
anthropology stand in sharp contrast to this bleak picture. In primatology, most of the 
significant reseaich in the last two or three decades was done by women, nicely 
contrasting with the long-standing prejudice of men as “naturally inclined” towards 
scientific research. As a matter of fact, if one wants to study chimps today, one will 
necessarily start with the work of Jane Goodall, for mountain gorillas one of the 
leading authorities is the late Diane Fossey, for orangutans, Birute Galdikas, for 
baboons, Shirley Strum, etc. Sometimes it looks almost as if female researchers have 
actually “taken over” this field.
The research conducted in primatology also helped to get rid of some of the 
prejudices related to male/female interaction, especially in the aspects dealing with 
sex and power. The issues being discussed underlie some of the most basic functions 
biologically attributed to males or f e m a l e s . 2 2 2  Some authors (Tanner 1981) have
221 She also notes that “Most o f the notable theoretical movements o f the 1920s through the 1960s 
and particularly those bearing on topics o f direct relevance to women’s status, such as kinship and 
marriage or the sexual division o f labor —  ignored or naturalized sexual difference” (Di Leonardo, 
ibid.).
222 Por specific cultural constructs related to these biological “facts” see Quinn 1977.
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proposed looking at the whole of human evolution in a radically different way, based 
on the results of their observations of primate interactions. But how far can one get 
by following the line of inquiry of the connection between aggressive behavior and 
sex among the primates? And what can it tell one about the gender interactions 
within a specific academic field?
Many researchers have observed that violent and aggressive behavior is not 
necessarily the way in which some primates operate, as exemplified by “pygmy 
chimps” {Pan troglodytes) from the tropical forests of Zaire:
Friendly feelings among the bonobos may be linked to sexual 
receptivity of the female. For almost half of her 46-day menstrual 
cycle, the female is in estrus or false estrus — signalled by pink 
swelling. Like chimpanzees, female bonobos give birth at five-year 
intervals. Unlike them, bonobo females usually resume copulation 
within a year after bearing offspring. With females readily available, 
males do not need to compete for their favors.
(Linden 1992: 48)
The argument of female receptivity was also made in an hypothesis on human 
origins by Owen Lovejoy (1981), connected with the argument for pair-bonding 
(woman, the nurturer, and man, the p r o v i d e r 2 2 3 ) .  The argument (that has been 
suggested almost invariably by male researchers) has provoked a number of angry 
responses by feminist scholars (like Nancy Tanner and Adrienne Zihlman), who did 
some significant work among primates.
They were quick to point out that, in most cases, an intelligent diplomacy can 
achieve more than sheer strength. This is a point of view very much emphasized by 
scholars like Tanner and frequently overlooked by many of her male colleagues. The 
narrative that “aggressive behavior always pays off” has been succesfully
273 Which is, o f course, another stereotype that has never been proven (or, for that matter, even 
tested) in any context.
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deconstructed by anthropologists like Strum.224 in fact, this can be seen as an 
important part of the “bigger” picture, as summarized by Di Leonardo:
Feminists also noted that in apotheosizing male hunting as the early 
human activity par excellance, “man-the-hunter” theorists ignored key 
evidence from contemporary hunting and gathering, or foraging, 
societies: women do some hunting, and female-gathered foods account 
for more than half and at times nearly all of what is eaten.
(19916: 7)
It has been objected that most of the models for early hominid behavior stem 
from the model that emphasizes the role of males (Tanner 1981). As noted by 
Zihlman,
Growing out of “man the hunter,” the emergence of almost all human 
behaviors were attributed to hunting: bipedal locomotion evolved for 
freeing the hands to make and use tools for hunting, for following 
animals, and carrying the meat back to the home base. Food shaiing 
meant that males gave meat to their mates and their own offspring, 
females, in return, lost estrus (heat) and became sexually “willing” at
all times.225
(1985: 367; footnote added)
She goes on specifically to criticize Lovejoy’s (1981) influential article as 
“male-chauvinistic” and “sexist” (p. 374), noting that most of the prevailing theories 
of human evolution are male-biased. (On the other hand, it can be argued that the 
emphasis on the cooperation and friendship that chai acterizes work of most of the 
modern female paleoanthropologists and primatologists is also gender-oriented and 
biased, only in a different direction.) When the origin of hunting (as a form of violent 
behavior par excellance ) is concerned, Zihlman notes that we can prove hunting in
224 When asked recently whether her conslusions actually represent some kind of “wishful thinking,” 
Strum pointed out that she has 20 years o f field notes to support these conslusions (Eagle 1996).
225 In regard to females that are “willing" at all times, Lovejoy refers to a “personal communication” 
of Donald Johanson. This provoked a series o f hilarious comments, beginning with the question o f  
how Johanson “personally” knew this, to more philosophical questions of what anthropologists 
actually do in the field and what fieldwork is all about.
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the archaeological record only in the last 200,000 years (Zihlman 1985: 369), 
millions of years after the hominid divergence from apes, seriously questioning the 
implications of the primate models for analyzing the behavior of our evolutionary 
ancestors. There are other and less sensational aspects of primate behavior (primarily 
connected with the social regulations and cooperation within each group) which 
might be more helpful as working models for understanding certain evolutionary 
traits.
I started this chapter with an analysis of the writings on gender and difference 
by Luce Irigaray, and continued with a descriptive section on gender imagery based 
on contemporary popular culture. Anthropological accounts of the construction of 
gender have to take into account populai' culture because it shapes the ways in which 
large segments of population form and express their opinions. This is in particular 
the case with S l o v e n i a , 22 6  where images from (Western-style) popular culture 
become part of everyday life. Of course, there are some interesting twists in this 
Westernization; for example, apart from the Church or extreme right-wing groups, no 
one seems to be too upset about p o r n o g r a p h y .222
The changing perspectives on the body are closely related to the image of 
body as an artificial construct (cf. Big wood 1991). This artificiality becomes even 
more appaient in the case of physical anthropology, a discipline which deals with 
bodies and their interactions in a most direct way. The whole dominant discourse 
that was at one time the basis of this discipline (men as inherently aggressive, “man 
the hunter, woman the nurturer” dichotomy) is put into a different perspective in the 
most recent research. Feminist anthropologists (Tanner, Zihlman, Haraway) were 
able to show the extent to which these alleged “natural facts” were actually cultural 
constructs aimed not only at proliferation of a certain type of narrative (the 
aforementioned “man the hunter” hypothesis with all its implications), but also at
226 And probably will be with Macedonia in a few years.
222 One of four main TV channels shows a hard-core movie every Friday night —  one could hardly 
imagine ITV or Channel Four doing the same in Britain!
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reproducing a certain type of hierarchy within the discipline itself. The paradox of 
models derived from primatology lies in the fact that while, on the one hand, they 
stressed the (often underestimated or totally overlooked) role of the female members 
of the primate communities, they, on the other hand, also tended to support some 
evolutionary models that were still extremely androcentric — almost to the point of 
suggesting that, to paraphrase the title of a famous book (Hrdy 1981), woman has 
never evolved. However, as a direct result of reseaich and publications of scholars 
mentioned in this section, this picture is now changing. Models based on cooperation 
and complementarity are challenging previous ones based on a simple male-dominant 
hierarchy (especially in Tanner 1981).
But this opens a whole series of questions regarding the actual ways in which 
men and women see each other and interact with each other, the ways which are best 
presented in the context of specific communities. I have already presented (in 
previous chapters) some examples relating to Macedonia and Slovenia. These 
questions can also be looked upon in the context of the gender construction (as well 
as an interpretation of this construction) in contemporary anthropology. In this case,
I take “contemporary anthi'opology” to be another type of community. It is almost a 
self-evident “fact” that anthropologis^do recognize themselves as well as other 
anthropologists as co-paiticipants in some sort of exclusive collective entity — this is 
what I will call “community” here. As an anthropologist studying it I have to rely 
again on the voices and statements of my fellow anthropologists and students of 
gender (“informants” in this context), because everything that exists within this 
community exists as such only because it has been conceptualized as such by them. 
So, in the next chapter, my main objective is to present my answer to the question 
how can research on gender (and about gender) influence contemporary 
anthropological theory?
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In the hall of mirrors :
Gender,
anthropology,postmodernism
The Caterpillar was the first to speak.
“What size do you want to be?” it asked.
“Oh, I’m not particular as to size,” Alice hastily 
replied; “only one doesn’t like changing so often, you know.’ 





Most people have heard of Post-Modernism and don’t have a 
very clear idea of what it means. They can be forgiven for this 
confusion because Post-Modernists don’t always know (...).
(Jencks 1987: 7)
The previous chapter ended with a snapshot of the influence and role of 
women in physical and biological anthropology. The impact that, for example, 
primatologists have had in the last 30 years owes a lot to a specific political climate. 
According to some estimates, 80% of current field research in primatology is 
conducted by women (Eagle 1996). Of course, the fact that women researchers are 
gaining a disproportionate influence has also attracted the criticism (outlined in a 
recent Channel Four TV program [Eagle 1996]) that women are “too sensitive” and 
identify too easily with the subjects of their study, which leads to them losing their 
“objectivity.”
This is a return to “biologically-centered” views of men and women, where 
each gender is supposed to “naturally” have certain emotional and psychological 
traits. But this is also a sort of backlash against a rapidly changing imagery in 
industrialized Western societies: the greater visibility and presence of women in 
public life (especially in the last 10-15 yeai's) makes many men (accustomed to the 
“good old days” when everyone “knew” what “real women” should do^^S) feel 
extremely vulnerable and almost as if something that they had had “since time 
immemorial” was suddenly lost.^79 As Clifford Geertz (1990: 19) wrote: “The 
intrusion, advance, spread, import, insinuation — word choice is important here.
That is to say, take care o f home and children.
The lead-in o f a recent article provides a good illustration: “As women win equal rights and 
financial independence, men are complaining of impotence” (Theobald 1996: 6).
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exposing world views, projecting fears — of feminist thought into just about every 
aspect of contemporaiy cultural life is by now entirely general.” This presents a very 
powerful image, constructed with some help of an imagined tradition —  although the 
examples like the one mentioned above on the status of women in medieval Piran, 
clearly show big cracks in the (supposedly monolithic) imagery of always dominant 
men and always subordinate women.
In this concluding chapter, I will concentrate on some current debates about 
the relationship between feminism and postmodernism and then between feminism 
and anthropology. I started off with postmodern approaches as something that 
exemplifies difference and multiplicity. Through the chapters on Macedonia and 
Slovenia I have shown how some specifically postmodern tools (like the construction 
of hyperreality) can open up new perspectives on the understanding of some societies. 
I have also shown how the questioning of a certain metanarrative can be useful in 
comprehending certain social and cultural processes. Deconstruction of the 
metanarrative that claimed some forms of evolutionary-derived gender differences 
has been an important part of the anthropological legacy of the last 15-20 years, as 
shown in the previous chapter. Finally, the concept of instability and uncertainty (as 
a consequence of the questioning of dominant naiTatives) is something that people in 
both Macedonia and Slovenia have to deal with on a daily basis. This element of 
uncertainty is very important — just as postmodernists do not necessarily “know” 
what postmodernism “is,” so “feminists” do not necessarily “know” what feminism 
“is.” Therefore, it is nothing unusual to say that the relationship between feminism 
and postmodernism is a highly ambiguous one (Mascia-Lees, Sharpe and Cohen 
1989; Moi 1988; Gordon 1993; Strathern 1987a, 1987Z?), but I see this ambiguity as a 
source of strength that comes from diversity.^^o
280 This diversity, as well as a need to deconstruct “a unified subject” o f fem inism, is recognized in 
recent works o f fem inist scholars who would not describe themselves as postmodern —  for example, 
Nancy Tuana (1993: 172).
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I have already outlined (in the chapter “Postmodernism, anthropology and 
common sense”) some of the debates and questions concerning the legacy of the 
Enlightenment. That chapter ended with an introduction of issues related to gender 
(section “Conclusion and points of departure: Defining gender”) into the main body 
of the thesis. Now I am completing the circle and returning to the theoretical issues 
related to gender. Most of all, I am interested in the place o f gender in contemporaiy 
anthropology and its relation to feminist anthropology. My view is that gender 
studies rather Ûmn feminist studies provide the most useful matrix for the study and 
understanding of gender-related issues in contemporary world. Therefore, I think that 
the place of men in feminism should also be reconsidered. I mention Baudrillard as 
an important thinker of the contemporaiy because he argues strongly for the 
abolishment of dichotomies where one gender regards the other as something else.
For him, this process of “othering” is a sign of weakness, not strength. I also mention 
Baudrillard for his provocative (and, as mentioned above, quite often seriously 
misunderstood) style. At the same time, Baudrillard is one of the sharpest critics of 
the “mainstream” (essentialist) feminist theories. His views make him a very 
unpopular figure among some feminists, and he is well aware of that:
They [the feminists] have shown more detestation for me than they 
have for the machos. A macho is never anything else but a macho.
All you have to do is fight against him. But somebody who comes 
along and tells you that you have much more sovereignty over men 
than you think, that throws your mechanism into confusion.
The feminists have rejected me completely. It’s a pity.
(Gane 1993: 47)
Finally, while I understand the feai' that feminist authors have from 
postmodern approaches that question everything (including feminists’ right to ask 
certain questions!), I think (together with contemporary feminist authors like Flax 
[1987] and Butler [1990]) that they have to overcome these fears. Contemporary
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anthropology as anthropology of gender (Moore 19946) provides an example of the 
usefulness of multiple perspectives and multiple voices.
Sabina Lovibond (1989) has tried to reply to some of the points raised in 
postmodern discourses from a feminist perspective. Lovibond takes as her target 
three philosophers, Lyotaid, Rorty and MacIntyre. All three of them share a deep 
skepticism towards Enlightenment ideals such as the positioning (and producing) of 
“grand narratives, ” as well as “the pursuit of ideal consensus” and ideas such as 
Objectivity, Truth, Universal Reason, etc. (1989: 6-10). Lovibond, in contrast, 
definitively believes that there are metanarratives worth fighting for: “It is difficult to 
see how one could count oneself a feminist and remain indifferent to the modernist 
promise of social reconstruction” (1989: 11-12). She continues:
From a female point o f view, ‘tradition’ has (to put it mildly) an 
unenviable historical record. Yet, it is in the area of sexual relations 
that ‘traditional values’ (marriage, home ownership, wholesale family 
life, etc.) are proving hardest to shift. (...) Still, if we assess without 
prejudice the implications for gender (...) of the ‘modern’ repudiation 
of unearned privilege, we may well conclude that this development is 
an integral part of the package; and if so, it will follow that feminists 
have at least as much reason as the rest of the world for regarding the 
‘project of modernity’, at the present time, as incomplete.
(1989: 12, emphasis minej^si
Of course, the “historical tradition” that Lovibond mentions is a 
generalization and an oversimplification. Furthermore, it is just wrong — as I have 
demonstrated above with the examples from Piran (Mihelic 1978) and France
281 The reference to the “incomplete project of modernity” refers to a debate between Jean-François 
Lyotard and Jürgen Habermas. Without getting into the details o f this debate, I cannot quite 
understand what Habermas was objecting to and why. Habermas seems to, first o f all, accept a 
metanaiTative (Modernity in all its glory) and then to derive all his arguments from it. Since Lyotard 
rejects metanarratives, it is difficult to see how Habermas’ (as well as Lovibond s) criticism can refer 
to Lyotard (or any other postmodern author). It is like criticizing a play written in English for not 
paying enough attention to the nuances o f Japanese language. Nice, but what is the point?
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(Segalen 1983, 1986). The notion of “tradition” is further relativized in the light of 
the examples that I have mentioned from Macedonia (as well as numerous cases from 
Greece^82) “a  female point of view” is something that Lovibond (as well as many of 
her colleagues) understands as self-evident and taken-for-granted, so she does not 
even try to explain or define it.
Another important point is that Lovibond seems to believe that postmodern 
approaches always represent radical and complete breaks with previous (including 
“modernist”) tradition. This is most certainly not the case; as outlined in the chapter 
“Postmodernism, anthropology and common sense,” these approaches are a product 
of certain ways of looking at things (perceiving “reality”), which have gradually 
evolved and changed over time. It is impossible to look at postmodernisms apart 
from the specific cultural and social milieu where they appear — just as it is 
impossible for one to read a book if one does not know the language in which it is 
written.
Criticism of the Enlightenment draws Lovibond towards an examination of 
Nietzsche’s writings. It is true that Nietzsche was one of the first critics of the 
Enlightenment, but I find it difficult to see how a critique of some of his statements 
(the examples quoted are incredibly sexist, to be sure!) can be applied to postmodern 
authors. Lovibond wishes “simply, to suggest that we take seriously Nietzsche’s own 
understanding of his work as a contribution to the overcoming of ‘feminism’ ” (1989: 
18-19). But I see quoting Nietzche’s attitudes on feminism from the 1870s and 1880s 
as hardly relevant to the questions that postmodernism and feminism wish to address 
more than a century later. Is it possible that Lovibond maintains that the world has 
not changed in the meantime? Her defense of the embattled Enlightenment principles 
only strengthens the postmodernists’ criticism.
The critique of Modernity and its relation to contemporary feminist discourses 
is the main theme that Rita Felski explores in her aiticle “Feminism, postmodernism.
282 por example, in Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991,
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and the critique of Modernity.” Terminology can sometimes be a problem, since she 
mentions that, according to Alice Jardine:
“[MJodernity” denotes the cluster of issues more often classified under 
the rubric of postmodernism in the United States: the loss of faith in 
history and the dialectic, the crisis of truth and representation, the 
disappearance of the subject. Jardine reads this process as being 
closely linked to the valorization of the feminine, defined as the space 
of desire, the maternal body, the mystical, the repressed Other of 
reason.
(Felski 1989: 34)
Felski criticizes Jardine for essentially seeing feminism as subordinated to the 
master discourse {metanarrative in the terminology that I prefer to use) of 
poststructuralism (which is used as a synonym for postmodernism), as well as for the 
failure to establish a theoretical framework “to explain how feminism as an 
oppositional politics and critique is to be integrated with Jardine’s apocalyptic vision 
of the death of reason, history, and the subject” (1989: 34-35).
The basic problem is how feminist discourses can proceed in their 
questioning of dominant (patriarchal, as many feminist authors call them^^S) 
narratives, regarding these dominant narratives as fictional, while at the same time 
regarding their own critique as somehow closer to the truthl Would it just be a 
substitution of one dominant narrative for the other? This would hardly be a pleasant 
possibility for feminist authors who want to abolish the idea of domination. This 
seems to place feminism as a movement trying to abolish male domination, in
Authors (like Felski here) who use words like “patriarchy” or “patriarchal” usually do not bother 
to define them (an important exception is Jalusic 1992) —  which leaves one with a variety o f possible 
or probable meanings. As Humpty Dumpty told Alice: “When I  use a word, it means just what I 
choose it to mean —  neither more nor less.”
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opposition to postmodernism, as a movement trying to abolish all forms o f  
domination
One possible solution to this problem is a refusal of the whole specter of 
postmodernism.2^5 Drawing upon the work of Hartsock (1987), and using arguments 
similar to Lovibond (1989), Felski writes that it could be “possible to relativize 
postmodernism as the symptom of a crisis in established male intellectual authority 
which bears no relevance to feminist concerns” (1989: 35). But this would seem to 
be just “too good to be true” —  postmodern concerns are part of our world and they 
cannot be ignored.^^ 6 These concerns include:
the proliferation of information technologies and the gradual shift 
towards a postindustrial (although not postcapitalist) society, the 
declining authority of liberalism and Marxism as symptomatic of an 
increasing skepticism towards metanarratives, the reemergence of 
feminism and other social movements which have foregrounded 
difference and exposed the patriar chal, heterosexist, and ethnocentric 
nature of dominant Western ideals, an expanding aestheticization of 
everyday life through the mass dissemination of signs and images and 
a simultaneous questioning of the art/life opposition inherent in high 
modernism, a shift in philosophical and social theory towards 
linguistic paradigms accompanied by a sustained critique of 
foundationalist thought, and so on.
(Felski 1989: 36)
I have already made clear my view that there are multiple postmodern discourses as well as 
multiple feminist discourses. The authors that I mention here usually regard both fem inism and 
postmodernism as single and more or less unified movements, so I follow their arguments here using 
their own terminology.
In Felski's words: “the category o f postmodern, whose diagnostic claims can be read as an 
unwarranted generalization from a particular and limited set o f culture experiences” (1989: 35). But 
fem inism can also be seen “as an unwarranted generalization from a particular and limited set o f  
culture experiences” —  as non-Wes tern authors like Minh-ha (1987) seem to see it.
286 Or, if  they are ignored, one takes incredible risks. These concerns are part o f  the world we live in 
—  not something that can be arbitrarily accepted or rejected.
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There are feminist scholars (for example, Hekman 1990; Flax 1987, 1990) 
who see the postmodern critique of metanarratives as something that is inherently 
connected with feminist aspiration (without any need to put feminism or 
postmodernism in a position of the metanarrative). Although Rita Felski takes a 
much more cautious approach and cannot quite shake off the problems in the 
“mainstream” feminist reception of postmodernism,287 she rightly notes that:
Being oppressed is no guarantee of clarity of vision or possession of 
truth. Furthermore, women have no exclusive claim upon the 
experience of oppression, and feminism has been forced in recent 
years to confront extensive criticisms of its own race and class 
blindness which is concealed by appeals to a unifying substratum of 
female identity. The crumbling of an objective, all-embracing 
standpoint brought about by a pluralization of ideological perspectives 
problematizes simultaneously the absolute authority of any one of 
these. There can be no single “feminine” trath which can hope to 
succeed a deposed patriarchal wisdom.
(Felski 1989: 40)
In response to criticism, and while acknowledging criticisms from the points 
of view that can be called postmodern, Felski ai'gues for a degree of skepticism and 
“multi-dimensional” critique of contemporaiy capitalist culture. It seems to me that, 
while in general terms siding with Habermas’ defense of Modernity, she inserts 
important points of caution against just rejecting everything that is (or is suspected to 
be) of “postmodern” or “poststructuralist” origin.
Elspeth Probyn (1988) presents another way of criticizing postmodernism.
She concludes her article in the following way: “For no matter how hyper reality is, it 
is in the end where we live and speak from” (1988: 309). The main problem with 
postmodernism, for Probyn, is the lack of position, the lack of a specific place from
287 I take as a “mainstream” feminist reception o f postmodernism, those feminist approaches that 
postulate the existence o f universalizing categories (like the “woman”) and then derive all their 
prem ises from it. They are naturally very suspicious o f the projects (like postmodernism) tliat want to 
question the possibility of any universal categories.
193
where one can speak. The “real” is primarily political, and although she does give 
some credit to “the juxtaposition of feminism and postmodernism” (1988: 305-306), 
she sees postmodernism as too generalizing, too much removed from the positions 
{sites) of specific lives and voices. Probyn, in my view without much justification, 
criticizes postmodern authors (especially the feminist ones, like Owens [1992]) 
exactly for universalizing the “postmodern.”
Probyn’s notion of specific sites represents a starting point for Bondi and 
Domosh (1992). “In rearticulating the ground that is locally built around us,” Probyn 
writes, “we give feminist answers that show up the ideological conditions of certain 
postmodern questions” (1990: 187). Bondi and Domosh oppose both the essentialism 
of what they call “liberal feminism” and the “radical or cultural feminist position 
which implies that (...) there are two types of knowledge, one masculine, one 
feminine” (1992: 200-201). Instead, in an interesting blend of postmodernism and 
feminism, they propose using poststructuralism and deconstruction “to interpret 
gender difference as a complex and contradictory phenomenon that is both power­
laden and unstable” (Bondi and Domosh 1992: 201). There is still criticism of 
postmodernism (for what they see as “intellectual tourism” — appropriation of 
female voices by postmodernists) as well as a pointing out of differences (they see 
feminism as “less deconstructive” [Bondi and Domosh 1992: 209-210]), but, 
according to Bondi and Domosh, feminism and postmodernism are far from 
incompatible.
I understand the criticism expressed by Rita Felski (as with the one by 
Lovibond 1989) to be primarily directed towards a concept of relativism (Lyotard’s 
language games). However, in my experience (and taking into account people like 
Baudrillard, Rorty and Derrida^ss)^ cognitive relativism does not mean moral
288 All three are frequently labelled as more or less “typical” (or at least immensely important) 
representatives o f postmodernism. In the examples referred to here, Lovibond criticizes Rorty, Felski 
mentions Baudrillard and Derrida. None o f the three would describe himself as a “postmodern” 
thinker.
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indifference. The postmodern “baddies” like Baudrillard, Derrida and Rorty do take 
moral positions and they do engage in current political debates and speak out publicly 
against war, nationalism, ethnic hatred, racism, sexism, and so on.289 To proclaim 
that they are examples of a project that tries to silence the feminist criticism of a 
specific dominant narrative (“patriarchy”) seems to me to be a bit far-fetched.
Unless, of course, the fact that they are men is by itself enough for susp ic ion .290
289 Elizabeth Grosz in particular uses Derridean deconstruction as the point o f  departure in her 
critique o f male-centered subjectivity:
The dominant and subordinated tenns are simply positive and negative 
versions o f each other, the dominant defining other by negation. Binary 
pairs such as good/bad, presence/absence, mind/matter, being/non-being, 
identity/difference, culture/nature, signifier/signified, speech/writing and 
man/woman mark virtually all the texts o f philosophy, and provide a 
methodological validation for knowledges in the West, The first tenu is 
given the privilege of defining itself and o f relegating to the other all that is 
not it... [Derrida] shows that the positive term gains privilege only by 
disavowing its intimate independence on its negative double: far from 
identity or presence generating difference or absence through negation, they 
can be seen as vitally dependent on their opposites in ways that cannot be 
acknowledged. To recognise that identity depends on difference, and that 
presence relies on absence to disturb the very structure of knowledges.
(quoted in Bondi and Domosh 1992: 201-202)
All three have been engaged with the Belgrade Circle —  Derrida came to Belgrade in support 
of independent Serbian intellectuals in 1993, despite international sanctions against the Serbian regime 
—  so his visit provoked anger and dismay in many Western intellectual circles. His critique of 
“phallogocentrism” is readily acknowledged as an important influence by feminist authors like Hélène 
C ixous (his text is a Foreword in Cixous 1994). Baudrillard criticized and ridiculed Western media 
manipulation in and around events such as the Gulf War. More recently, he has been a point o f
Vreference (and an object o f criticism) in an article by a Slovenian feminist scholar Alenka Svab 
(19966).
290 c f . Seremetakis (1994: 110): “Many male gender experts have exploited this instant authorisation 
to colonise the representation of women.”
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BEYOND OTHERNESS: MEN AND FEMINISM
(...) male feminists aie the most virile of all.
Marit Paulsen^^i (Theobald 1996: 7)
In this section, I will focus on the place of men in feminism. Do they have 
one? The question is a quite complicated one. If men and women are perceived to be 
absolute “others” to each other, if they are perceived to be fundamentally different, 
how can they function together? If they are intrinsically the same (if this Otherness is 
just a construction or a simulation, as Baudrillard [1996] would argue), what is the 
point in regarding them as different? The question of the role and presence of men is 
a very difficult one for the “mainstream” feminist theories exemplified by Lovibond
(1989) or Hartsock (1987). Slovenian feminist authors, on the other hand, seem to 
me to be much more open in their inclusion of men and men-related issues within the 
context of feminist studies.
Men seem to be in a highly ambivalent position when they converse (or argue, 
or just make then- point) with proponents of feminist theories. They seem to be both 
encouraged to participate and discuss some issues related to gender identity and 
difference (as a sign of the greater inclusiveness of different women’s groups), and at 
the same time to stay away from things (that they are told) they cannot possibly 
understand (reiterating an exclusivity of “women only” groups). Unlike places like 
Macedonia or Slovenia (where “male feminist” sounds like a contradiction in 
t e r m s ) ,292 Western academic circles have been much more open to male input in the
291 Voted European Woman o f the Year 1996.
292 Having said that, I have to note that my friend Ljuba Stojic (now deputy editor o f the weekly 
magazine NIN in Belgrade) was mockingly labelled “the first Serbian male fem inist” in the early 
1970s. The label was meant to be insulting, but Ljuba was (and still is) quite proud o f his raising of 
some questions regarding place and role of women. One of the leading Serbian opposition figures.
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areas of study regarded as “feminist” or, more broadly, “gender-related.” Having said 
that, I have to note that there is only one male contiibutor in each of the volumes 
edited by Teresa Del Valle (1993) and Vigdis Broch-Due, Ingrid Rudie and Tone 
Bleie (1993). At the feminist conference I recently (March 1996) attended in St. 
A n d r e w s ,2 9 3  there were not more than two men in the audience at any time.
There are obviously certain (feminist) issues (primarily related to the feminine 
“body politics”) where men can say very little or nothing. The majority of men 
cannot perceive the constant exclusion that women face throughout their lives. 
Through biology, men are presumed to have access to an exclusive and élite club, 
where all the important decisions are made. Of course, aspects of gender bias are also 
culturally constructed; it is a fact that the former (communist) Yugoslavia was a 
male-dominated society, but still, a (male) friend of mine was absolutely shocked at 
the level of sexism incorporated in American business circles when he moved to New 
York in 1991. It can be argued that discussing gender discrimination could not 
possibly be done by men, since they seem to be in a position of domination in most 
Western societies, so it is hardly realistic to expect that men would willingly give 
away the power(s) that society bestows on them. On the other hand, the problem of 
discrimination and oppression is also a relative one; studies by Berlin sociologist 
Birgit Rommelspacher showed that women are quite capable of discriminating 
against others (both women and men) based on racial differences (Zavirsek 1995: 18).
The question of men in feminism or men and feminism is part of a much 
broader one, regarding scientific and any scholarly endeavor as (until quite recently) 
essentially “male” or “androcentric.” Writing about the feminist critique of science, 
Clifford Geertz remarked that its success will depend
Dragomir Olujic (secretary o f the SDSS/J), is closely asociated with the Belgrade fem inist group 
“Women in Black.”
293 The conference “Engendering Debate” was organized by Dr. Lesley M cDowell and held at the 
Department of English, University o f St. Andrews, on March 16, 1996.
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most critically on how the tension gets resolved between the moral 
impulses of feminism, the determination to correct the gender-based 
injustice and secure for women the direction of their lives, and the 
knowledge-seeking ones of science, the no-less-impassioned effort to 
understand the world as it, free of wishing, “really is.”
(Geertz 1990: 23)
Feminist approaches are pait of our (scholarly, anthropological, cultural, 
e t c . 2 9 4 )  everyday “reality.” They cannot be ignored or just bypassed. The problem 
that men face is whether they have the right to discuss problems that they never 
actually experienced (maiginalization, exclusion, sex discrimination, and so on). Of 
course, as pointed out by scholars like Henrietta Moore (1988: 4-11, 19946: 2), the 
attitude “it takes one to know one” is not a serious option — it would definitely make 
disciplines like anthropology impossible or irrelevant. On the other hand, this 
attitude is present among many feminist scholars — Dagenais (1987), Ule (1988: 54), 
Probyn (1988), Lovibond (1989), Bondi and Domosh (1992), and Chapman (1996) 
specifically mention feminists as women only. The only country which included men 
in their delegation at the 1995 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing was 
Sweden. According to the Slovenian sociologist Daija Zavirsek, Sweden has reached 
the stage where men contemplate their masculinity in the same way as women tiy to 
define their f e m i n i n i t y 2 9 5  — the question of gender roles in society is something that 
both men and w o m e n 2 9 6  can expect to address. As put by Mirjana Ule (1988: 54), 
men must question the universality of their own (gendered) position in s o c i e t y , 2 9 7  and 
this would enable them to reevaluate their own roles. Ule believes that this
294 A good recent example is Sam Raimi’s Western The Quick and the D ead, where the archetypal 
“good guy” and the savior o f a little Western town is a woman, played by Sharon Stone. This movie is 
a brilliant example of postmodern subversion and playing with clichés (male toughness vs. female 
sensitivity), while unexpectedly twisting them at the end.
295 In the interview published in Mladina No. 39, September 26, 1995, p. 31.
296 I (Jo not wish to imply that I consider men and women to be the only two genders within any 
society —  the same goes for hermaphrodites, transsexuals, and so on.
297 She uses somewhat general terminology; “society” here means “Western societies.”
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réévaluation would help feminism as well — in fact, the future of feminism is in the 
inclusion of both men and women in its different aspects and approaches.
One of the anthropologists that ventured into the exploration of iconography 
related to masculinity was Eduardo Archetti from the University of Oslo. He has 
explored the images of masculinity as constmcted through the Argentinian tango 
(1994: 109 ff). The lyrics of tango seem to revolve around the theme of romantic 
love. “ [T]he basic elements in the cultural construction of romantic love are 
intimacy, companionship (friendship), the existence of mutual empathy and the 
search for sexual pleasure” (1994: 111). There is a perception of a balance between 
these elements, so if one of them gets too much emphasis, the whole edifice of 
romantic love can be destroyed. Romantic love is presented as a sort of mirror in 
which the main protagonist (a man) sees himself. If one element (like passion, for 
example) gets distorted, the mirror shatters.
Tango emphasizes the importance of “pure” or “true” love — the example of 
which is the mother/son relationship (“the narrator is always a son, never a father” 
[Archetti 1994: 112]). It also emphasizes honor (which is, curiously enough, “very 
dependent on the woman’s sexual behaviour” [1994: 115]). However, tango also 
presented (from the 1920s onwards) ways of rebelling against dominant narratives 
which emphasized “domestic love,” marriage and family as the ultimate values, and 
some sort of a “sacralization” of family s p a c e .298 Tango reinvented romantic love in 
this period, and it was seen as a way of escaping these official moral codes by both 
feminists and suffragists. The relationship between men and women was presented 
as multifaceted: a woman was feared and at the same time desired. She presented the 
seeds of (man’s) potential destruction, yet she could at the same time liberate him 
from the chains of everyday life. Romantic love was compared to “pure” love. 
“Pure” love based on chastity was something worth striving for, yet its value could
298 Compare this with the chapter “Gender, identity and rights: Mothers, fathers, and the rest in 
Slovenia.”
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not have been fully understood unless one experienced romantic love with all its 
potential dangers. The whole set of relationships between men and women was 
perceived as extremely complex and loaded with different meanings — and it is 
important to stress that the female characters in tango are extremely strong, self- 
aware and self-confident personalities.
Of course, if we are to accept the more general questions within feminism 
(that is to say, the ones regarding the meaning and status of “masculinity” as well as 
“femininity”), feminism probably leads right into the more general field of gender 
studies. In Eva Bahovec’s words (also the title of Tania Modleski’s book ): 
""Feminism without women.’’ The same phrase has different meaning for these two 
scholars; for Bahovec (as well as many of her Slovenian c o l l e a g u e s 2 9 9 ) ,  it means 
rejecting the (essentialist) notion of women as mere objects — and putting in its 
place what she calls a void symbolic subjectivity as a means of expression (see 
Bahovec 1995). This subjectivity (in all its aspects) will be different in substance to a 
similarly conceived male subjectivity — but it will deal with similar questions. 
Modleski, on the other hand, wains against what she calls:
the subsumption of feminism within a “more comprehensive” field of 
gender studies, accompanied by the rise of “male feminist perspective 
that excludes women,” and the dominance within feminist thought of 
an “anti-essentialism so radical that every use of the term ‘woman,’ 
however ‘provisionally’ it is adopted, is disallowed” ([Modleski 
1991:] 14-15). The two trends are linked, Modleski argues, because 
“the rise of gender studies is linked to, and often depends for its 
justification on, the tendency within poststructuralist thought to 
dispute notions of identity and the subject”. (15) These trends are 
troubling for Modleski because she fears that, insofar as gender studies 
tend to decenter women as the subjects of feminism, they may be not a
299 Primarily, members of the Center for Women’s Studies at the Pedagogical Institute in Ljubljana, 
Apart from Eva Bahovec, they are: M ilica Antic, Zalka Drglin, Svetlana Slapsak and Valerija 
Vendramin.
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“new phase” in feminism but rather feminism’s “phase out”
([Modleski 1991;] 5).
(Chapman 1996)
In her article “Male pro-feminism and the masculinist gigantism of Gravity’s 
Rainbow r  Wes Chapman argues that, although not all “male-authored gender 
criticism” is anti-essentialist (her synonym for poststructuralist and postmodern), 
there is an important and very significant overlap between anti-essentialism and 
male-authored works:
Anti-essentialism is both symptom and cause of a deep anxiety which 
I take to underlie much gender criticism written by men today, an 
anxiety about being a male subject in a society in which male 
subjectivity has been identified as a problem. On the one hand, an 
awareness of the social construction of the self can lead to a 
heightened anxiety in men about gender, as it implies an awareness of 
the complicity of male subjectivity with social structures which are 
oppressive to women. On the other hand, male anxiety about gender 
can encourage an anti-essentialist viewpoint, both because anti- 
essentialism appeal's to offer hope that positive changes in gender 
identity are possible and because anti-essentialism can diffuse personal 
responsibility by shifting the object of critique from the self to social 
codes which have “always already” constructed the self.
(Chapman 1996)
Overall, Chapman seems to argue that while women immediately “know” 
what they are (i.e., they are constantly marginalized and socialized into accepting this 
as a “natural thing,” men are now belatedly “discovering” (or “rediscovering”) their 
own subjectivity. Her point of view (as well as the one by Modleski [1991] and 
Lovibond [1989]) seems to be radically essentialist, and Slovenian scholars, for 
example, would strongly disagree with it. Following Simone de Beauvoir, and Judith 
Butler more recently (1990), they would say that just as one “becomes a woman,” one 
also ""becomes a man.”
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The effects of socialization and domesticization cannot be underestimated in 
favor of some universal “essence” •—- for example, from an early age, girls are taught 
to sit in such a way to use as little space as possible, making them almost invisible 
(Bahovec 1996). A recent study of medical discourses reveals to what extent even 
bijlogically-centered attitudes towaids gender were and still are a social construct 
(Findlay 1995). At the same time, one should bear in mind that images of 
masculinity depend on time and space — an overview by Nickola Pazderic (1995) 
shows the (politically related and politically inspired) ways in which these images 
were shaped in the US during the 1980s (the imagery of the “hard body”).
In the interview conducted in 1989, Jean Baudrillard proposed a strategy of 
seduction as the way of overcoming strains and conflicts that arise in gender 
relations. He saw this strategy as “a happy, liberating power for women” (Gane 
1993: 154). In another interview, Baudrillai’d remarks:
Seduction is a subversive power, it makes it possible to have mastery 
over that secret rule of the game, mastery not of power relations but 
another type of relationship. In that sense, nobody has won and 
nobody has lost. It would be too easy to say that men have won that 
age-old struggle. The feminists need the ancestral female woe in order 
to exist. They have defined themselves as movements in relation to 
what they claim from society. It is vital for them to have that their 
woe has always existed and will always exist.
(Gane 1993: 47)
“One must rise above the battle of the sexes,” Baudrillard remarked in the 
same interview. Rather then taking the otherness of men and women as something 
“given,” Baudrillard (1996) sees this differentiation as constructed (artificial), as one 
of the by-products of the whole concept of Modernity.^oo He calls it “a masculine
300 And this puts him in conflict with the authors like Felski (1989), Mascia-Lees, Sharpe and Cohen 
(1989), Gordon (1993), or Benhabib (1995).
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hysteria,”001 which influences a change in sexual paradigms. So, according to 
Baudrillard:
During this hysterical phase, it is to a certain extent the femininity of 
men that is projected onto women and shapes them as ideal figures of 
likeness. Romantic love is no longer about winning over a woman’s 
heart, or about seducing her. It is rather a matter of creating her from 
inside, of inventing her, either as a realized utopia (an idealized 
woman), or as a “femme fatale,” a star, which is yet another hysterical 
and supernatural metaphor.
(Baudrillard 1996)
In sharp contrast to feminist scholars like Marilyn Strathern (for example, 
1987a), Baudrillard demands the abolishment of this idea of O t h e r n e s s .3 0 2  in his 
view, it is the very idea that there is something Other (radically different) from “us” 
that provokes the most violent and most senseless r e s p o n s e s . ^ ^ 3  % n typically 
irreverent style, he therefore observes that: “Feminism is in fact an example of 
hystericization of the masculine by women, a hysterical projection of their 
masculinity which follows exactly the hysterical projection by men of their 
femininity in the mythical image of a woman” (1996). I have to note here that I do 
see some feminist authors (like Luce Irigaray in her writings on equality, quoted in 
the previous chapter) as actually agreeing with this last statement. I would not go that 
far. Feminism is an important discourse that questions certain dominant narratives 
that have to do with power and inequality. Therefore, it is important for anthropology
391 Lane Lawley (1994) criticizes his use o f the word “hysteria” —  but I think that this is more than 
anything Baudrillard’s subtle way of arguing with some o f Foucault’s ideas about the body.
302 This is a very different reading of Baudrillard than the one by Lane Lawley 1994, Of course, I 
have to note that the text quoted here (“Plastic surgery for the Other”) was only published in French in 
1994.
393 He uses the example o f racism: “Logically, racism should have diminished thanks to 
Enlightenment’s progress. But, the more we know that a genetic theory o f race is unfounded, the more 
racism is reinforced” (Baudrillard 1996).
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(Moore 1988), and, following arguments by Coombe (1991), I see postmodern 
approaches as their most obvious meeting point.
AN AWKWARD CASE OF FEMINISM AND 
ANTHROPOLOGY
Now more than ever we know just how little is known about women. 
(...) We have in fact plenty of data ‘on women.’ (...) What is needed,
I will suggest, is not so much data as questions (...) what we can know 
now will be determined by the kind of questions we learn to ask.
(Rosaldo 1980; quoted by Dagenais 1987: 19)
From the late 1960s, feminist studies begin to establish themselves within 
anthropology (Mathieu 1991a: 275). Feminist concerns were always present, but not 
necessarily noted, mostly because of a specific androcentric bias in research. Women 
were considered “mute” — but mostly because anthropologists did not bother asking 
them about their opinions (Moore 1988: 3-4). Cultural stereotypes regarding gender 
were just accepted, without inquiring what they really meant and whether men and 
women in any given society actually acted according to these stereotypes (Moore 
1986; see also chapter on Macedonia, above). Perhaps in some cases it can be said 
that people acted according to anthropologists’ expectations — being polite hosts, 
they did not want to offend visitors from afar by disagreeing with the “mental image” 
that their visitors already had about them.
Feminism and anthropology both rely on the notion of difference. Differences 
within and between cultures were one of the primary triggers of anthropological and 
ethnographic research (cf. MacCormack and Strathern 1980, as well as Ortner and
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Whitehead 1981). Differences between the genders^o^ (and the effective subjugation 
of women in Western cultures) is the main trigger of feminism. How do these 
approaches to difference combine in what can be called feminist anthropology?
Perhaps a question of terminology can be inserted here: can there be a 
feminist anthropology? Is feminist anthropology just a first step in the development 
of the anthropology of gender (or even gendered anthropology?)? Henrietta Moore, 
while outlining the development of feminist approaches in anthropology in great 
detail, seems a bit ambiguous on this point:
Probably the most outstanding contribution feminist anthropology has 
made to the discipline has been the development of theories relating to 
gender identity and the cultural construction of gender, of what it is to 
be a ‘woman’ or a ‘man’. This has come to be called the 
‘anthropology of gender’, and it is a field of research which did not 
exist and could not have existed before the advent of a feminist 
anthropology.
(Moore 1988: 187)
So does one come before the other? Is feminist anthropology a logical 
precursor of the anthropology of gender or the other way around? Moore makes a 
distinction between the anthropology of gender (which she defines as “the study of 
gender identity and its cultural construction” [1988: 188]) and feminist anthropology 
(“the study of gender as a principle of human social life” {ibid.Y). Although the 
anthropology of gender is not a sub-discipline of feminist anthropology, they both 
seem to share a concern “with the cultural construction of gender and gender identity” 
(Moore 1988: 188).
The main difference seems to be that feminist anthropological a p p r o a c h e s ^ o s
394 I stress again that, follow ing Moore (1988), Butler (1990, 1993), and Grant (1993), I do not think 
that there are only two genders.
395 Huguette Dagenais (1987; 21) uses term “approaches” instead of methodology, which is followed 
by Mathieu (1991a). I think that the use o f this term is very convenient because it stresses plurality.
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are about considering things “from a woman’s point of view.”306 But how does one 
get to this “point of view”? Throughout her book {Feminism and Anthropology), 
Moore shows the impossibility of speaking with a single voice in the name of women 
and representing women (a point of hers taken in Slovenian feminist research, 
primarily by Darja Zavirsek [1991, 1995]). The way out of this paradoxical 
situation^o? seems to be to posit feminist anthropology as being aware of the 
“fundamental differences between women — whether based on class, race, culture or 
history — and that difference[s] is [are] something which needs to be theorized” 
(Moore 1988: 192).308
However, this does not really answer the question of what “a woman’s 
perspective” is. Any perspective by any woman? Feminist authors from former 
Yugoslavia are sometimes quite annoyed by what they call “Western feminist 
ignorance” of their situation (cf. the example quoted in Smejkalova-Strickland 1995). 
Would one have to be a woman to have this point of view? Is a specific perspective 
(“the way of looking at things”) of a Macedonian woman who disapproved of her 
younger son’s marriage because her older son still wasn’t married the same (or 
similar) to the one of a Slovenian unemployed woman staying at home and taking 
care of her 5-year old son? Is a point of view of a Slovenian feminist intellectual 
similar or different from both? Does my attitude as a white non-Western 
heterosexual quasi-academic male writing against all forms of gender discrimination 
identify me as a non-feminist or anti-feminist (not having a “woman’s point of view”) 
because I am not a woman? Is this point of view limited to biological females only? 
(If so, then it slips into some form of biological essentialism.) Are transsexuals who
306 According to Moore (1988: 188), “feminism is all about the women’s perspective.”
307 And for anthropologists like Marilyn Strathern (1988, 1991), this “way out” is not a very 
convincing one.
308 Moore switches from the plural (“fundamental differences”) to the singular (“that difference”). I 
think that the plural would be more in accord with the overall arguments of her book. For example, a 
few pages later (1988: 196), she writes: “I do not think that we can necessarily establish the primacy of  
one form of difference over others.”
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are biologically male capable of it? What about transsexuals who are biologically 
female?
This way of describing "a woman’s perspective” would require defining what 
a “man” and what a “woman” is. But Moore cites numerous ethnographic examples 
which show the fluidity and instability of these categories. The whole argument of 
Judith Butler’s book Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion o f Identity
(1990) focuses exactly on this impossibility.
Butler also takes anthropology into account; in her opinion, Mary Douglas 
provided a groundbreaking study in her Purity and Danger (1966), in pointing to the 
importance of a symbolic understanding of the body and especially of what happens 
around the boundaries of the body. Douglas had already criticized concepts that took 
for granted the “naturalness” of the body (Butler 1990: 131-133). The body was 
where the flux and instability were focused; so what gender one was was determined 
primarily by what gender one performed. For Butler, the body is “a set of 
boundaries, individual and social, politically signified and maintained” (1990: 33). 
She continues:
No longer believable as an interior “truth” of dispositions and identity, 
sex will be shown to be a performatively enacted signification (and 
hence not “to be”), one that, released from its naturalized interiority 
and surface, can occasion the parodie proliferation and subversive play 
of gendered meanings.
(Butler, ibid.)
Gender in the sense of sexual identity is, however, usually assumed to be a 
“natural thing.” For example, if one sees a man or a w o m a n ,3 0 9  one automatically 
(“naturally”) ascribes male or female sexual identity to them. However, sexuality — 
including female sexuality — is a synthetic {man-made/artificial) thing. As Butler 
would say: “As in other ritual social dramas, the action of gender requires a 
performance that is repeated” (1990: 140). There is nothing “natural” about gender
309 0 (. more precisely, what is within a specific culture perceived to be a man or a woman.
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identity and there is nothing “natural” about the positions that one might take 
regarding and based on one’s gender identity. Gender cannot be constituted as a 
stable identity (or even a stable category), since it is “an identity tenuously 
constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a stylized repetition o f 
acts” {ibid.). Furthermore, “[gjenders can be neither true nor false, neither real nor 
apparent, neither original nor derived. As credible beaiers of those attributes, 
however, genders can also be rendered thoroughly and radically incredible ” (1990: 
141).
According to another author who calls the perceived essentialist categories 
into question, Teresa De Lauretis (1984, 1987, 1994), gender is first of all a 
“representation” — which is secondly its own “construction” (“the construction is 
both —  the product and the process of representation and self-representation”). This 
construction in the third place occurs daily and continuously through social and 
cultural discourse (for example, in the media^^O) and paradoxically, gender is 
forcefully also influenced by its “deconstruction.” According to De Lauretis, the 
preoccupation with the differences between men and women has unnecessarily 
limited feminist discussion. Therefore, she writes:
The first limit of “sexual difference(s),” then, is that it constrains 
feminist critical thought within the conceptual frame of a universal sex 
opposition (woman as the difference from man, both universalized; or 
woman as difference tout court, and hence equally universalized), 
which makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to articulate the 
differences among women from Woman, that is to say, the differences 
among women or, perhaps more exactly, the differences within 
women. (...) A second limitation of the notion of sexual difference(s) 
is that it tends to recontain or recuperate the radical epistemological 
potential of feminist thought inside the walls of the master’s house, to 
borrow Audre Lorde’s metaphor rather than Nietzsche’s “prison-house 
of language” (...) By radical epistemological potential I mean the
310 See the interplay of representations and images outlined in the section “I sing the body electric...” 
in the previous chapter.
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possibility (...) to conceive of the social subject and of the relations of 
subjectivity to sociality in another way: a subject constituted in 
gender, to be sure, though not by sexual difference alone, but rather 
across languages and cultural representations; a subject en-gendered in 
the experiencing of race and class, as well as sexual relations; a 
subject, therefore, not unified but rather multiple, and not so much 
divided as contradicted.
(De Lauretis 1987: 2)
Following (and extending) Beauvoir’s phrase that one becomes a gender 
(1990: 33, 111-127), Butler offers a devastating critique of ideas and concepts based 
on “naturalness” and “inherent” or “universal” properties. She also criticizes 
feminist positions that generalize and universalize a “unified” subject of feminism:
The feminist “we” is always and only a phantasmatic construction, one 
that has its purposes, but which denies the internal complexity and 
indeterminacy of the term and constitutes itself only through the 
exclusion of some part of the constituency that it simultaneously seeks 
to represent. (...) The radical instability of the category sets into 
question Ûic foundational restrictions on feminist political theorizing 
and opens up other configurations, not only of genders and bodies, but 
of politics itself.
(1990: 142)
By accepting the consequences that there are no fixed categories associated 
with gender and identity, Butler thinks that the critical task of feminism is to examine 
different gender categories as the sites of instability. All of these sites (“male,” 
“female,” “queer,” “lesbian,” etc.) present the potential for subversion and 
democratization (cf. Butler 1993: 229). And it is this subversion that enables the very 
postmodern questioning of dominant narratives regarding gender.
There are several narratives (the sex/gender distinction,^^! the “naturalness” 
of gender categories, “male” and “female” as universal cross-cultural categories)
311 Cf. Moore (in Broch-Due, Rudie and Bleie 1993: 281-282): “(.. .)  it is not necessary for fem inist 
theorists to hold a radical distinction between sex and gender.”
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which work by both Moore and Butler^i^ renders obsolete. Critical feminist (or 
“postfeminist” [1990: 5]) theory as perceived by Butler takes feminist anthropology 
as perceived by Moore as a natural ally. In fact, I think that Moore (19946: 36-42) is 
basically taking the same (decentered and decentering) perspective as Butler.
However, this still does not mean that contemporary feminist theoreticians are 
happy with the abolishment of universal categories (like “woman”) as the subject of 
their discourse. If they want to be “in touch” with contemporaiy culture (as 
exemplified in Western media representations which are widely accepted by people 
across cultural and gender divisions), they have to locate themselves in this maze of 
mirrors. The problem of contemporary feminist theory, as I see it, is that it looks for 
a fixed image (a single mirror) that would reflect who “feminism” really represents 
and w ha^is^all about. This can never be done, because contemporary feminism, 
like all of us, has entered into the hall of mirrors, the age of mass-communications, 
technological wonders, mass media and popular culture. The mirrors are multiple 
and the images distorted. How can we know what the “real” image is and how a 
“real” gender category looks like? Well, we cannot. We have to learn to live with 
multiple images and multiple possibilities of representation.
3 !2  More precisely, the interpretations that they provide. I do not wish to imply that Moore and 
Butler would necessarily consider their work to be methodologically connected or that they influenced 
each other.
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COPING WITH DIFFERENCES: 
FROM ALICE TO TANK GIRL
Multiple forms of difference ■—■ race, class, gender, sexuality — 
intersect within individuals, and identity is therefore premised on 
difference. The pressing task for the anthropology of the future is that 
we must begin to acknowledge the differences within rather than 
simply the differences between.
(Moore 1993: 204)
Henrietta Moore’s recent work (especially 19946) is oriented towards 
stressing the importance of difference(s). In doing so, she brings closer 
postmodernism and anthropology. Of course, I do not wish to imply that she would 
ever refer to herself as a “postmodern anthropologist.”  ^13 However, as I have shown 
above, critics of postmodernism frequently equate it with poststmcturalism. Where 
feminist authors are concerned, there is sometimes a feeling of solidarity, even when 
the authors disagree. To give one example, Di Leonardo (19916) does not criticize 
Moore by name — even though she criticizes Moore’s whole theoretical approach! 
There are other critics of poststructuralist and postmodern approaches (like Lovibond 
1989) who, while criticizing these approaches, will make sure not to include any 
women as objects of their criticism.
The problem is that for many feminist authors abolishment of the universal 
subject of feminism (the category of “woman”) is something extremely threatening. 
Feminist theory has until quite recently assumed the existence of such a category and 
the existence of universal shared concerns between women. This was achieved with 
an implicit notion of what a “woman” was — primarily through a mere biological 
definition (which was in itself socially constructed [Findlay 1995]!). The universal
313 In fact, she points to some risks involved in the postmodern antluopological production of texts 
(Moore 1994/?, Chapter 6).
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category of “woman” was positioned as a metanarrative that was explaining all the 
other narratives of feminism. A “feminist position” was constructed as a specific site, 
a place where only women could find themselves.
It seems to me that this was like tying one in a chair in front of a mirror. The 
mirror never moved. The chair never moved. The image was stable and constant.
The trouble arose when the person (a “woman,” actually!) wanted to get up from the 
chair, tired and perhaps bored of the same image. What she discovered was other 
rooms (even ones that she could call “a room of her own”), and open spaces. In a 
sense, it is “safer” being in a secure, enclosed space, but it is hard to see anyone 
wanting to be there all the time.
Anthropology by its very definition (as a study of other cultures as well as our 
own) shatters this stable, “safe” image. Ethnographic data provide sufficient material 
for cross-cultural comparisons and clearly provide specific examples of differences. 
The more radical this approach gets, the more it aligns itself with what I call 
postmodern approaches.
In the chapter “The other side of the window: Gender, equality and difference 
in Prespa, Republic of Macedonia,” I have shown how a certain stable image of 
dominant men and subordinate women shows cracks. When more closely examined, 
the situation in Prespa seems to be one where men and women are interdependent 
and actually stand in a relationship of complementarity, not domination and 
subordination. This still does not mean equality, and I do take into account criticism 
of recent Mediterranean studies (especially dealing with the material from Greece) by 
Nadia Seremetakis (1994), who writes:
This model of gender complementarity [as described in the volume 
edited by Loizos and Papataxiaichis 1991, for example] and social 
totality presumes a homeostatic model of a social order to be a base­
line condition from which all social processes originate and to which 
they return. Thus under the model of gender complementarity, acts of 
resistance or self-empowerment by women are role reversals or 
inversions. Such concepts as inversion and reversion always cany
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within them a teleology of return, a swing back to the ‘normal’ 
condition.
(Seremetakis 1994: 109)
I do not wish to present the images from Prespa (based on my observed but 
also lived experiences) as universal, although I try to put them (whenever possible) in 
a wider context, not just in Macedonia, but also within the whole complex of South 
European/Mediterranean cultures. This is not the image of women in Prespa — this 
is just my presentation of it, my own narrative.3^4 At the same time, there are 
specific women’s rituals in Macedonia (like the “blaga rakija” [literally, “sweet 
brandy ” ] — something that very loosely resembles what in Britain and the US is 
called “hen’s party”) about which I do not know anything.
Contemporary feminist discourses in Slovenia^i^ remind me of Eco’s Name o f 
the Rose. What is a rose? Does it actually have a name? Similarly, what is feminism 
in Slovenia? Is it different from feminism elsewhere? While I present the situation in 
Prespa through a deconstruction of a master narrative and the construction of 
hyperreality, in Slovenia, I am more interested in the concept of differences. There 
are also master narratives to be deconstructed (“women as mothers”), but I found the 
differences in approaches between the feminists^i^ and the “others”3i7 really 
fascinating. Both feminism and anthropology were marginalized by the communist 
authorities between 1945 and the late 1980s, and both are trying to reestablish 
themselves now. Some of the most prominent authors of anthropological texts^is in
314 Qf course, it is a narrative whose authenticity I am ready to defend, and it includes statements 
which I can corroborate with specific ethnographic examples.
315 Chapters, “What’s in a name?: Contemporary feminist discourses in the Republic of Slovenia” and 
“Gender, identity and rights: Mothers, fathers and the rest in Slovenia.”
316 Y include here men (for example, employed in the Institute for Humanistic Studies in Ljubljana) as 
well.
317 The majority of population.
318 j ngc this awkward phrase because not all the scholars writing about anthropology are 
antliropologists —  Zavir^ek, for example, is a sociologist.
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mV^ AKDAN IE PISAN PAJCOLAN nA TURNIRJIH - BRK BlAK
VsE TO eiSTA JE RESN/CA.. NAa QNeT jE V es Sv ET
Fig. 3 Illustrations for the different sections of the fourth-grade Slovenian language 
textbook. Note how girls are depicted either crouching or hiding — in any case, 
taking as little space as possible; while boys are the ones having an “active life.” 
AfterBahovec 1996; 111.
Slovenia can be readily described as feminist: Vesna Godina, Darja Zavii^ek, Jana 
Rosker. Others, like Eva Bahovec, are very much engaged in debates about the 
politics of the body and gender representation — all of which ai*e very relevant for 
contemporary anthropology. The same goes for reseai'ch on educational discourses 
—  are “girls” and “boys” really different in the way that they learn and perform at 
school (Dunne and Johnstone 1992; Hacker 1992; for the Slovenian perspective, 
Drglin in Bahovec 1993a; Bahovec 1996) — or are all these just different realities 
that are inscribed on children (by their teachers, environment, curriculum, end so on)? 
The educational discourses are rightly seen by Slovenian feminist scholars as an ai'ea 
where gender biases and streotypes are formed and emphasized. If these stereotypes 
are going to be abolished (as I believe they should), one would have to start with 
children. In all of these areas of research, anthropological insights and feminist 
perspectives are combined.
My research has convinced me that not only is there no single feminist 
perspective in Slovenia — there is not even something that can be labelled “a 
woman’s point of view.” A “feminist perspective” in Slovenia always means a 
specific feminist speaking in a specific place (site) about a certain issue from (her) 
particular perspective. There are multiple voices and multiple representations, the 
sum of which represents specifically Slovenian discourses on g e n d e r . 3 i 9
A postmodern emphasis on “incredulity towards metanarratives” (Lyotard) 
combines well with an insistence on the recognition of differences. Feminist theories 
have founded themselves on a number of “facts” related to gender difference, while at 
the same time trying to prove that their opponents’ “facts” related to gender 
difference are a mere delusion. This presents a problem in accepting postmodern 
approaches; on the one hand, questioning of the “facts” (or specific master narratives) 
would mean questioning the foundations of feminist theories themselves. On the
319 por the problems that Western feminists face when they try to use their generalized concepts in 
non-Western cultural contexts, see Larbalestier 1990 and Cooppan 1994.
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other hand, it would (according to some feminist critics^^O) slip into an absolute 
cognitive relativism, where its own aims (like the abolishment of all forms of 
discrimination based on gender) would be symbolically of equal value as the aims of 
the patriarchally-dominated societies. Questioning of the foundations of feminist 
theories has begun by many Third World or minority scholars and authors (Trin 
Minh-ha, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, bel hooks — to name just a few). The data 
provided by anthropology (Quinn 1977; Moore 1988), as well as calls for a dialogue 
within anthropology (Jennaway 1990; Haraway 1991; Strathern 1991), only furthers 
this erosion of the solid, stable, unmovable foundations of feminism. As far as the 
relativistic danger is concerned, I see both sorts of claims (the ones arguing against 
the discrimination and the ones arguing for its necessity) equal only in their/orm. 
Both type of claims are narratives — and that is as far as any relativism can go! I 
cannot see how narratives justifying any form of oppression can be defended from a 
moral point of view. Any form of oppression and discrimination is just plainly wrong 
— whether one is a postmodernist or not! I am unaware of any example of a 
postmodern thinker arguing for the equality between the oppressed and their 
oppressors — and feminist scholars taking this line of criticism should be able to 
present some if they want to make their point.
“The pressing task for the anthropology of the future” that Moore refers to in 
the quote at the beginning of this section is most easily realized through the 
postmodern anthropology of gender. Or: an anthropology of difference.
I have already outlined above (mostly in the chapter “Postmodernism, 
anthropology and common sense”) some of the misunderstandings regarding 
postmodern approaches.321 In the hall of mirrors where contemporary researchers 
find themselves, it sometimes appears that “Postmodernism” is some ferocious
320 Mascia-Lees, Sharpe and Cohen 1989; Gordon 1993, etc.
321 I have also tried to show how postmodern approaches actually have a long history, and how some 
things (“culture as texts”) criticized for the “postmodernity” in contemporary anthropology, were 
actually present long before this term was in the popular usage.
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monster that is just waiting for the opportunity to destroy them. The idea of 
everything being open to questioning is the one of a world which is unstable and 
constantly changing. It is difficult to accept the world of uncertainties.
Donna Haraway proposes a cyborg as something capable of dealing with 
these uncertainties. In her words, “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” 
(1991: 149). This hybrid also presents “a condensed image of both imagination and 
material reality, the two joined centers structuring any possibility of historical 
transformation. (...) The cyborg is a creature in a post-gender world” (1991: 150). 
This option may encourage one to take advantage of the flux and instabilities in 
boundaries (such as the ones opened up by the new technologies), as well as provide 
for a total abolishment of a biologically-centered matrix of gender and gender 
relations. The concept of the cyborg seems easier to grasp than total absence, total 
potentiality (cf. Bahovec 1995). But I think that it is {essentially) the same thing.
The consequences of not accepting the changes that postmodern approaches 
to gender bring are simply missing the world around us. It would be like staring at 
the same reflection in the mirror, over and over again, without ever wishing to get up 
and see whether there is something different, some new image. The danger is that in 
accepting metanairatives (even when they have been proven false — as much as one 
can prove anything) and ignoring the differences, contemporary anthropologists 
studying gender might find themselves trapped, just as Alice found herself always 
walking back through the door of the Looking Glass House, no matter what part of 
the magic garden she had hoped to reach (Carroll 19926). It is much easier to gain a 
better understanding of the world around us if we accept the inherent instability of 
both “the world” and our own perceptions of it. It will still be possible and desirable 
to produce narratives about this world, but without claims to absolute tmth or 
absolute certainty.
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The “magic gai'den” that Alice tried to reach can be an understanding of 
others (as well as ourselves as others). Again, the work of Butler (1990, 1993, 1995), 
as well as Strathern (1991) and Moore (1988, 19946) opens numerous possibilities 
and viewing perspectives. By accepting some tools provided by postmodern 
approaches, the contemporary anthropology of gender should provide means for the 
elimination of all forms of gender discrimination by pointing out the falseness (and 
actual impossibility) of the master narratives on which discrimination is based. 
Different genders will enter into the anthropologists’ field of vision, as well as new 
symbols of this age of technology, like the self-conscious Tank Girl. I am not quite 
sure how some feminist anthropologists (like Seremetakis 1994) would react to the 
fact that this icon of femininity in the 1990s is a product of (the artwork by) two men 
(Hewlett and Martin 1995; also Boskovic 1995)— but it would definitely add to the 
notion of flux, paradox and instability. And that is what the contemporaiy 
anthropology of gender is all about.
217
Appendix:
Translation of the Slovenian Maternity Leave Law
* This translation is based on Svab 1995: 49-53. She omitted the Article 79, because 
it actually deals with night work and not with maternity leave.
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THE PROTECTION OF MATERNITY 
AND THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS WHO CARE FOR CHILDREN
Article 76
Employed female workers have the right to special protection during 
pregnancy, during the delivery and with regards to maternity.
Types of work which affect health and psycho-physical abilities of women in 
a hai'mful way aie defined by a special law, issued by the Republic [of Slovenia] 
administi'ative agency in charge of health care. Women should not take up these jobs, 
especially during pregnancy.
Article 77
If it is necessary to move a pregnant woman to another work place, she has 
the right to the same salaiy as she would have at the previous work place —  except in 
the case where the salary at the new work place is higher.
Article 78
A female worker with a child aged one to three years can be asked to work 
overtime or during the night only with her previous consent.
Article 80
A female worker has the right to a total of 365 days of the maternity leave and 
child care leave.
A female worker can use this right in a form of paid leave of 105 days before 
the delivery, and after the delivery she has a right to a child care leave of 260 days — 
or she can work pait-time until the child is 17 months old.
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Article 81
A female worker who gives birth to twins or to more children at the same 
time, or to a physically disabled or mentally handicapped child, or to a premature 
child, has longer child care than stated in a second paragraph of the previous article of 
this law.
If a female worker cares for a seriously physically disabled or mentally 
handicapped child, or twins, she is entitled to a paid leave until a child [or children] is 
[are] 15 months old. Regarding care of multiple birth children, a female worker has 
the right to an additional 3 months leave for each further child.
If a female worker takes an option of part-time work, she has the right to do 
so until her physically disabled or mentally handicapped child, or twins, is [are] 23 
months old. For every further child, she has the right to additional 5 months of this 
leave.
If a female worker cares for a premature child, the longer child care leave lasts 
as many more weeks as the pregnancy was shorter than 37 weeks —  in the case of 
full absence from work.
If a female worker takes an option of part-time work, she has the right to use 
longer child care leave for a prematurely born child in such a way that she works 
pai't-time. The exact duration of longer leave in this case is determined when 
considering the number of weeks for which pregnancy was shorter than 37 weeks and 
in accordance to a planned working hours schedule in the female worker’s company 
or employer.
Article 82
The way in which child care leave is used as described in the previous two 
articles, is defined by a special law issued by the Republic [of Slovenia] 
administrative agency in chai'ge of the protection of family, in agreement with the 
Republic [of Slovenia] administrative agency for labor.
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Article 83
A female worker who uses maternity and child care leave in a way described 
in Articles 80 and 81 of this law has the right to a subsidy for salary in accordance 
with the law.
Article 84
A female worker has the right to work part-time until her child is 3 years old 
if a child needs additional cai*e. This is determined by the Republic [of Slovenia] 
administrative agency in chai'ge of health care.
A female worker referred to in the previous paragraph has the right to a salaiy 
according to her actual work and other rights in accordance with the special law.
Article 85
One of the parents who care for a more physically disabled or mentally 
handicapped child has the right to work part-time.
In such a case, a worker has the right to a salary according to his/her actual 
work and other rights in accordance with the special law.
Article 86
The rights from Article 45, the right to child care from Article 80, and the 
rights from the Articles 81, 84 and 85 of this law are exercised by a worker-father of 
the child if there is an agreement with mother-worker. The right from the 
aforementioned articles as well as from Article 78 of this law are also held by a 
worker-father of the child or by the worker who cares for the child in the case of 
mother’s death, if she leaves, or if she is temporaiy or permanently incapable of 
independent life and work — the latter being determined by the competent health 
institution.
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A worker-father of the child or by the worker who cares for the child in the 
case of mother’s death, if she leaves, or if she is temporary or permanently incapable 
of independent life and work — the latter being determined by the competent health 
institution — also has a right to a maternity leave reduced for as many days as used 
up by a mother, but not less than 28 days.
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